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ABSTRACT 
This study provides an analysis of the narrative construction of interiority in the 
Confessions, the Inferno, and the Interior Castle. I take as a starting point a cognitive 
linguistics/evolutionary psychology perspective on 'common sense' or 'folk' dualism 
where the 'self is construed as divided between two entities --such as a 'soul' and a 'body' 
that acts in the world-- that have different roles and relate to each other spatially and 
hierarchically. I contend that this loosely called 'model' resonates with and helps make 
explicit a basic, shared, similarly spatial pattern of the 'self' described by the three texts. 
With this pattern in view, the analysis seeks to reveal the particular way in which 
each of the three texts develops interiority and performs self-understanding. In particular, 
I show that self-understanding is created through the rich description of the protagonists' 
interaction with and development within interior spaces and landscapes. This 'productive' 
development occurs during the narrative 'undoing' of self and the self's language on the 
way to the divine 'within.' Lastly, I suggest that the interior journeys both perform and 
overtly offer parallel lessons on reading itself. 
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Introduction 
Augustine's Confessions, Dante's Inferno, and Teresa of Avila's Interior Castle, 
the three texts this dissertation considers, depict journeys to the divine through interior 
landscapes. Read together, as a collage of pilgrimages 'inward,' they lay out the soul's 
path from the outer reaches of destitution to the center, where God dwells. While they 
reveal richly detailed interior geographies, these interior explorations are occasioned by 
the soul's progressive undoing as it seeks to know itself by coming to know God in 
conversion and prayer. What emerges from examining these travels 'within' is a dynamic 
account of self-understanding as an overcoming of an unproductive reflexivity in relation 
to both the self and the selfs language. This opening of the self-enclosed will so that the 
soul may reach the divine at its center is mirrored in the perspective on reading the texts 
both offer and perform. To be transformative, the act of reading requires a similar 
avoidance of closed-off reflexivity in relation to both self and language. 
The three chapters focused on these individual texts analyze an unfolding and 
undoing of the self, its overcoming of senses and faculties, and of its will, in order to 
prepare for the encounter with the divine. Each chapter argues that the texts, in concert, 
note as well a parallel surrender of language, reduced to silence in the innermost space. 
Journeying towards God, these texts teach, is necessary because knowing oneself is 
contingent upon knowing God. The textual, explicit renderings of the spiritual 
pilgrimages offer depictions of interior spaces as understood with the benefit of the 
transformative experiences of conversion and prayer, experiences that have also 
'redeemed' the very language of the narratives that describes them. In other words, the 
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texts are able to present their own prodigality as well as a restoration of the self and of its 
language. 
In doing so, they teach the reader about the very act of reading. They insist that 
the reader's understanding is mediated by another's intervention, by one who is able to 
create desire for the message and also to ready the reader for the assimilation of that 
message. In consequence, the writer, once the work is completed, can no longer be called 
to answer for the text. These texts explain and demonstrate that the writer's responsibility 
is to use language carefully, to avoid both the risk of elevating it above its message to 
showcase only the writer's skill, and the danger of remaining aloof from its message. 
They show the power of metaphor to transport the reader into the world of the text, yet 
they seek to avoid inordinate delay in its riches so that the reader may advance towards 
the narTative's goal. They serve as guides to the reader's own transformation both in and 
beyond the reading act by capturing the difficult journey of the experience itself and of its 
rendering. They enact the interpretative tension that gives birth to metaphor itself, where 
the first, literal construct has to be overcome for the truly new, the metaphorical, to be 
manifest. 
The readings presented in the text-analysis chapters, especially of the 
understanding of the core dualities that undergird the conception of self and of language, 
rest on a number of theoretical bases. First among these is Gadamer's description of the 
relationship between language and being accounting for the idea of the Incarnation of a 
divine Logos with the aid of an analogy from the verbal sign. Second, the ensuing 
verbum/vox, inner/outer, soul/body, meaning/language dichotomies are juxtaposed with 
the psychologist Paul Bloom's model of common sense dualism. The latter is, finally, 
shown to resonate with a similar dualism from cognitive metaphor theory. Taken 
together, these perspectives on dualism provide a point of access to the interior space 
described in the three works, a roughly hewn map that, rather than prescribe the 
experience of reading, simply assists in the preparation for the journey. However, as the 
discussion on the limits on Lakoffs theory shows, an interpretative practice that avails 
itself of a scientific approach to metaphor must be carefullest it obscure that which it 
seeks to shed light upon. 
The three narratives are connected in several ways. For all three texts, the soul is 
both a space in which the journey happens on vertical and horizontal axes, as well as the 
traveler within that space. They avail themselves of similar spatial metaphors for the 
interior self: in order to find God in the heart, one must travel inward and up, while the 
outside and the down are the places of danger and terror. The outside is full of perils: 
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Augustine faces drowning waves, desolate deserts, dark abysses; Teresa's soul must 
quickly enter the castle to fl ee from vipers and other creatures that wish to enter as well; 
Dante's Inferno painstakingly showcases the increasingly gruesome desperation of the 
ever tightening well of hell. Yet these dangers ultimately serve to discourage the pilgrim 
from lingering and propel him or her as protagonist, towards the divine at the center, or 
atop an interior mountain, destinations all the more striking for their lack of physical 
features, their light-filled mystery. 
Chronicling both its misguided meanderings and its arrival beyond all that is 
transitory, Augustine's Confessions gives a complete view of the soul's carving out its 
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inner landscape. Dante's b~ferno is free of the tentativeness of Augustine's newly 
discovered interior universe. His is an architecturally precise, stepped and ordered 
downward procession, already populated with souls for whom the journey has ended and 
who present the pilgrim with the consequences of stopping along the way, short of the 
divine end. Teresa's focus in the Interior Castle is on the central part of the soul, the 
metaphorical steps to that center being again tremulous, hesitant, her interior castle one 
that is linguistically fragile and that needs to be built again and again by the traveling soul 
in personal acts of prayer. 
In the itinerary towards correcting the will, for Augustine and Teresa, the finite 
and the linguistic must make room for the silent infinite, where for the moment of the 
encounter with the divine, the temptations, the tiredness, the pull of the world falls away, 
the need for language is no longer, and the soul and the divine can really be one. In the 
b1ferno, Dante's descent finds a denser materiality, which impedes communication, and a 
silence that results not from the soul's union with the divine but from hopeless, ice-
encased isolation. The self-renunciation highlighted by Teresa and Augustine (and the 
consequence of not doing so, evident in the Inferno) is counteracted by a positive 
description of the possibilities of their interior selves, mapping out a space that is always 
present, that is always available to walk through, a space that contains the region of 
destitution as well as the inner paradise, the dark abysses as well as the mountain-top. By 
means of the productive undoing they make room for the discovery of the divine in the 
heart; their textual, narrative journeys manifest and sustain that interior life, that inner 
dialectic of unity and multiplicity, speech and silence, finitude and infinitude, 
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Though the texts differ greatly in genre, language, and historical situation, they 
share the aim of instructing and inspiring readers on the way towards God. In his 
Retractationes, Augustine wrote of his trust that the Confessions "excite the human mind 
and affection towards God" so that the effect writing the text had had on him could be 
shared, recreated in its readers. 1 Dante, in his letter to Can Grande della Scala mentions 
the intent of the Commedia: "the aim of the whole and of the part is to remove those 
living in this life from a state of misery, and to bring them to a state of happiness. "2 . 
Teresa admits that her work "has brought me much happiness" and hopes to have offered 
her Sisters "a consolation for you to delight in this interior castle since without 
permission from the prioress you can enter and take a walk through it at any time." 3 
The declared aim of these texts is not merely to inform, but to perform their 
message in order to elicit a genuine transformation in their readers. They do not offer a 
1 Augustine, Retractationes, II.6.1. as paraphrased in Henry Chadwick, 
"Introduction," in Confessions, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1991), xiii; Latin: " ... 
in eum excitant humanum intellectum et affectum. Interim quod ad me attinet, hoc in me 
egerunt cum scriberentur et agunt cum leguntur," Sant'Agostino Opera Omnia, February 
2011, http://www .augustinus.it/latino/ritrattazionilindex2.htm. 
2 Dante,"Epistle to Cangrande," (39) 15. Ed. Ermenegildo Pistelli, Testo critico 
della Societa' Dantesca Italiana; Florence: Societa' Dantesca Italiana, 1960; Latin: "finis 
totius et partis est removere viventes in hac vita de statu miserie et perducere ad statum 
felicitatis." Princeton Dante Project, June 2011, 
http://etcweb.princeton.edu/dante/pdp/epistole.htmL 
3 Teresa of Avila, "Epilogue," Interior Castle trans. Kieran Kavanaugh and Otilio 
Rodgrigues, (Mahwah, NJ: Paulist Press, 1979), 195; Spanish: "me ha dado mucho 
contento." "me parece os sera consuelo deleitaros en este castillo interior, pues sin 
licencia de las superioras podeis entrar y pasearos por el a cualquier hora." Teresa de 
Jesus, Las Moradas, July 2011, 
http://www .mercaba.org/FICHAS/Santos/TdeJ esus/moradas OO.htm.) 
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mere set of prescriptions about steps to conversion or rules of prayer. Instead, they 
propose an adventure, epic in scope, that enacts the perils of the wayward soul; rich 
sensory details lure the reader so she can see, taste, hear, smell, and therefore experience 
the fear, the disorientation, the despair, or the joy together with the protagonists. By 
telling the stories, the narrators themselves claim to relive these moments. This 
performative mediation enacts a perspective on interpretation itself: it trusts that language 
derived from experience can again point, if not also lead to experience. 
As mere messengers, the narrators stop before presuming to trust their own 
experience, and the language derived from it, as being sufficient to affect the readers' 
understanding and subsequent actions. As the narrators themselves have learned and 
enact in their texts, union with the divine remains finally unsaid, undisclosed, even 
though the entire journey makes the encounter its goal. Both the negotiation and the 
event of understanding are understood as being mediated by the interpretative possibility 
of a Logos that is divine-become-human, whereby the open space of understanding 
between the text and the events it points to, on the one hand, and the reader and her re-
creating of that experience on the other, can be bridged. Without the work of the Logos, 
there is no guarantee that the text will express any more then "parrots that are taught to 
speak,4" or that the reader will see beyond the finger to the stars to which it is pointed, as 
Augustine writes.5 
4 Teresa of Avila, "Prologue," Interior Castle, 33. 
5 Augustine, De Doctrina Christiana, "Preface." 
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Leaving the communicative act open in this way is a hermeneutical point derived 
from a theological one; it is a hope in the continued, combined power of language and 
grace that the souls in each of the journeys have already experienced. Neither 
Augustine's traveler, nor Teresa's advancing soul is able to hear the divine call until made 
ready, desire itself being a gift that is given when the will has been tried and healed. 
Understanding, then, can only happen once the reader's own will has been molded and 
shaped and properly oriented, the texts' language serving as the path the reader must 
follow in the hope of achieving her own moment of silent rest in the divine. 
And if the deepest inwardness, the summit beyond 'the summit,' remains hidden 
from sight, if the concreteness of the landscape and the weary toil of the pilgrim lead to 
the effortless, timeless, noiseless occasion where images are silent, if the journey has 
been one of emptying both of self and of selfs language, at the end, transformed, self is 
restored to self, language to language. It is as a result of the mysterious encounter beyond 
self and beyond language that there is a story to tell at all. The journey narrative is itself 
the fruit, the productive performance of the secret of union with the divine. This is how it 
can serve as a voice that is Christological, and as a call to the readers to enflesh the 
metaphors and perform their own pilgrimage. 
The focus on performance is important because conversion or prayer cannot 
happen without the actual pilgrimage. This connection between language and experience, 
expressed step by step in the journeys, can be traced to the description of both creation 
and Incarnation in terms of the divine Word. The inward pilgrimage to the divine 
imagines and describes the discursive as seeking rest in the intuitive, the temporal as 
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reaching towards the eternal. Incarnation offers a way of conceiving language and life as 
deeply and necessarily connected; a word, Gadamer writes, "has a mysterious connection 
with what it 'images'; it belongs to its being."6 The word is not a receptacle filled with 
meaning so that it can reveal something else by a haphazard and temporary connection. 
Rather, the word and its meaning are intrinsically linked, "the ideality of the meaning lies 
in the word itself. It is meaningful already."7 Language and experience seek each other, 
neither preceding the other: "We seek the right word- i.e., the word that really belongs to 
the thing - so that in it the thing comes into language. "8 
This being of language, writes Gadamer, finds its expression in the idea of 
Incarnation which contrasts with Platonic embodiment in the same way the unity of word 
and thing contrasts with the idea of language as arbitrary and instrumental: "Neither the 
idea of the soul nor of God that is connected with embodiment conesponds to the 
Christian idea oflncarnation"9 that, in traditional theology, retains the necessary integrity 
of the person of Jesus. Against the idea that bodies and souls are of absolutely different 
natures, are separable without affecting the soul, that language only arbitrarily and 
unreliably points to reality, the Incarnation distinguishes itself by the act of becoming that 
makes Christ fully human. 
6 Hans Georg Gadamer. Truth and Method, (New York: Continuum, 2002), 416. 
7 Ibid.,417. 
8 Ibid. 
9 Ibid., 418. 
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Given the Gospel of John's presentation of Christ as the Word of God, the idea of 
Trinity has been explored theologically by appealing to the relationship between word 
and thought, which reflects the mysterious unity between the Father and the Son. 
Incarnation frees "the logos from its spirituality," places it in history, and "brings the 
phenomenon of language out of its immersion in the ideality of meaning" and into 
temporal, actual existence, making it "pure event." 10 Since both creation and Incarnation 
are described in terms of the Word, as it is, for example, in the Nicene Creed, "exegesis 
interprets the speaking of the word to be as miraculous as the incarnation of God" where 
"the act of becoming is not the kind of becoming in which something turns into 
something else." 11 
The duality of word and thought becomes more complex as outlined by Aquinas, 
who describes three meanings of the word: the verbum, the "interior concept," 
"the vocal sound itself" and the "imagination of the vocal sound." 12 Since the 
meaningless sound is not a word, what makes it so is its signifying the concept in the 
mind. The spoken word is composed of the "vocal sound itself and the signification of 
the sound." 13 As the interior concept, the word is "the natural movement of the intellect;" 
as the voice, the word is "the messenger of intelligence;" and as the imagined word in the 
10 Ibid., 420. 
II Ibid. 
12 Thomas Aquinas, The Summa Theologica, ed. Anthony C. Pegis (Indianapolis, 
IN: Hackett, 1997), 333: I, 34, i. 
13 Ibid. 
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mind, it is "uttered in the heart." Aquinas points, in addition, to a fourth, pe1formative 
use of the word, "alluding to some deed signified by the word either by way of assertion 
or of command."14 
Aquinas, for the purposes of the analogy between language and Incarnation, 
wishes to restrict the meaning of the verbum to the inward arena, before the act of 
utterance. Of the meanings above, in relation to God, verbum means only as "signifying 
the concept of the intellect," 15 and Aquinas cites Augustine as support of this 
understanding of the word: "Whoever can understand the word, not only before it is 
sounded, but also before thought has clothed it with imaginary sound, can already see 
some likeness of that Word of which it is said: In the beginning was the Word." 16 Yet, 
Aquinas continues, even concept itself proceeds from "the knowledge of the one 
conceiving." 17 Therefore, in relation to God, verbum "signifies something proceeding 
from another" and verbum is used of God "not essentially but personally," a crucial point 
in considering the miracle of Incarnation. 18 
14 Ibid. 
15 Ibid. 
16 Augustine, De Trinitate XV, 10, as quoted in Aquinas, Summa, 333; Latin: 
"quisquis potest intelligere verbum, non solum antequam sonet, verum etiam antequam 
sonorum eius imagines cogitatione involvantur, iam potest videre aliquam verbi illius 
similitudinem, de quo dictum est, in principia erat verbum." "De Trinitatae", The Latin 
Library, April 2012, http://www.thelatinlibrary.com/augustine/trin15.shtrnl. 
17 Aquinas , Summa, 333. 
18 Ibid. 
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As Gadamer sums up, the becoming brought about by Incarnation does not 
diminish its source, does not involve transformation, and does not necessitate separation. 
The "miracle of language" and that which makes it a worthy analogy for Incarnation "lies 
not in the fact that theW ord becomes flesh and emerges in external being, but that that 
which emerges and externalizes itself in utterance is always already a word." 19 Language 
and thought are bound. Yet language that is externalized, or even simply imagined in the 
mind, must contend with the intractability of spoken language, with the different tongues, 
meaning that the verbum "cannot reveal itself through the human tongue in its true 
being. "20 The true verbum is unaffected by the variation of languages, it is pre-linguistic, 
and as such it is "the mirror and the image of the divine Word."21 
The counterpart of the divine Word, then, is the thought before it is at all 
concretized into either an inner or an outer, pronounceable, linguistic word. Actual 
utterance only has being in "revealing" the inner word; but in itself it "is nothing . .. and 
does not seek to be anything. "22 The miracle of Incarnation concerns the inner word, the 
fact that it "is just as con-substantial with thought as is God the Son with God the 
Father, "23 that Christ can both be a personal name, while at the same time being one with 
the Father. Gadamer notes the difficulty in the patristic and Scholastic periods of 
19 Gadamer, Truth, 420. 
20 Ibid. 
2 1 Ibid. 
22 Ibid., 421. 
23 Ibid. 
considering the Word of God mainly in terms of the interior word, without contending 
with the act of communication, with the "handing over of one's own thinking to 
another. "24 
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While verbum, the word, may not be the "event of the utterance," as inner word 
the potential for its being uttered whether internally or outwardly remains; this possibility 
appears to sneak temporality and discursiveness into the conception of the inner word, 
which "still has the ontological character of an event."25 Thinkjng itself, pre-verbal, is 
still a thinking towards utterance, therefore necessitating an ordering that is sequential, a 
"processual element. "26 The inner word, "by expressing thought, images the finiteness of 
our discursive understanding. "27 And if this is the case, an analogy between verbum 
conception and that of Trinity appears flawed, for "Does not the very antithesis between 
intuition and discursiveness get in the way here? What is common to both processes?"28 
How can the two types of verbum, human (and therefore linguistic) and divine have 
anything to do with each other when one is temporal and one not? Gadamer clarifies that 
discursive successiveness of human thought is not merely, fundamentally, temporal; it is, 
at the same time as it accommodates first order successiveness, an underlying and 
unifying mental process that oversees and orders the successions of thoughts: "it knows 
24 Ibid. 
25 Ibid. 422. 
26 Ibid. 
27 Ibid. 
28 Ibid., 423. 
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what it is doing, and knows how to connect that one thing with the next. "29 Therefore, a 
"mental process," an emanation more akin to the image of a fountain where the source is 
not depleted by its "flowing out" is suggestive of the "mental emergence" that 
characterizes both the inner word and the Trinity. 30 
Useful as the analogy is, Gadamer writes, "the mystery of the Trinity, which the 
analogy is supposed to illuminate, must ultimately remain incomprehensible in terms of 
human thought. "3 1 Following Aquinas, Gadamer lays out three differences between "the 
imperfection of human mind" and the divine. First, unlike the Word of God, "human 
word is potential before it is actualized. "32 Second, it follows that human word is unable 
to offer a thorough expression of the mind; it is not "completely present to itself" and it is 
"dispersed into thinking this or that," unable to understand itself fully and all at once. The 
third distinction stems from this lack of immediate self-knowledge where thought "is 
fundamentally incapable of being wholly realized" in any complete sense. 33 
The relationship of contrast between divine unity and human multiplicity that 
emerges when one focuses on the differences between the human word and the Word of 
God may be useful, however, as a dialectic. The event of Incarnation makes room for 
multiplicity as it requires contending with the "essential connection between the unity of 
29 Ibid. 
30 Ibid. 
31 Ibid., 424. 
32 Ibid. 
33 Ibid., 425. 
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the divine Word and its appearance in the church. "34 Performatives were the fourth 
meaning of the verbum in Aquinas's description, and here, performance, the Incarnation's 
quality as event, "cannot be separated from the act of uttering" any more than a 
performative speech act, such as a curse, can. 35 The Word is one, but this Word is 
proclaimed in the Gospel, which is its own event. And this event, though one, is 
"proclaimed ever anew in preaching. "36 In reverse, "the saving message preached in 
every sermon is the crucifixion and resurrection of Christ. "37 
Serving as guides to the journeys in which the soul is to cover the ground from the 
externals inward, the narrators of spiritual pilgrimages contend with the dialectic of 
multiplicity and unity. They each proclaim the singular Incarnation message in their 
individual manner, serving as multiple versions of the unique event. Though the goal is 
to advance towards unity, the texts create, pause at, survey, and vividly retain a detailed, 
ornate region of the multiplicity to be overcome. As they long for the encounter with the 
divine and the rest that is to defy speech and understanding, and as they seek to prepare 
for the encounter by moving beyond the senses, faculties and need for words, they pull 
the reader in with immediate, bold depictions, a saying that undoes the proposed goal of 
unsaymg. 
34 Ibid., 427. 
35 Ibid. 
36 Ibid. 
37 Ibid. 
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The self-description emerging between opposing poles and rooted in the 
mediating hermeneutics of Incarnation has certain features in common in its metaphorical 
expression with so called 'folk' or 'common-sense' conceptions of dualism that emerge 
from studies in cognition. In particular, the resonances regard accounts of the person 
where the body, together with the mind, is involved in temporal, material, and cognitive 
interaction with the world 'outside,' while the seat of identity, sometimes called 'soul,' is 
'inside,' atemporal, unchanging, immaterial, involved in moral and spiritual concerns and 
in states such as love. These accounts of dualism are not presenting metaphysical 
statements about the nature of personhood. Rather, they submit observations taken from 
ordinary language and from the behavior of pre-linguistic infants that appear to suggest a 
dualistic bias in human self-perception, while the cognitive theories themselves have a 
strong materialistic stance. The parallels that I point out are not those between the 
embodied materialism of the theories and the self-conception in the three texts, which are 
deeply at odds. Instead, the similarities I underline are between the 'natural dualism' 
observed by the theories and that apparent in the texts under discussion. 
In his article, "Religion is Natural," the psychologist and cognitive scientist Paul 
Bloom discusses research aimed at understanding the presence of religious universals in 
children's conceptualizations, first among which he mentions common-sense dualism, So 
strong is this sense of dualism that preliminary studies observing the behavior of infants 
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in relation to objects and to people suggest that they may consider humans immaterial 
and do not register surprise when they fail to obey physicallaws.38 
The import of this finding to religion, for Bloom, is that it provides the cognitive 
basis for imagining both body without soul and soul without body, thus making room for 
the idea of a deity without a literal body, as well as that of the afterlife. He re-asserts the 
position developed in his earlier work, Descartes' Baby, that when "we think of bodies 
and souls as distinct; we implicitly endorse a strong substance dualism," one that can be 
traced back to Plato.39 Bloom posits the presence of this dualism as a result of "an 
evolutionary accident"40 brought about by the two different cognitive systems regarding 
b. d 41 o ~ects an persons. 
Humans, he explains in Descartes' Baby, continue to believe that "we use our 
bodies to experience and act on the world, but we ourselves are not physical things. We 
38 In other words, the infants apply appropriate physical principles, particularly 
object permanence, to objects but not to humans. The study Bloom refers to considers 
this difference in expectations, together with the expectations that people and not objects 
are goal-oriented agents, as a suggestion that infants have two modes of constming 
people and objects: humans are construed in terms of social and intentional actions, while 
inanimate objects are interpreted via a system sensitive to object physics. 
Valerie A. Kuhlmeier, Paul Bloom, Karen Wynn, "Do 5-month-old infants see humans as 
material objects?" Cognition 94 (2004), 102. 
39 Paul Bloom, "Religion is Natural," Developmental Science 10:1 (2007), 149. 
40 Additional perspectives on evolutionary psychology and religion with which 
Paul Bloom is in conversation with can be found in Scott Atran, In Gods We Trust: The 
Evolutionary Landscape of Religion, Pascal Boyer, Religion Explained, and Justin 
Barrett, Why Would Anyone Believe in God. 
41 Bloom, "Religion is Natural," 149. 
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are immaterial souls." 42 Describing this phenomenological experience, he highlights that 
humans feel a sense of ownership to their bodies, which in turn is responsible for the use 
of the possessive pronoun in certain languages when speaking both of objects we own, as 
well as of body parts: my pen, my mother, my hand, or my brain. Bloom contends that this 
disposition towards dualism is responsible for human attitudes towards certain types of 
narratives that involve souls traveling between bodies, and exchanging bodies, where 
personhood rests with the soul, and the beliefs that, at death, the soul retains the essence 
of the person. 
The perspective on dualism Bloom espouses appears a simple material/immaterial 
dichotomy. This body-and-soul dualism appears to fail to account for the mind, or the 
brain, or it seems to collapse the distinction by treating the mind as interchangeable with 
the soul. "The Ghost in My Body," an article responding to Bloom, reports on 
experiments exploring this very distinction.43 The authors point to afterlife beliefs that 
mention the soul's or spirit's remaining after death but not the body and the mind, as well 
as to the existence of words for each of the three entities, and set to find out if this 
difference is evident for children already exposed to the notion of soul.44 
42 Paul Bloom, Descartes' Baby: How the Science of Child Development Explains 
What Makes Us Human (New York: Basic, 2005), xii. 
43 Rebekah A. Richert and PaulL. Harris, "The Ghost in My Body: Children's 
Developing Concept of the Soul," Journal of Cognition and Culture 6:3-4 (2006). 411. 
44 Richert and Harris present and discuss an experiment that inquired into whether 
baptism changes the brain, the mind, or the soul. The questions addressed the location of 
the difference, whether inside or outside of the baptismal subject, its visibility, and 
whether the difference can be touched. The majority of children answered, correctly 
given the parameters of the study, that the change was inside, invisible, and it cannot be 
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Overall, the study found that "participants were more likely to say that the soul stays 
the same throughout a person's life, but that the mind and the brain change over time. "45 
As to the question of identity, on average children did not distinguish between mind and 
soul, or brain, but older children overwhelmingly saw the soul as the seat of identity, 
showing the development of these concepts with age. In this respect, "the mind and the 
brain are believed to change, whereas the soul is held to be a constant feature throughout 
a person's life. "46 Finally, the soul appeared to be involved with what the authors call 
spiritual functions, including morality, the sustaining of life both before and after death, 
love, and making contact with God.47 
Even though Paul Bloom does not overtly separate brain, mind, and soul in his 
study of 'common-sense dualism,' Bloom's discussion of children's belief in the afterlife 
touched. They also privileged the soul as the affected part of the person, followed by the 
mind and then the brain. To understand what the children believed was the function of the 
soul, a second experiment inquired "whether babies have brains, minds, and souls; 
whether they change or stay the same; and whether they confer identity," ( 416) as well as 
what the function of each entity may be. Overall, children of various age groups agreed 
babies have all three. Regarding the question of change over time, most children agreed 
that minds and brains change, but the number of children who thought the soul changes 
over time was significantly lower. 
45 Ibid., 417. 
46 1bid., 417-8. 
47 In a third experiment, the Richert and Harris study analyzed the answers to the 
open-ended question of the functions of each item and whether these continue in the 
absence of that item. The answers pointed out that cognitive functions discontinue in the 
absence of mind or brain, but not biological ones. This, however, was not true of the 
soul, which, for the children, did not appear "critical for cognitive, non-cognitive, or 
biological functioning, suggesting that they do not see the soul as being the same as either 
the mind or the brain" (419). 
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shows a more complex distinction between the roles given to the body and the soul in 
folk theories of dualism. As he does apply his and others' findings48 to conversations 
with his own son, he learns that for his son, "the brain didn't do dreaming, it didn't do 
loving his brother, it didn't do pretending to be a kangaroo." Rather, "that's what I do, 
though my brain might help me out. "49 What the brain does do is help with sense 
perception and with "conscious problem solving," thus functioning as what Bloom calls a 
48 A study Bloom refers to, on children's reasoning regarding beliefs in afterlife, 
hypothesized that children would believe first that "psychobiological states" such as 
hunger cease at death; as they become older, they would reason that perceptual states, 
such as seeing would also cease. "Epistemic, desire, and emotional states" require more 
advanced reasoning, and, as the authors note, "such reasoning may be cognitively 
effortful" and even adults were biased against admitting the end of these states after 
death. 
To determine children's perspective, the authors presented them with a scenario 
where, in a puppet theater, a mouse gets eaten by an alligator. Young children were then 
asked questions regarding the endurance of biological functions, such as hunger; young 
and older children were then asked about both biological and psychological functions 
including both cognition, such as the mouse's death awareness, and psychobiology, such 
as whether the mouse is sleepy. Finally, three groups, including adults, were asked a wide 
range of questions that included epistemic states, desire, and emotion. The results of the 
study show that respondents, children as well as adults, "were, overall, more likely to 
state that both biological imperatives and psychological states ceased at death and were 
more likely to report that particular categories of psychological states (i.e., 
psychobiological and perceptual states) ended at death than that others did (I.e., 
emotional, desire, and epistemic states)." 
As this study shows, there is a distinction between perceptually based cognition 
and personhood that echoes the brain/mind and soul distinction, even though Bloom, or 
the studies he brings up, do not use this terminology. 
Jesse Bering and David Bjorklund, "The Natural Emergence of Reasoning About the 
Afterlife as a Developmental Regularity," Developmental Psychology, 40:2 (2004) 218-9; 
228; 
49 Paul Bloom. "Natural-Born Dualists," Edge: Conversations on the Edge of 
Human Knowledge, January 2009, 
http://www.edge.org/3rd culturelbloom04/bloom04 index.html. 
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"cognitive prosthesis. "50 In other words, the distinction made between the properties 
associated with various states suggests that the soul does things that are atemporal and is 
responsible for the creation of states, such as 'love," 'know,' 'like,' while it does not do 
temporal, experiential things involved with sense-perception such as grow, eat, or work; 
it also does not participate in direct problem-solving. The body/soul dualism, then, 
appears to be more adequately a body-brain-mind/soul dualism. Given the interior 
journeys considered in this dissertation, the polarity expressed may be more accurately 
thought of as this latter dualism, where the body with agency is negotiating its 
relationship with the soul, the temporal with the atemporal, the experiential with the 
center of identity. 
A consonant view of dualism emerges from observations in cognitive metaphor 
theory (CMT). This theory of metaphor was first developed by George Lakoff and Mark 
Johnson in their well-known work Metaphors We Live By, and later recapitulated in the 
more recent volume Philosophy in the Flesh. Lakoff and Johnson hold that metaphors 
are primarily conceptual in nature, and that language, namely, everyday language, 
reflects these conceptual metaphors. CMT, therefore, moves away from an 
understanding of metaphor as a literary trope, which maintains its linguistic character as 
preeminent, to that of metaphor as a structural principle of thinking itself, metaphors 
being primarily conceptual in nature: 
Metaphor is for most people a device of the poetic imagination and the 
rhetorical flourish- a matter of extraordinary rather than ordinary 
50 Paul, Bloom. Descartes' Baby. 201 
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language .. . . We have found, on the contrary, that metaphor is pervasive 
in everyday life, not just in language but in thought and action. Our 
ordinary conceptual system, in terms of which we both think and act, is 
fundamentally metaphorical in nature.51 
Philosophy in the Flesh opens with the tenet that, as the mind is inherently 
embodied,"52 the embodiment of reason53 entails its very structure's being shaped by 
human bodily systems. Furthermore, the human way of thinking is at foundation 
universal, 54 since humans share the manner of this embodiment. 55 A pillar of cognitive 
51 George Lakoff and Mark Johnson, Metaphors We Live By (Chicago: University 
of Chicago Press, 1980), 3. 
52 George Lakoff and Mark Johnson, Philosophy in the Flesh (New York: Basic 
Books, 1999), 3. 
53 Ibid., 20, 38. An embodied concept is "a neural structure that is actually part of, 
or makes use of, the sensorimotor system of our brains. Much of the conceptual 
inference is, therefore, sensorimotor inference." While the writers specify that there is no 
direct neurophysiological proof through brain scans that the same "neural mechanisms 
used in perception and movement are also used in abstract reasoning," they do have 
evidence from neural modelings that shows that a neural model designed to execute a 
motor task can execute abstract tasks, showing that "neural structures that can carry out 
sensorimotor functions in the brain can in principle do both jobs at once - the job of 
perception ... and the job of conceptualizing, categorizing and reasoning." 
A recent article, however, has claimed to provide "preliminary proof of concept 
for the conceptual metaphor theory," offering "the first clear evidence for activity in 
functionally localized, domain-specific sensory cortical area during processing 
metaphors." The experiments involved comparisons of response (using "event-related 
fMRI") between sentences using textural metaphors and equivalent (in meaning and 
structure) literal sentences. While the findings indicated no difference in activity in the 
"classical language areas," they showed that "metaphor processing selectively activated 
sensory areas in the modality from which the metaphors primarily derived their 
meaning." Lacey, St., et al. "Metaphorically Feeling: Comprehending Textural Metaphors 
Activates Somatosensory Co1tex," Brain and Language 120:3 (2012), 417-8. 
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metaphor theory regards the presence of primary metaphors that are the building blocks 
for more complex metaphors; these result from bodily experience through conflation, or 
cross-domain mapping, and form more complex metaphors. 56 Primary spatial metaphors 
form the foundation for a hierarchical system of concept categorization, some of which 
are available to consciousness, but many not, underlying learned categories, and being 
supplied by the very nature of our bodies. Spatial metaphors are at work in the 
conceiving of categories as containers with an interior and an exterior, orientational 
metaphors being one of the most basic types of metaphor. These metaphors "organize a 
whole system of concepts with respect to one another" 57 and are characterized by "up-
down, in-out, front-back, on-off, deep-shallow, central-peripheral" relationships. Spatial 
metaphors are also culturally determined and appear differently in different languages. 
54 Ibid., 46. Subjective experience, then, is conceptualized in this system by 
appealing to bodily based sensorimotor domains, with the aid of conceptual metaphors. 
The ties between subjective and physical experience are so strong in young children, 
according to Johnson's theory of conflation, that they have to undergo a process of 
separation later on, disassociating, for example, the feeling of physical warmth from the 
sensation of security or comfort even as the "cross-domain associations persist." 
55 Ibid., 5. Lakoff and Johnson's account wishes to distance itself from the 
Cartesian dualistic perspective of "a mind separate from and independent of the body, 
sharing exactly the same disembodied transcendent reason with everyone else" while 
having access to the mind. Because of its embodiment, the mind cannot access itself 
because "most thought is unconscious." Furthermore, the rootedness of reason in bodily 
system restricts its freedom since "the possible human conceptual systems and the 
possible forms of reason are limited." 
56 In addition, neural connections are posited that sustain the connections made 
through conflation, leaving primary metaphors represented in the brain through neural 
mappings. Finally, through blending, new metaphors may arise by simultaneous 
activation of conceptual domains. 
57 Ibid., 46. 
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However, for most western languages, 'up,' for example, is correlated with wellness, 
whether physical, financial, or emotional. 
Concepts related to spatial relationships are "at the heart of our conceptual 
system," enabling us to understand space itself and our relationships with objects in 
space, building unconscious scenarios to contribute to understanding. 58 They necessitate 
the creation of a three-dimensional container with boundaries, to make sense of as simple 
a thought as 'a butterfly is in the garden,' while at the same time positioning the object 
inside the imagined container. Similarly, the movement of an object in space, what 
Lakoff and Johnson call The Source-Path-Goal Schema, incorporates the mover, 
beginning location, projected destination, the known route, the actual path from source to 
aim, the position and direction of the traveler, and the final location of the mover. Spatial 
reasoning employing both types of basic metaphors assist, for the purposes of this study, 
in creating an image of the interior life as spatial, and of the traveler as progressing 
through this space. 
An example of primary metaphor that takes advantage of the spatial schema and 
is relevant to considering spiritual journeys and the interior landscape as representative of 
a state, is 'States are Locations,' as in the following example, from the Confessions, "I had 
come into the depth of the sea (Ps. 67:23). I had no confidence, and had lost hope that 
truth could be found. "59 The subjective experience corresponds to a subjective state, lack 
of confidence; the physical correlate experience corresponds to being in a physical 
58 Ibid., 30. 
59 Augustine, Confessions, trans. Henry Chadwick (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 1991), 91: VI, 1. 
24 
location, bottom of the sea. Another primary metaphor, this time related to movement 
through space, is 'Change is motion,' where the experience of a state-change correlates to 
the physical experience of advancing in space.60 Dante's Convivio describes the example 
of Augustine's life, in the Confessions, as having "proceeded from bad to good, good to 
better, and better to best. "61 
Conceptual systems underlying ordinary language can be gleaned, then, from 
ordinary speech: for example, talking about ourselves as if observing a struggle between 
adversaries, searching for our true self, distinguishing between an inner and an outer self. 
The 'self,' for CMT, is an example of metaphorical conception "rooted deep in our 
unconscious conceptual systems" where "the hidden hand of the unconscious conceptual 
system . . . makes such reasoning 'common sense. "62 Lakoff brings the spatial 
character of metaphors in dialogue with the notions of dualism and the self to the 
forefront in his 1996 article entitled "Sorry I'm not Myself Today." He considers the 
conception of the self that emerges from studying everyday speech and finds that "most 
accounts of our inner life are oversimplified. The Cartesian mind/body dualism is too 
simple-minded." 63 Instead, he offers that the self is often thought of as being made of 
60 Lakoff, Philosophy, 52. 
61 Dante, Convivio, trans. Richard Lansing, 1998, 
http:/ I dante. il t.co I umb ia.edulbooks/ con vi vi/con vi vio .html. 
62 lbid., 14 
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two different parts, the 'Subject' and the 'Self' ,64 which "conceptualizes a person as 
bifurcated."65 The Subject is the locus of subjective experience, emotion, will, and 
reasoning principles, of the 'essence' of the person, and it is usually thought of spatially as 
being 'inside.' The Self,' on the other hand, is associated with physical characteristics, 
with acting in the world, and is thought of as being 'outside.' The spatial relationships 
between the two components of the self are that the Subject is contained by the Self, the 
Subject is above the Self, or that the Subject is in 'possession of the Self.66 
Before setting off to consider individual metaphors, Lakoff makes a few 
additional general remarks that continue to situate the metaphorical system into more 
basic metaphorical terms. First, he stresses that the 'inner life' is thought of "in terms of 
physical relationships between two or more individuals."67 Other recurrent themes found 
in analyzing metaphors of the self, themes that determine linguistic usage and social 
understanding are" 
(i) normal functioning is nonselfsconscious and controlled, with no internal 
incompatibilities; (ii) in normal functioning, the Subject and the Self are in a 
63 George Lakoff, "Sorry I'm Not Myself Today," in Spaces, Worlds, and 
Grammar, ed. Gilles Fauconnier and Eve Sweetser (Chicago, IL: University of Chicago 
Press, 1996), 101. 
64 I am following the article's notation, where the two components of the self in 
the model are capitalized and where 'Self is used technically to refer to the part of the self 
that acts in the world. 
65 Lakoff, Philosophy, 269. 
66 Ibid. 
67 Lakoff, "Sorry, I'm Not Myself" 101. 
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canonical spatial configuration with the Subject exerting force over the Self; (iii) the 
canonical spatial positions all have the Subject located in the same region of space as 
the Self and (iv) the canonical configurations are either Subject inside Self, Subject 
directly above Self, or Subject in possession of Self. 68 
Lakoff's model of Subject and Self echoes, in the assignation of properties 
between the two components, the distinctions apparent in Paul Bloom's perspective on 
dualism, and anchors the expression of this dualism in the metaphorical use of language 
arising out of the conceptual metaphors based on physical experience. Philosophy in the 
Flesh reconsiders the Self Subject distinction and makes certain clarifications. They 
stress that this model is significant not because it expresses scientific knowledge about 
68 Ibid., 100. To uncover the structure of Self and Subject from language use, 
Lakoff looks to counterfactuals of the type 'If I were you' as evidence. The structure of 
these counterfactuals follow the form 'If NPl were NP2, NP3 would VP;' NP stands for 
noun phrase, which can be composed of either nouns and their determiners or pronouns, 
and VP stands for verb phrases which can be formed of predicates and adjoining 
adverbial or prepositional phrases. According to Lakoff's theory, NP3 and NPl are 
coreferential, as in 'If I (NPl) were you (NP2), I (NP3) ... ' and each NP refers to an 
entity that has a Subject and a Self. The Subject of the first T or NPl and the Subject of 
the second 'I' or NP3 are counterparts; however, the Self of NP3 becomes a counterpart 
of the Self of the 'you' or NP2. Thus, NP3 stands for a hypothetical situation where the 
Subject of the 'I' has taken control of the Self of the 'you.' For Lakoff this sentence 
dynamic is proof that "the antecedent-anaphor relationship indicates not full person 
identity, but rather Subject identity between NP3 and NP1."(95). In sentences such as 
these, "the occurrence of were linking NPl and NP2 is not a simple predication of 
identity. It is rather an instruction to form a hypothetical person by uniting NPl 's 
'subject' with NP2's self' (96). He also presents certain 'constraints' regarding the well-
formed quality of counterfactuals. In a sentence of type 'If I were you I'd ... ' the second 
'I' cannot be in an anaphoric relationship with the 'you,' or it cannot 'refer' to it. In other 
words, to use Lakoff example, a sentence such as 'If I were you, you 'd get upstairs this 
second!' sounds odd because it violates this constraint (96). A second constraint is that 
the verb phrase, VP, "must predicate Subject properties, not Self properties"(96). In other 
words, the VP will predicate matters concerning will, judgment, reason, and not physical 
traits or social conditions. Therefore, an example such as "If I were you, I would be short 
and named George" violates this rule since the VP ' would be short and named George' 
assigns properties to the Self rather than the Subject. 
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the mind's actual workings; rather, it contradicts what is known, yet it is consistent: "we 
all grow up with a view of our inner lives that is mostly unconscious, used every day ... 
in our self-understanding, and yet both internally inconsistent and incompatible with what 
we have learned from the scientific study of the mind. "69 The authors warn against 
reifying the distinction of Subject and Self as it manifests differently in different 
metaphors, though neither is it arbitrary. What is consistent is the conception of the 
Subject as "being person-like, with an existence independent of the Self."70 
Lakoff and Bloom's perspectives on dualism as Subject/Self or soul/mind-brain-
body serve to shed light on the metaphor of life as a journey, where this complex dualism 
can be seen at work in the travels of the pilgrim towards aligning itself and becoming one 
with its inner essence. Yet the difficulty with cognitive metaphor theory is that, while 
fighting against what they consider the positivism of analytical philosophy, or that of 
Chomskyan generative grammar, it seems to have replaced the propositional content, or 
the innate language module with a similarly sterile conceptual metaphor content. This 
isn't to deny the usefulness of the model. Instead, it is to deny its explanatory power to 
apply to all aspects of the creation of meaning. CMT doesn't account for the impact of 
sheer novelty of sense. It doesn't answer to the event side of discourse, and it is not 
equipped to allow the creative aliveness to exist as such. In order for it to contend with a 
poetic line, they must translate it down, must peel back its poetic defiance, to find the 
underlying structure of metaphorical support. The issue isn't whether indeed poetic 
69 Lakoff, Philosophy, 268. 
70 Ibid. 
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metaphor can be traced back to embodied metaphors; the concern is that by doing so, the 
theory runs the risk of ignoring that which it seeks to explain. The danger is, as Ricoeur 
has remarked in response to the psychology-oriented hermeneutics of Schleiermacher and 
Dilthey, that "the counterpart of a hermeneutical theory founded upon psychology is that 
psychology remains its final justification" since the text can then "only be a provisional 
and superficial phenomenon. "71 
In his article "Live Metaphor in the Age of Cognitivist Reduction,"72 Max 
Statkiewicz accuses CMT itself of positivist inclinations,73 while offering instead Paul 
Ricoeur's theory of metaphor, which distinguishes between ordinary-language and 
literary metaphor and focuses on preserving the mystery and novelty of literary metaphor. 
Statkiewicz takes issue with CMT's collapsing of the distinctions between literary and 
ordinary language and asserts that really it is CMT's work that "exacerbates it and makes 
it manifest." 74 He points to the conflict at the core of CMT between its attempts at, on the 
one hand pinning metaphor down for scientific study, and on the other maintaining its 
character as 'alive.' The rejection of the special character of literary metaphors presses 
7 1 Paul Ricoeur, "The Task of Hermeneutics." Philosophy Today 17 (1973): 112-
124. 
72 Max Statkiewicz, "Live Metaphor in the Age of Cognitivist Reduction," 
Monatshejte, 95:4 (2003) . 
73 To clarify, Statkiewicz refers to positivism in general, as in the scientific 
method, not to the linguistic positivism of analytical philosophy, which Lakoff and 
Johnson argue against. 
74 Ibid., 548. 
them down into ordinarily available forms, taking away their vitality. While Ricoeur is 
able to retain the 'enigma' of the literary, all Lakoff can do is 'explain it away.' Lakoff, 
contends the criticism, focuses on issuing "ideological commonplaces" and makes 
"exorbitant claim[s] to govern the humanities"75 leading to "the affirmation of the 
universality of patterns of thought, of ideas and conceptual metaphors. "76 
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Statkiewicz notes that "without a radical distinction between banal and 'novel' 
metaphors, the latter could never transcend the ideology of ordinary language. "77 The 
ubiquity of ordinary language metaphor also leaves it prosaic, fixed in the pages of 
dictionary from which it isn't able to create new meanings. When Lakoff finds the 
everyday metaphorical expressions in the dictionary, though, he thinks them alive, "in the 
most fundamental sense: they are metaphors we live by. The fact that they are 
conventionally fixed within the lexicon of English makes them no less alive."78 On the 
other hand Ricoeur suggests that the metaphorical meaning of a word cannot be 
discovered in the dictionary; instead, "the literal sense is the one that is lexicalized. "79 It 
is the semantic impertinence of literary metaphors and "their potential function of 
redescribing reality" that makes them alive, while the dead metaphor, "a lexically defined 
7s Tbid., 549. 
76 Ibid., 550. 
77 Statkiewicz, "Live Metaphor," 550. 
78 Lakoff, Metaphors, 55. 
79 Ricoeur, Rule, 291. 
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expression, even a polysemic one, doesn't have such potential. "80 Yet he acknowledges 
dead metaphors have power through their ability to disappear as "usual, ordinary familiar, 
conventionally accepted,"81 and literalized metaphors. 
While literary metaphors resist the classification efforts of empirical search, 
dead ones do not. Statkiewicz points to the problem of decontextualization, of "tearing 
figures and tropes out of their setting82" be it 'sentence' or 'discourse,' where metaphor, 
according to Ricoeur, fully resides, and where the production of new meaning emerges 
from the conflict of the literal and the metaphorical interpretation manifested as the 
interplay between the singularity of identification and the universality of predication. 83 
The source/domain 'invariance' principle of CMT facilitates 'the lexicalization of 
metaphor' torn away from its setting. Ricoeur finds the focus on context in Aristotle's 
Poetics where "metaphor receives is full meaning only within the framework of the entire 
poem,"84 even though Ricoeur moves away from the latter's metaphor theory as 
substitution85 and towards a theory of tension, or "impertinent predication, "86 that reflects 
80 Statkiewicz, "Live Metaphor," 551. 
81 Ibid. 
82 Ibid., 552. 
83 Ricoeur, "Metaphor and the semantics of discourse,'' Rule of Metaphor, 70-72. 
84 Ibid., 553. 
85 It should be noted that Ricoeur does not discard the theory of substitution: "let 
us establish now that the real definition of metaphor in terms of statement cannot 
obliterate its nominal definition in terms of word or name, because the word remains the 
locus of the effect of metaphorical meaning ... this is why Aristotle's definition is not 
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metaphor's place in its context and its work of innovation. The sentence, as Ricoeur 
learns from the linguist Emile Benveniste, is "an undefined creation of limitless variety, 
is the very life of human speech in action," as language begins in discourse, and is 
actualized in sentences. 87 
In active meaning creation, "this element of tension ... must be emphasized in 
view of the cognitivists' rejection of the interaction theory and their radically opposing 
view: that of the smooth and effortless use of metaphors, including the so-called novel 
ones. "88 Ricoeur stresses the novel aspect of metaphors, their ability to create new 
meaning, "to recognize it for what it is, namely, a creation of language that comes to be at 
that moment, a semantic innovation without status in the language as something already 
established with respect to either designation or connotation"89 And this work must be 
enacted by both reader and writer: "recognition of the creative work of the reader that 
corresponds to that of the writer should necessarily accompany this view of metaphor"90 
especially since, as Ricoeur states, "metaphor does not exist in itself, but in and through 
an interpretation."91 Without taking into account the creative, innovative act of metaphor, 
abolished ... the word remains the focus even while it requires the frame of the 
sentence." Rule, 66. 
86 Ricoeur, Rule, 66. 
87 Benveniste, Problemes de linguistique generate, 130. As quoted in Statkiewicz, 
554. 
88 Statkiewicz, 555. 
89 Ricoeur, Rule, 98. 
90 Statkiewicz, 555. 
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if one continues to "bind the creative process of metaphor to a non-creative aspect of 
language" the "interaction theory of metaphor is lost" and metaphor is 'dead' and "closer 
to a concept than to a genuine live metaphor. "92 Yet Statkiewicz admits that there is a 
place for work such as the CMT proposes, as long as it does not overreach: "an analysis 
of commonplaces and connotations [including such as the cognitivists have] must remain 
a preparatory stage for the actual explanation and understanding, culminating in "the 
construction of the network of interaction that causes a certain context to be one that is 
real and unique.'"93 
It would be mechanistic to attempt to read a literary text only in light of such a 
limited model as derived from these cognitive accounts of dualistic bias. Indeed, it may 
appear reductionist. But recognizing an ordinary underlying phenomenology at work in 
the text, both in the presentation of the self and in imagining one's development as a 
journey, provides a foundation for the timeless accessibility of the texts, for the task of 
interpretation. It offers a perspective on why the pilgrims' map appears so readily 
understandable, but is not itself the journey. Understanding the embodied grooves upon 
which the experience that creates language partially rests can be clarifying and 
preparative for reading. As the practice of reading shows, and as the peiformance of the 
texts itself conveys, the aliveness of the metaphor is not endangered by the reader's 
having gleaned the outlines of a map beforehand. A model of conceptual metaphor does 
91 Ricoeur, Interpretation Theory, (Fort Worth, Texas Christian UP, 1976), 50. 
92 Statkiewicz, 555. 
93 Ibid. 
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not supply and populate the interior world of these texts; nor does it provide the quiet of 
the garden, the dark abyss of hell, or the transparence of the interior diamond. Those 
things, the readers will discover, will perform, incarnating the metaphors as they read, 
and understanding their own interior world more richly. No cognitive model can offer 
the transformational power of the metaphor, the moment of crossing over into 
imaginative space, which, like the encounter with the divine, is personal, take place in 
secret, and leaves one's perspective changed. 
The chapter on Augustine's Confessions discusses the construction of an 
interior space through which the pilgrim travels from the externals inward and then up 
towards the divine in the heart. As Charles Taylor argues, Augustine inherits a Platonic 
body and soul dualism that he transforms into an inner/outer dichotomy to contend with 
the Christian God who dwells inwardly. As God is in the hemt, and Ideas become 
thoughts in the mind of God, externals lose their preeminence. God's being the sustainer 
of the very act of knowing prompts the seeking person towards inwardness as well as to 
the individuality characteristic of knowing. In connection to knowledge, Augustine also 
augments the inherited notion of the will with the capacity of choosing between its 
inclinations, good or evil, and its need for redemptive restoration so as to act in 
concordance with its knowledge. The will lacks the resources to perceive itself without 
the completion of the journey inward to God, remaining lost in the sensible until, as the 
Confessions shows, it hears the divine call, and it reorients itself accordingly. 
Augustine's inner I outer dualism is represented in his treatment of language as 
well, especially given the Biblical analogy of Christ as verbum. That chapter's discussion 
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on language focuses first on Augustine's inherited hesitation regarding the 
epistemological possibilities of language and the need to reconcile this position with 
divine revelation through both Christ and Scripture. Plato's Cratylus portrays the unease 
regarding the connection between knowledge and language, as the dialogue frustrates the 
hopes for a solution and instead rejects the two equally difficult possibilities that 
language is neither purely arbitrary in its connecting names and things, nor does it 
directly embody the reality of things. This skepticism regarding language can further be 
seen in Plotinus, for whom discursiveness is an obstacle from achieving union with the 
divine, keeping the soul immersed in multiplicity, and always failing in describing God. 
Another inheritance Augustine receives is a theory of signs that is not focused on 
words but on inference. He will develop a view of signs as primarily verbal and a theory 
of language, theologically inflected, as a system of signs. The sign, as developed in 
various works, consists of verbum and vox, pre-verbal meaning and articulated word. 
Verbum, the equivalent of Christ, is atemporal and precedes vox, even as vox is perceived 
first in a speaking context. Cognitively, vmrcls themselves are not able to impart 
knowledge but can aiel in its recalling, once knowledge is already facilitated by the work 
of Christ. What signs are able to point to, through their structure, is Incarnation itself: 
even as thought isn't diminished in its speaking, neither is Christ by becoming human. 
While Augustine, like Plotinus, imposes limits on the ability of language to speak of God, 
he sees its possibilities not only in providing an analogy for Incarnation, but for 
describing the way to God. 
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With this foundation in mind, the chapter's main section provides a thematic 
reading of the Confessions, chronicling the travel from the externals inward and 
following the traveler's changing reliance on both self and language in relation to the 
multi-staged conversion. As Augustine pursues youthful pleasure and rhetorical skill, 
both these sets of temptations are described as violent natural forces that keep the soul 
away from God and down, in a dark abyss. Slight change begins with Cicero, a fledgling 
focus to an inwardness barely gleaned, followed by a first encounter with Scripture, an 
encounter that shows he isn't yet ready to achieve understanding. Yet now, his 
wanderings away from an interior not yet known to him benefit from a Biblical allusion, 
that of the prodigal son consuming the Manichean husks. As the will attempts to choose 
well, Augustine shows that, on its own, it cannot. Progress is elusive, the traveler still 
oriented away from the center, towards the externals, unable to find rest, though not 
hidden from God. 
A pivotal moment of grief leads to the protagonist's imagining interiority through 
the despair at its absence. Meeting Ambrose begins to open the Scripture and brings the 
soul closer to the center though without its full understanding. The soul wishing to find 
truth confronts, still, its outward temptations. But the soul's insight is increasing and, 
with the book of the Platonists, it begins to understand it isn't able to heal itself. His own 
interior becomes present and accessible, if the will is still weak in choosing well and the 
protagonist has not yet encountered Christ. The struggle of the will continues until, in the 
garden scene, the storms of his soul subside and he orients himself and directs his speech 
fully towards God. Finally, at the culminating moment at Ostia, while uplifted high in his 
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own inwardness, Augustine, in the company of Monica, experiences a moment of divine 
union where true understanding is made possible beyond both self and language. 
If Augustine's Confessions presents a newly discovered interior whose general 
shape is suggested but not developed fully, Dante's b~ferno showcases a bold, stable, 
highly organized vision of the early stages of the soul's travel where the will is 
misdirected and the consequences of its mistakes increasingly the fruit of intention, loom 
on each tightening tier. As this chapter addresses the expression of virtue as the action of 
will, it outlines Aristotelian virtue in relation to habit as well as proper choice, connecting 
act with intention and finally knowledge. 
Not only has the will been marked by the fall from Eden , but, as the following 
section describes, so has language. Dante's De Vulgari Eloquentia presents his account 
of the origin of language, its confusion at Babel, and the role of the poet in elevating 
language with the aid of the divine Word. He also discusses the role of language in 
human interaction, where direct sharing of thoughts is impeded by the dense, material 
body. The verbal sign arises as an appropriate combination of natures, perceptual and 
rational, to allow for communication, in a similar manner as Augustine's theory of signs. 
Furthermore, the poet must use language virtuously in his purpose of pointing the 
audience to God. Dante's focus on virtue connects language and will; in the Inferno, they 
often spiral towards their annihilation. 
The following, main portion of the chapter presents the unfolding of this 
downward trajectory. This section follows the turning, the unwinding of the pilgrim's 
will as it interacts with the landscape, while showing in parallel the difficult, mediating 
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role of the narrator. First, it focuses on the decision to undergo the journey at all, the 
acquiescence to take on the burden of both the journey and of its iteration. Once on the 
journey, it highlights the descent with special attention given to the pilgrim's interaction 
with the tableaux he comes upon, in which he participates and from which he remains 
separate. From gate to gate, towards deeper awareness of wrongdoing, from the lustful 
all the way to the "submerged" and to Satan himself, the pilgrim has witnessed the end of 
will in frozen inaction, and the end of language in isolated, hopeless silence. It is from 
this place of utter, eternal, isolation that he can emerge, humbled, with a new 
understanding of virtue, even as the narrator presents the reader with a performance of 
vittuous language-use, and a lesson on reading virtuously. 
Lastly, Teresa's Interior Castle features the opposite end of the interior 
exploration, where the soul progressively overcomes, negates itself, and where language 
dissolves so that the union, which allows the soul to know itself, can return the soul to 
itself so that it may practice the will of God. This chapter highlights the two-directional 
communication between the human being and God, showing the stages of the soul from 
its embeddedness in externals, which block it from hear-ing God's voice, to hearing it 
without being able to respond, to the sleep that allows for God to speak to the soul first, 
until, transformed, the soul can communicate with God. 
In addition, the discussion of the Interior Castle highlights the coexistence of an 
overall hesitance regarding the ability of language, particularly Teresa's own language, to 
describe the soul's progress with an abundance of startling metaphors. These are at once 
vivid, gripping, and surprising, while also elusive, fleeting, resisting stability. Teresa's 
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account manifests, through the metaphorical chain that moves the narrative, her solution 
to the problem of the inadequacy of language. She doesn't go against her statement in a 
seemingly contradictory manner where her skill and figurative agility show off her stated 
discomfort. Instead, the language she does use shows how it is possible to practice a 
linguistic humility by having each metaphorical step dissolve once it has served to carry 
the reader fo1th, avoiding reification or focus on the stability of her figures of speech. 
This way, she makes sure the reader herself will not be detained in the externals, but will 
be propelled by the images inward, to where they are not needed. 
This is the lesscm, in fact, that all three texts teach. Their renderings of the 
journey inward serve to advance the reader further in, to offer a temporary footrest from 
one circle, one stage, one mansion to the other. They do not fail in definitively 
describing the road to the divine, or the arrival at their destination, because that is not the 
ultimate goal. Their language must release the reader back into the world upon her 
having followed the steps of these spiritual exercises, where the pleasing, the terrifying, 
the soothing have met their purpose but must not hold the reader captive. The language 
of the texts must point beyond itself. By offering a guide to the inner way towards the 
divine in the heart, the texts present an interpretation theory that relies on the ability of 
language to point beyond language, that both elevates it and keeps it in check. Gadamer 
writes that interpretation should point away from itself, should not eclipse the text it 
interprets or pe1forms. These texts, in interpreting the message of Incarnation, do just 
that. They manage to attract attention to themselves in as much as they point to the work 
they interpret. And in this process, they do not claim they can fully bridge the gap, fully 
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translate, fully retell. They lure in order to release, trusting in the power of the original, 
and of experience, to create a miracle in the reader. 
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Augustine's Confessions 
To begin reading Augustine's Confessions is to be drawn into a feverish quest for 
understanding: he seeks to discover who he is, who God is, and how his own efforts at 
speaking to and of the divine may achieve their hope. The Confessions is an exploration 
into language and into inwardness, where by clarifying his relationship with the divine, 
Augustine seeks to ensure his very existence. It is a prayer that leads to the unraveling 
realization that Augustine both means to say and means God: he comes to know a truth 
that he had so fervidly pursued in all his searching, whether in conversation with 
philosophers, astrologers, poets, or the professionally religious. This discovery is evident 
both in his discussion of himself and in his discussion of language. He can only know 
himself by finding the immutable, eternal Truth, and then by positioning himself against 
it, at first distancing and then tethering himself to this center untouched by time and 
hidden from space, a center that he, very much in the throes of living and dying here and 
now, can claim as his own very meaning. 
Augustine will consider this anchoring to Truth by ove1tly exploring his own 
inner space and the distance between this self and the divine, as well as by setting and 
describing language in relation to and often in opposition to the divine and to divine 
communication. A rich and complex picture of self-and-language inte1twined results; the 
journey occasioned by this pressing pilgrimage is not only an occasion for self-
understanding but also one of the discovery of a self to understand at all. 
A thematic reading of the Cm~fessions showcases language and self portrayed as 
containing variedly termed dichotomjes between inner and outer features. Both language, 
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once sanctified, and soul, once saved, point inward towards the divine where they 
converge. Word, fiction, rhetoric, lie, must give way to meaning, reality, salvation, and 
truth. In the same way, body, ambition, time, space, multiplicity must be overcome 
towards the selfless and timeless unity of the divine. Augustine is first responsible in the 
West for privileging an inside/outside dichotomy in terms of self and in terms of 
language by transforming his philosophical inheritance so that it can accommodate the 
Christian God dwelling in the heart. The Confessions showcases this spatial, interior 
exploration. 
Having inherited a notion of body and soul from Plato, Augustine transforms it by 
focusing on the distinction between inside/outside, made more pertinent philosophically 
when God is in the heart. Though it may be tempting to equate the body/soul distinction 
with the inside/outside binary, Charles Taylor warns that they must be kept distinct. The 
difference lies in the idea of the Good versus that of God. By remembering to 
contemplate the Good, "reason reaches its fullness in the vision of the larger order" 
meaning that it is outwardly oriented ultimately: "the moral sources we accede to by 
reason are not within us." 1 Whether "outside us, in the Good" or whether reason's ascent 
can be considered to "take[s] place in the 'space' between us and this order of good," the 
fulfillment of reason can no longer "be described as something that takes place in us, but 
rather better as our connecting up to the larger order in which we are placed. "2 According 
1 Charles Taylor, Sources of the Self (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 
1989), 123. 
2 Ibid. 
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to Taylor, for Plato what mattered wasn't the inwardness of the soul but instead its 
orientation: "Not what happens within it but where it is facing in the metaphysical 
landscape is what matters. ,.J The inside/outside opposition tends to "obscure" this 
distinction. 
While for Augustine "the Christian opposition between spirit and flesh was to be 
understood with the aid of the Platonic distinction between the bodily and the non-
bodily,"4 the essential move to distinguish the new model is that the Ideas become 
thoughts in the mind of God, thus doing away with the preeminence of the externals, 
even as the external world is a manifestation of the Ideas. They being thoughts of God 
and God's dwelling inward calls the soul to remember5 to choose between the directions 
it will face. For Augustine, "the road from the lower to the higher, the crucial shift in 
direction, passes through our attending to ourselves as inner. "6 And unlike Plato's 
understanding of objects in the world as proof of the organizing abilities of Ideas, "our 
principal route to God is not through the object domain but 'in' ourselves," God being 
"the basic support and underlying principle of our knowing activity. "7 
3 Ibid., 124. 
4 Ibid., 127. 
5 Robert Miner, in "Augustinian Recollection" argues for an augmented view of 
"anamnesis." Instead of displacing recollection, divine "illumination" functions as a 
"prerequisite" for it. Augustinian Studies 38, no. 2 (2007): 435-450. 
6 Ibid., 129. 
7 Ibid. 
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As the Confessions makes clear again and again, "God is not just what we long to 
see, but what powers the eye which sees. "8 And this turn is also a turn towards 
individuality, since "in contrast to the domain of objects which is public and common, the 
activity of knowing is particularized, each of us engaged in our own. To look towards 
this activity is to look to the self, to take up a reflexive stance,"9 an inward gazing that, 
for Taylor, was "a turn to radical reflexivity." 10 Taylor clarifies that not all attention to 
oneself is 'radical;' it is only when this attention is on the self "as the agent of 
experience," which then becomes the 'object' of knowing, that reflexivity becomes 
radical. 
Such a turn to the first person perspective, is, for Taylor, "what made the 
language of inwardness irresistible" for Augustine. Inward lies the road to the divine, 
"the truth dwells within, ... , and God is the truth." 11 Augustine's inward turn relates to 
his inference that God is above reason, and that God "is criteria! for it." 12 Inwardness 
assists in proving that God exists: Because the knower knows his own existence, he can 
be said to know something. He is certain of his "self-presence" and Taylor writes that 
"Augustine was the first to make the first-person standpoint fundamental to our search for 
8 Ibid. 
9 lbid., 130. 
10 Ibid., 131. 
II Ibid., 132. 
12 lbid. 
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the truth."13 What the knower knows is three-fold, living, existing, and having 
intelligence, listed in order of importance, with reason, intelligence, being superior. 
Therefore, "nothing is superior to reason in human nature." 14 
Augustine, like Plato, distinguishes between reason's objects of knowledge, 
"common objects," available to all to know, and "higher common objects" such as "truth 
of numbers and wisdom." 15 Yet Augustine appeals to a series ofrecognized absolutes that 
leads him to conclude that truth is not up for debate but is the foundational of reason, as 
"we can by no means judge about the truth itself."16 This Truth is God, and by appealing 
to inwardness, Augustine takes us upward to that which is superior to reason and that 
which grounds reason. First person stance is how he achieves this. For Taylor, 
Augustine's effort at establishing this common ground above reason was due to "his 
concern ... to show that God is to be found not just in the world but also and more 
importantly at the very foundations of the person ... God is to be found in the intimacy 
of self-presence." 17 God orders and establishes the principles of our external world and 
13 Ibid., 133. 
14 Ibid. 
15 Ibid. 
16 Augustine, The Problem of Free Choice, trans. D.M. Pontifex (Westminster, 
MD: Newman Press, 1955), Bk. Il.12.34, 115. 
17 Taylor, Sources, 134. 
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also structures and organizes us "by that 'incorporeal light ... by which our minds are 
somehow irradiated, so that we may judge rightly of all these things."'18 
When the soul seeks to know itself, Augustine found it can be "utterly mistaken 
about its own nature."19 Yet in order to know it is lost or found, in Augustine's model, 
the soul must have enough sense of itself to assess its state. Augustine resolves this 
difficulty of both knowing and not knowing by introducing a revised idea of memory, 
having it include innate ideas regarding the structure of the 'intelligible order,' in a 
solution similar to that of anamnesis in Plato's Meno. However, Augustine modified the 
Platonic idea of memory he inherited by preserving 'implicit understanding' without the 
"theory of prenatal experience"20 acquired by the soul in its existence "during all time he 
. . h ,21 
ex1sts, e1t eras a man or not. 
The soul's movement between "self-ignorance" to "true self-knowledge" is 
guided by "our implicit grasps of what we are," which is ensconced in 'memoria.' 22 
'Memoria' is the domain of the divine and therefore, "at the end of its search for itself, if 
18 Augustine, De Civitate Dei as quoted in Taylor, Sources, 134, "Lucem illam 
incorpoream ... , qua mens nostra quodammodo irradiator, ut de his omnibus recte 
judicare possumus" XI.xxvii.2. 
19 s Taylor, ources, 134. 
20 Ibid., 135. 
21 Plato, Meno, trans. G. M.A. Grube, in Plato: Complete Works, ed. John M. 
Cooper (Indianapolis, IN: Hackett, 1997), 886. 
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it goes to the very end, the soul finds God.'m In other words, the soul remembers the 
divine, 
Not because it recollects the having known him in 
Adam, or anywhere else before the life of this present body, or when it 
was first made in order to be implanted in this body; for it remembers 
nothing at all of this . ... But it is reminded that it be turned to God, as 
though to that light by which it was in some way touched, even when 
turned away from Him.24 
Reason receives its principles, the soul receives its light from the divine within. When 
the soul seeks to find itself and in fact does, when the "knower and known are one," it is 
then that the soul is aware God is above it, and that God resides "at the very root of 
memory."25 The soul, having come from far away, outside, and having been down, gets 
closer and moves inward and upward in its search for itself and the divine. 
As Augustine transforms Plato's ideas, where "the 'within' was only a way of 
recurring to a 'before,' for Augustine, it is the path to an 'above, " '26 a path leading "from 
the exterior to the interior and from the interior to the superior. "27 Taylor points again to 
23 Ibid. 
24 Augustine, On the Trinity, trans. Arthur W. Haddan, (Edinburgh: T &T Clark, 
1873). Bk. XIV.xv.21. 
?5 
- Taylor, Sources, 135. 
26 Ibid., 136. 
27 Ibid. 
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the shift in focus from objects of knowledge, as in Plato, to the knowing activity itself, 
which God is "sustaining and directing."28 Not only is the soul traveling towards the 
divine within, but the very journey is guided by the divine towards which the soul travels. 
It is from this perspective on inwardness that Augustine builds a model of the 
trinity as mirrored "in the soul and its activity."29 He notes two trinities present, one of 
"mind, knowledge, and love" and the other of "memory, intelligence, and will." Through 
the action of knowing, the knower begins to love itself. Mind attempts to know itself and 
therefore love itself, and memory is "the soul's implicit knowledge of itself."30 The 
bringing forth of implicit knowledge from memory requires the word, the '"verbum' that 
I formulate inwardly, and this constitutes intelligentia."31 Verbum is needed to make the 
true knowledge of itself understandable to the soul, as Taylor affirms: "Nothing shows 
more clearly than these images of the Trinity how Augustinian inwardness is bound up 
with radical reflexivity, and they also begin to make clear how essentially linked is this 
doctrine of inwardness to Augustine's whole conception of the relation of man to God."32 
The importance of reflexivity in relation to Christian principles in Augustine is 
well manifested in his understanding of the will. Unlike the direct relationship between 
knowledge and "desire for good" in Plato, "for Augustine the will is not simply 
28 Taylor, Sources, 136. 
291bid. 
30 Ibid. 
31 Ibid. 
32 1bid., 137. 
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dependent on knowledge."33 Augustine's modification of the inherited notion of the will 
is twofold. The first regards its capacity for assent, inherited from the Stoics but 
strengthened by Augustine. The moral consequence of this capacity to choose, which is 
an individual rather than a shared trait, lies in the ability of the person to exhibit "moral 
sensibility" by "a full commitment of the will. "34 The second departure addresses the 
human capacity for having "two radically different moral dispositions," towards good or 
evil, rather than an overall inclination towards good "which can be sidetracked to evil 
through ignorance. "35 This second modification of the notion of will, what Taylor terms 
"Augustine's doctrine of two loves" can allow for a "radically perverse" Adamic 
inclination that requires restoration, so that the will, "healed through grace," can exercise 
its ability to choose to commit to the good. 
Returning to the relationship between knowledge and will, Taylor clarifies that 
this development does not render the will"independent of knowledge," nor does it allow 
for the possibility that the person encounter the divine and refuse to choose it, an 
allowance isolated to the character of Lucifer. But Taylor does state, and this tension is 
borne out in every step of the long and meandering journey of the soul in The 
Confessions, that 
33 Ibid. 
34 Ibid. 
it does mean, however, that in the zone in which we live, of half-
understanding and contrary desires, the will is as much the independent 
35 Ibid., 138. 
variable, determining what we can know, as it is the dependent one, 
shaped by what we see. The causality is circular and not linear.16 
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In this light, the will cannot be excused for its "perversity" by appeals to its lack of 
knowledge. Rather, as the Confessions will illustrate, "it makes us act below and against 
our insight, and prevents this from becoming fuller and purer." 
This acting against, this perversion, concerns the attempt of the self to become the 
focus, "to relate everything to ourselves, to dominate and possess the things which 
surround us."37 As the Confessions compellingly shows, this self-centeredness is a 
symptom as well as a cause of "our own obsessions and fascination with the sensible. "38 
When the soul becomes interested in the external, when it fails to face and pursue the 
divine, acknowledging its own absolute contingency, it makes room for evil, which arises 
when "this reflexivity is enclosed on itself,"39 reflexivity, therefore linked with morality. 
Even as reflexivity itself is not evil, since "we show most clearly the image of God in our 
fullest experience," by being self-enclosed thesoul shows it doesn 't recognize that it is 
dependent on the divine as "the very essence of Christian piety is to sense this 
dependence of my inmost being on God. "40 
36 Taylor, Sources, 138. 
37 Ibid., 139. 
38 Ibid. 
39 Ibid. 
40 Ibid. 
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The Confessions shows step after step the change in the conception of the soul's 
abilities from Plato to Augustine, from having "the capacity to see" to having " lost this 
capacity" which can be regained by hearing the call of Christ in the heart. This call 
makes the soul realize its dependence on the divine light, it "open[s] the inward man to 
God which makes us able to see that the eye's vaunted power is really God's," and it 
leads to the desire for good.41 Augustine's discussion of the interior "represents a 
radically new doctrine of moral resources, one where the route to the higher passes 
within."42 The inward turn, the awareness of our awareness which Taylor calls radical 
reflexivity "takes on a new status because it is the 'space' in which we come to encounter 
God, in which we effect the turning from lower to higher."43 
And it is in this space that, as the Confessions clearly show, Augustine explores 
the double contingency, the realization of his double debt to the divine for both his 
existence and his redemption, as well as the arrival to a proof of the divine existence 
through which he can then understand himself: God is an "essential condition" of the 
soul's thinking about itself, and this reflexivity "puts it in contact with a pelfection that .. 
. [is] also to be far beyond my own finite scope and powers to attain. There must then be 
a higher being on which all this depends, i.e., God."44 The soul, through its 'self-presence' 
requires the divine in order to make sense of itself as "we can only understand ourselves 
41 Taylor, Sources, 139. 
42 Ibid., 140. 
43 Ibid. 
44 Ibid. 
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if we see ourselves as in contact with a perfection which is beyond us."45 The 
Confessions makes clear that Augustine isn't attempting to understand himself in order to 
know God; he is traveling towards God with the clarity that only by doing so can he 
know himself. 
Augustine's treatment of language adheres closely to his perspective on the 
inside/outside dichotomy evident in the treatment of the self, and his attention to the role 
of Christ in the mediation between man and God becomes clearer as Augustine considers 
the hermeneutical role of Incarnation. The divine Logos interprets and embodies the 
divine message, which then must be interpreted and embodied by the pilgrim, who is 
rescued from a closed-off reflexive stance, and who then recounts this germinative event 
in the hope it will take seed in the reader. 
For Augustine, as for Teresa, twisted and temporal lanes of speech are imperfect 
yet necessary conduits of meaning when set against the silent, eternal, unchangeable 
pe1fection of the divine. And yet, this very imbalance disfavoring verbal signs provides 
Augustine with an analogy for Christ himself, the divine meaning, verbum, in relation to 
which human beings are but the voice, the vox. This tension lies at the core of 
Augustine's relationship with language: he must both allow for the inability of words to 
adequately speak of the divine, and therefore their failure to aid the soul in its quest for 
knowledge of itself, while at the same time express gratitude for the linguistic revelation 
given through Scripture, and for Incarnation as the main event of understanding, which 
makes possible the communication between God and human beings. 
45 Ibid., 140. 
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Augustine inherits a certain hesitance regarding language's usefulness to provide 
knowledge and understanding, particularly from Plato and Plotinus, and it is this nuanced 
perspective of the role of language in reaching beyond the material that becomes molded 
upon Augustine's conversion. It is the perspective of signs as mainly or primarily verbal 
and Augustine's interest in exploring the connection between language and theology that 
is of interest here. While he describes his own views on language in many of his works 
including De Dialectica, De Magistro, and De Doctrina Christiana, in the Confessions he 
showcases language as an inadequate but necessary companion through both the 
biographical journey towards conversions, and the concomitant journey inward. 
Historians of linguistics credit Plato with the articulation of the connection 
between knowledge and language and between nature and convention.46 In The Cratylus, 
the issue of there existing "a natural coalescence between things and words, between 
beings and language"47 is debated and ultimately left ambiguous. Hermogenes, the 
interlocutor holding the view that language is arbitrary, there being no necessary 
connection between it and reality, points out that 
[I] cannot convince myself that there is any principle of correctness in 
names other than convention and agreement; any name which you give, in 
my opinion, is the right one, and if you change that and give another, the 
new name is as correct as the old- we frequently change the names of our 
46 See Lia Formigari, A History of Language Philosophies, (Philadelphia, PA: 
John Benjamins, 2004), 15, and Vivien Law, The History of Linguistics in Europe: From 
Plato to 1600, (Cambridge, England: Cambridge University Press, 2003), 17. 
47 Formigari, Language, 15. 
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slaves, and the newly-imposed name is as good as the old: for there is no 
name given to anything by nature; all is convention and habit of the users;-
h . . 48 sue IS my view. 
After pursuing the question to its logical extremes, Socrates as the moderator tempers 
this perspective and states that "this giving of names can be no such light matter as you 
fancy, or the work of light or chance persons; and Cratylus is right in saying that things 
have names by nature. "49 
But Socrates also teaches Cratylus to give up his strong certainty in the role of 
language as a mirror of reality: "How real existence is to be studied or discovered is, I 
suspect, beyond you and me. But we may admit so much, that the knowledge of things is 
not to be derived from names. No; they must be studied and investigated in themselves." 
The conclusion drawn from the dialogue is that as a tool for knowledge language is only 
partially helpful: 
Whether there is this eternal nature in things, or whether the truth is what 
Heracleitus and his followers and many others say, is a question hard to 
determine; and no man of sense will like to put himself or the education of 
his mind in the power of names. 5° 
48 Plato. 'Cratylus.' Benjamin Jowett, trans. 
http://www.gutenberg.org/files/1616/1616-h/1616-h.htm. Retrieved Aprill, 2012. 
491bid. 
50 Ibid. 
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Language is not completely arbitrary, as there are conventions in place for its use, else 
people could not communicate. Yet, as a source for knowledge, language ultimately fails 
the requirement of encoding truth reliably. However, the very form of the Platonic 
dialogue "shows how, through a careful process of questioning it is possible to elicit 
knowledge that a person has never been taught,"51 language therefore serving as a tool for 
uncovering or remembering existing knowledge as persons might teach each other 
knowledge they hold, especially about the Forms. 
If Plato did not find language entirely useful towards achieving direct knowledge 
of being, Plotinus similarly finds it inadequate and even injurious to the quest for 
knowledge. As the linguist Lia Formigari points out, Augustine finds a "radical 
skepticism directed against the very roots of language in Neoplatonic theology."52 While 
in the Enneads Plotinus does not offer many remarks on language, when he does remark 
on it it is to stress its general inadequacy since "verbal thought, modeled on the flow of 
time and the plurality of objects, remains incommensurable to the indivisible unity of 
Being"53 
Plotinus writes that "discursive thought, in order to express anything in words, has 
to consider one thing after another: this is the method of description"54 (V.iii.17). The 
5 1 Law, History, 18. 
52 Formigari, Language, 33. 
53 Formigari, Language, 35. 
54 As quoted by Lia Formigari in A History of Language Philosophies, 34. From 
Plotinus, E_nneads, trans. A. H. Armstrong, (Cambridge, MA: Cambridge University 
Press, 1966). 
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features of language that are most noticeable for Plotinus are its necessary temporality 
and its fragmentary nature. The unity of the thought, which is more similar to the unity 
of the One, is broken by the linear temporality of speech. Therefore, language is in fact 
an obstacle in the ·attempt of the soul to leave the material world and reunite with the One 
from which it had emanated. Language is a pointer to lower things, it seeks reference in 
the material world, and it burdens the soul, therefore, with unimportant matter. 
Furthermore, according to Plotinus, the One cannot be described in language 
anyway, since "whatever you say about it, you will always be speaking of a 'something', 
and He is merely 'One' and no 'something' is mingled in Him"55 (V.iii.13). Plato 
himself has declared that language about the divine is difficult if not impossible and 
Plotinus reinforces this: "We speak about it but we do not speak it. For we say what it is 
NOT but we do not say what it IS"56 (V.iii.14). In order to be able to speak of God, one 
must "have a God within them and [are] be in the grip of divine possession"57 (V .iii.14 ). 
Therefore, language is disconnected from the divine and in its plurality and temporality 
simply incompatible with the perfection and unity of the One. 
Together with this view of language as an inadequate tool for true knowledge, 
Augustine receives a theory of signs indirectly through his studies of rhetoric and his 
reading of Cicero; he is also indebted to Aristotle and to the Stoic and Epicurean debates. 
Yet, what he inherits is a view of signs "conceived primarily as a theory of inference" and 
55 Ibid., 33. 
56 Ibid. , 34. 
57 Ibid. 
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where "language is hardly mentioned" and incidental, even as "no one would dispute that 
words are signs. "58 It will be Augustine who develops a "theory of language as a system 
of signs" where "words are ... signs par excellence. "59 
This focus on verbal signs, together with his infusion of theology into his 
linguistics and of linguistics into theology, marks Augustine, according to the historian of 
linguistics Vivien Law, as the "first Christian we are aware of who wrote on linguistic 
questions from a Christian standpoint."60 Upon conversion, Augustine was to apply his 
intellectual talents to both the articulation of a theology and of the role language could 
have towards knowledge of the divine in order to address the challenge of explaining the 
possibility of Incarnation and of a divine Word. 
Augustine outlines his understanding of the word as sign, composed of verbum or 
meaning and vox or voice and uses this distinction to illustrate the relationship between 
Christ and the believer. Thus, since verbum contains the meaning, and it communicates 
both to the 'mind' ~nd to the 'ear,' while vox only communicates to the 'ear,' verbum is 
much more valuable then vox. Meaning, according to Augustine is "not in language' but 
it is "conceived in the heart, stored up in memory, made ready by will and lives in 
understanding."61 The speaker whose "verbum, [is] already complete" waits for the 
58 R.A.Markus, "Saint Augustine on Signs," Phronesis 2 (1957): 64. 
59 Ibid., 65. 
60L H. aw, lstory, 100. 
61 Augustine, "Sermon 288," (3) translation as quoted in Law, History, 106. 
Latin: "iam corde conceptum est; tenetur memoria, paratur voluntate, vivit intellectu." 
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listener since it is not in linguistic form as yet: "it simply seeks a vox in which to go 
forth" so that it can be understood by the interlocutor.62 Just as Christ was before John 
the Baptist, so the verbum is present before the vox . And just as concepts are outside 
time, and linguistic expression is bound by time, Christ is atemporal while John is 
temporal. In the speaking situation, however, the listener first hears the vox and only 
then receives and understands the verbum, as John the Baptist came before Christ to 
prepare the way for him. Augustine then goes further in extending the qualities of John 
to every believer: "Everyone who voices the Verbum is the vox of the Verbum. What the 
sound of our voice is to the verbum which we bear in our hearts, every pious prophetic 
soul was to that Verbum of which it was said: 'In the beginning was the Verbum, and the 
Verbum was with God, and the Verbum was God. This was in the beginning with 
God. "'63 
This relationship between Incarnation and word and meaning is also expressed in 
De Doctrina Christiana,64 where Augustine seeks to show how verbal signs can be useful 
Augustine, "Sermon 288," last modified September, 2009, Augustinus Hipponesis, 
http://www. au gustinus .it/latin o/ discorsilin dex 2. htm. 
62 Ibid. (3)"Ecce ergo verbum iam formatum, iam integrum, manet in corde: 
quaerit procedere, ut dicatur audienti." 
63 Ibid. (4) translation as quoted in Law, History, 107. "Omnis enim homo 
annuntiator Verbi, vox Verbi est. Quod enim est sonus oris nostri ad verbum quod in 
corde gestamus, hoc omnis anima pia praedicatrix ad illud Verbum de quo dictum est: In 
principio erat Verbum, et Verbum erat apud Deum, et Deus erat Verbum: hoc erat in 
principio apud Deum." 
64 Augustine, De Doctrina Christiana, 1.1 3., last modified May, 2002, 
http://www9.georgetown.edu/faculty/jod/augustine/ddc.html "Just as when we speak ... 
the word which we have in our hearts becomes an outward sound and is called speech; 
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towards exegesis, the two roles of interpretation being "ascertaining the [Scripture's] 
proper meaning, and the mode of making known the meaning when it is ascertained." 65 
For the purpose of gleaning the meaning of Scripture, Augustine clarifies the relationship 
between verbal signification and "the facts, events, and words that [the interpreter] finds 
in the text as signs of divine realities. "66 Given the importance of words in the exegetical 
task, Augustine focuses his discussion of signs on words in particular, words being the 
items that are always signs. He writes, "There are signs, such as words, whose sole use is 
in signifying. For no one uses words except for the purpose of signifying something. "67 
Augustine distinguishes between natural signs and conventional signs, words being 
conventional, those signs "which living things give among themselves for demonstrating, 
so far as they are able, the impulses of their mind, or whatever it may be that they have 
sensed or understood. There is no reason for our signifying, that is, giving a sign - except 
to express and transmit to someone else's mind what is going on in the mind of him who 
and yet our thought does not lose itself in the sound, but remains complete in itself, and 
takes the form of speech without being modified in its own nature by the change: so the 
Divine Word, though suffering no change of nature, yet became flesh, that He might 
dwell among us." 
65 Ibid., 2.1. 
66 Colish, Mirror, 42. 
67 A . D D . 1 2 2 ugustme, e octnna, ... 
gives the sign."68 Words are established in this work as crucial to communication and 
unique in their capacity to "denote other signs. "69 
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And yet, in terms of the ability of language to reach the divine, Augustine answers 
the question "Have I spoken of God, or uttered His praise, in any worthy way?" with 
"Nay, I feel that I have done nothing more than desire to speak; and if I have said 
anything, it is not what I desired to say."70 And while he agrees that God is 
"unspeakable" he remarks upon the apophatic contradiction that follows: 
God is not even to be called "unspeakable," because to say even this is to 
speak of Him. Thus there arises a curious contradiction of words, because 
if the unspeakable is what cannot be spoken of, it is not unspeakable if it 
can be called unspeakable. And this opposition of words is rather to be 
avoided by silence than to be explained away by speech.71 
In the Cm~fessions, however, Augustine shows that language can and does serve 
as a ladder of divine ascent that leads one from the externals to the regions where it is no 
longer needed. Like Plotinus, Augustine looks at language askance, yet needs 
language, and therefore physicality, temporality, and spatiality, to speak of realities felt 
in a part of the self that would eschew these confinements. And unlike Plotinus, whose 
text did not speak of Incarnation, Augustine's view on language must contend with both 
68 Ibid., 2.1.2.-2.2.3. 
69 Colish, Mirror, 37. 
70 Augustine, De Doctrina, 1.6. 
71 Ibid. 
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scriptural revelation, and the revelation of Christ, the Word of God. As a result of the 
Incarnation, the human word is elevated by its association with the divine Word, which, 
as Gadamer notes, points to "the unity of God the Father and God the son [ ... ] the 
mystery of this unity is reflected in the phenomenon of language."72 Augustine must 
contend with language to unravel the "mystery of the incarnation" described in the 
Gospel of John, the Incarnation of the Word serving as counterpart to creation through 
the Word. 
The books of the Confessions provide an epic account of this shift from the 
externals inward, where both language and self are interconnectedly transformed towards 
union with the divine, a change shown through the suspenseful narrative in which 
Augustine discovers the inward road that leads to God. Augustine appears to awaken 
from the story he hasn't yet told, stunned by the realization that God is in his heart. And 
the Cm~fessions leads its readers on a description of how he came to receive this 
understanding, after many wrong turns and much time spent tossed about in unfriendly 
seas. From the storms of the desires of the flesh and the false guidance of rhetoric to the 
still waters of baptism73 and the fulfillment of his hopes for truth, Augustine weaves the 
tale of the gradual discovery of his own interiority. His account sets up both a horizontal 
and a vertical distinction, where the soul is away from God, outside, and low, in the 
abyss, while God is behind, inside, and high up. He will need to turn around and step 
72 Hans-Georg Gadamer, Truth and Method (New York, NY: Continuum Books, 
2002), 419. 
73 Augustine, Confessions, IX.vi.14. "et baptizati sumus et fugit a nobis 
sol1icitudo vitae praeteritae." James J. O'Donnell, "The Confessions of Augustine: An 
Electronic Edition," last modified 1999, http://www.stoa.org/hippo/. 
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over the threshold to enter his own interior space, aided by the book of the Platonists and 
redirected, enlightened by conversion, culminating with the vision at Ostia, where his 
hope of understanding is, however briefly, fulfilled. 
The first book of the Confessions begins with the conve1ted and baptized 
Augustine speaking with the language of the psalms, as he offers up front the answer to 
the question of the aim of both language and existence: we are, and we speak in order to 
praise God. The Confessions also begins with a declaration of the end of human beings, 
namely to "rest in you" (Li.l/4 and Augustine is unwavering in the declaration of this 
double contingency: ""Without you, whatever exists would not exist .. . I also have 
being. So why do I request you to come to me when, unless you were within me, I would 
have no being at all?" (I.ii.2)75 He exists because of the divine, and he must recognize 
this through salvation to achieve his own end. Augustine asks, "who will enable me to 
find rest in you? Who will grant me that you come to my heart and intoxicate it" (I.v.5)76 
and he will travel towards this intoxicating center throughout the Cm~fessions, moving, 
alongside his readers, from the region of externals to the inner heights of Ostia. 
Prior to the personal narrative, however, Augustine ensures his readers' awareness 
of the inadequacy of both the narrator and his language. This story cannot reveal the 
divine, the writer isn't worthy of containing God and his language is ultimately not 
74 Augustine, Confessions, 3. "inquietum est cor nostrum donee requiescat in te." 
75 Ibid., 4. "an quia sine te non esset quidquid est, ... quoniam itaque et ego sum, 
quid peto ut venias in me, qui non essem nisi esses in me?" 
76 Ibid., 5. "quis mihi dabit adquiescere in te? quis dabit mihi ut venias in cor 
meum et inebries illud." 
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referential of Him: "What has anyone achieved in words when he speaks about you? Yet 
woe to those who are silent about you because, though loquacious with verbosity, they 
have nothing to say" (I.iv.4).77 This statement follows a mosaic of paradoxical 
statements of the nature of God performing the apophasis Augustine finally declares; he 
juxtaposes the poverty of human speech to the cry for divine speech: "Speak to me so that 
I may hear" (I.v.5.)78 , a call for assurance of the journey's end, "say to my soul, I am your 
salvation" (I.v.5)79 . Only now, once the end of the journey has been revealed in the 
humble foreshadowing of the quest that must be presented no matter how unworthy the 
story teller, can the selective biography truly begin, guiding the reader to the revelation 
that God is inward, and that even as the epic hero stumbles and falls and spends much 
time ignorant of and away from this center, he will ultimately, decidedly prevail as one of 
those who "In seeking him they find him, and in finding him they will praise him" 
(I.i.l).so 
The first book takes Augustine from the beginning of life into the start of 
adolescence, a period where he contends with the beginning of language, with reading 
and writing, the perils of fiction, and the dangers of multiplicity. He remarks on his 
origins, "I do not know whence I came to be in this mortal life or, as I may call it, this 
77 Ibid., 5. "et quid diximus, ... , aut quid dicit aliquis cum de te dicit? et vae 
tacentibus de te, quoniam loquaces muti sunt." 
78 Ibid. "sic die ut audiam." 
79 Ibid. "die animae meae, 'salus tua ego sum.'" 
80 Ibid., 3. "quaerentes enim inveniunt eum et invenientes laudabunt eum." 
63 
living death? I do not know where I came from" (I.vi.7). 81 His beginning is not contained 
in the vault of memory, so he needs to trust the "parents of my flesh" that "the 
consolations of your mercies (cf. Ps. 50:3; 93: 19) upheld me"(I.vi.7). 82 He offers the 
"consolations of human milk" (I.vi.7)83 as evidence for the divine consolations, as 
Augustine's inquiry quickly points to "the gifts which you bestow both inwardly in mind 
and outwardly in body" (I.vi.7). 84 Already, Augustine begins to set up the inside/outside 
dichotomy that will add and improve upon the mind/body dichotomy inherited from 
Plato, and will finally privilege interiority as the dwelling place of God. 
As an infant, without speech, his "desires were internal; adults were external to 
me and had no means of entering my soul" (I.vi.8).85 It is only when the interior can 
communicate with the external through language that Augustine considers himself a 
character in his own narration. Of the period of infancy, he writes, "I do not wish to 
reckon this as part of the life that I live in this world for it is lost in the darkness of my 
forgetfulness, and it is on the same level as the life I lived in my mother' s womb" 
81 Ibid., 6. "nescio unde venerim hue, in istam dico vitam mortalem an mortem 
vitalem? nescio." 
82 Ibid. "et susceperunt me consolationes miserationum tuarum, sicut audivi a 
parentibus carnis meae." 
83 Ibid. "consolationes lactis humani." 
84 Ibid., 7. "per haec ipsa quae tribuis intus et foris ." 
85 Ibid. "quia illae intus erant, foris autem illi, nee ullo suo sensu valebant introire 
in animam meam." 
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(l.vii.l2).86 Augustine truly begins his journey as such when he can speak, and therefore 
when he begins to create memories through language: "I was no longer a baby incapable 
of speech but already a boy with power to talk;" the point of beginning "my path to the 
present" is the point of which he says "this I remember." (I. viii.l3). 87 
Augustine sets off on his life's journey "beyond boyhood" where "many great 
waves of temptations were seen to be threatening" (l.xi. l8). 88 The journey to come, first 
away from the divine and then towards God contains numerous epic images, dramatic 
landscapes, unbridled torrents, treacherous abysses and dry deserts. Even as Augustine is 
rejecting the literature he has been taught, he manages to find a redeemed purpose for the 
heroic journey narrative, one that allows him to employ its metaphors towards expressing 
the will's passivity, lack of agency, its inability to resist the pull of worldly passions. As 
he writes the story of the soul's progress, Augustine is pondering the usefulness of having 
to learn about the "wanderings of some legendary fellow named Aeneas (forgetful of my 
own wanderings I.xiii.20),89 and the Virgilian 'wanderings' do ultimately find their 
purpose, serving as counterpoint to Augustine's own prodigality. 
86 Ibid., 10. "piget me adnumerare huic vitae meae quam vivo in hoc saeculo. 
quantum enim attinet ad oblivionis meae tenebras, par illi est quam vixi in matris utero." 
87 Ibid. "non enim eram infans qui non farer, sed iam puer loquens eram. et 
memini hoc." 
88 Ibid., 14. "sed quot et quanti fluctus impendere temptationum post pueritiam 
videbantur." 
89 Ibid., 15. "tenere cogebar Aeneae nescio cuius errores, oblitus errorum 
meorum." 
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Augustine makes one of many references to water's acting unrestrained: "woe to 
you torrent of human custom! 'Who can stand against you?' (Ps. 75:8) When will you 
run dry? How long will your flowing current carry the sons of Eve into the great and 
fearful ocean which can be crossed, with difficulty, only by those who have embarked on 
the Wood of the cross (Wisd. 14:7)" (I.xvi.25).90 Language, rhetoric and poetry 
patticularly, flow into the ocean of error; rhetoric is the "infernal river," the ''flumen 
tartareum" (I.xvi.26). Augustine's discussion of both rhetoric and his unrestrained 
passions employ terms of torrent and waters and meandering footsteps. When describing 
his training and the opportunity to recite in public for a prize, he writes, "we were 
compelled to follow in our wanderings the paths set by poetic fictions" (I.xvii.27).91 
Soon thereafter, the soul is "in this terrifying abyss" and "far from your face in the 
darkness of passion" (I.xviii.28). 92 Augustine punctures the spell of the metaphor by 
clarifying, "one does not go far away from you or return to you by walking or by any 
movement through space" (I.xviii.28),93 distinguishing his account from the fictional 
landscapes of his learning. Yet the soul, far from God, is in darkness, and thirsty. This 
mixing of metaphors where the soul's senses are affected, speaks to the idea of the 
interior man moving through a physically manifested universe and in the process 
90 Ibid., 18. "sed vae tibi, flumen moris humani! quis resistet tibi? quamdiu non 
siccaberis? quousque volves Evae filios in mare magnum et formidulosum, quod vix 
transeunt qui lignum conscenderint?" 
91 Ibid., 19. "sed figmentorum poeticorum vestigia errantes sequi cogebamur." 
92 Ibid., 20. "immanissimo profundo . .. nam longe a vultu tuo in affectu 
tenebroso." 
93 Ibid. "non enim pedibus aut a spatiis locorum itur abs te aut reditur ad te." 
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describing the interior space through which it moves. He "lay on the threshold" about to 
cross into life, or enter "the arena in which I was to wrestle" (l.xix.30),94 while language 
is already flowing away from truth, and the soul is wandering away from God--language, 
lured by the flash of stylish recognition and soul tempted by passion. 
The second book finds Augustine in "a state of disintegration," a multiplicity that 
is temporal, subject to change, frantic, unable to stop moving through space, unable to 
rest, leaving him swept "through the precipitous rocks of desire to submerge me in a 
whirlpool of vice" (IJ.ii.2). 95 The restless circularity of the whirlpool he cannot resist is 
evoked again by the fruitlessness, the sterility of his erotic pursuits, his "concupiscentia 
carnis." Caught by the force of his unrestrained desires, of a love that "non tenebatur 
modus," Augustine describes the experience of an incontinent will that is prey to 
unleashed natural forces: "I traveled very far from you, and you did not stop me. I was 
tossed about and spilt, scattered and boiled dry in my fornications. And you were 
silent."96 Having wandered fm1her from his center, and "into more and more sterile 
things productive of unhappiness" (in plura et plura sterilia semina dolorum II.ii.2) he 
finds himself weary, beset by "inquieta lassitudine," in need of a restfulness that 
Augustine the narrator knows can only be found in God's productive unity, once the seed 
of the Word has taken hold, and the self-reflexivity has been opened. 
94 1bid., 21. "in limine iacebam ... et huius harenae palaestra erat illa." 
95 Ibid., 24. "per abrupta cupiditatum atque mersabat gurgite flagitiorum." 
96 Ibid., 24. "et ibam longius ate et sinebas, et iactabar et effundebar et diffluebam 
et ebulliebam per fornicationes meas, et tacebas." 
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Augustine juxtaposes his going astray to his family's lack of intervention, given 
their desire for him to learn rhetoric: "the only concern was that I should learn to speak as 
effectively as possible and carry conviction by my oratory" (II.ii.4).97 He presents his 
rhetorical learning as being subject to forces similarly outside of his control as his 
'fornications.' He points to the determination of his father to send him to Carthage in 
opposition to his lack of interest in "what character before you I was developing, or how 
chaste I was so long as I possessed a cultured tongue" (ll.iii.5).98 Not only does 
Augustine mention the parents' role in ensuring his developing language skills at the 
expense of his character, but he writes of his mother that "she thought it would do no 
harm and would be a help to set me on the way towards you, if I studied the traditional 
pattern of a literary education" (II.iii.8.).99 Going to literature and rhetoric parallels going 
astray from the divine, at this stage similarly passive as regards the will. 
Finally, in the story of the pear theft, the will has increased agency, and his heart 
is "at the bottom of the abyss" (II.iv.9). 100 Reiterating the directionality and spatial 
character of the interior journey, Augustine the nanator writes, "the soul fornicates (Ps. 
72:27) when it is turned away from you and seeks outside you the pure and clear 
97 Ibid., 26. "sed cura fuit tantum ut discerem sermonem facere quam optimum et 
persuadere dictione." 
98 Ibid., 26. "cum interea non satageret idem pater qualis crescerem tibi aut quam 
castus essem, dummodo essem dise1tus." 
99 Ibid., 28. "ilia autem quia non solum nullo detrimento sed etiam nonnullo 
adiumento ad te adipiscendum futura existimabat usitata ill a studia doctrinae." 
100 Ibid., 29. "in imo abyssi." 
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intentions which are not to be found except by returning to you" (Il.vi.14). 101 He 
stresses the will's contribution and accountability in this mis-placing of the soul: humans 
"put themselves at a distance from you" yet "there is no place where one can entirely 
escape from you" (II. vi.14 ). 102 Instead of "entering into you" and therefore "enter[ing] 
into the joy of the Lord' (Matt. 25:21)," Augustine summarizes the stage of adolescence 
in spatial terms, as a misorientation: "I went astray from you (Ps. 118:76), my God, far 
from your unmoved stability. I became to myself a region of destitution" (II.x.18). 103 
Book III finds Augustine's soul, though ill and 'ulcerosa,' hungrily chasing, 
thrusting itself into "outward things, miserably avid to be scratched by contact with the 
world of the senses" (III.i.1). 104 In his love of theatre, he "pursued a sacrilegious quest 
for knowledge, which led me, a deserter from you, down to faithless depths" (III.iii.5);105 
the stories kept him in the externals, and only "scratched me on the surface" (III.ii.4). 106 
His going astray and his self-involvement is mirrored not only in his pursuit of pleasure, 
but also in his relationship with rhetoric, which he now by choice persists in because "I 
101 Ibid., 32. "ita fornicator anima, cum avertitur abs teet quaerit extra te ea quae 
pura et liquida non in venit, nisi cum redit ad te." 
102 1bid. "qui longe sea te faciunt. ... et ideo non esse quo ate omni modo 
recedatur." 
103 Ibid., 34. "defluxi abs te ego et erravi, deus meus, nirnis devius ab stabilitate 
tua in adulescentia, et factus sum rnihi regio egestatis." 
104 Ibid., 35. "proiciebat se foras miserabiliter scalpi a vida contactu sensibilium." 
105 Ibid., 37. "sacrilega curiositate secutus sum, ut deserentem te deduceret me ad 
ima infida." 
106 Ibid. "in superficie raderer." 
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wanted to distinguish myself as an orator for a damnable and conceited purpose, namely 
delight in human vanity" (III.iv.7.). 107 He has progressedfrom being tossed about by 
natural forces to seeking, inflicting his own pleasure, leading to a deeper abyss, and to his 
further departing from his center. He bemoans "the terrible dangers in which I was 
wandering" and finds himself "further and further away from you. I loved my own ways, 
not yours. The liberty I loved was merely that of a runaway" (III.iii.5). 108 
The encounter with Cicero's writing signals a new stage, where with Hortensius, 
for the first time the soul begins to turn, to find his way, however feebly: it now begins to 
desire a new kind of satiety, it "longed [concupiscebam] for the immortality of wisdom" 
and it "began to rise up to return to you (Ili.iv.7),109 the book having "altered his prayers, 
Lord, to be towards you yourself' (III.iv.7). 110 Augustine's relationship to language 
begins to change too as he clarifies that he did not read the book "for a sharpening of my 
style" (III.iv. 7). 111 He is starting to turn from outside to inside, from an interest in the 
107 Ibid., 38. "in qua eminere cupiebam fine damnabili et ventoso per gaudia 
vanitatis humanae. II 
108 Ibid. llterribilibus nocentibus, in quibus vagatus sum ... ad longe recedendum 
ate. amans vias meas et non tuas, amans fugitivam libertatem." 
109 Ibid. "et immortalitatem sapientiae concupiscebam .. . et surgere coeperam ut 
ad te redirem. II 
110 Ibid. 11et ad te ipsum, domine, mutavit preces meas." 
Ill Ib.d II • d d 1. " 1 . non emm a acuen am mguam. 
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sharpness of the tongue to attention to meaning. He writes, "I was impressed not by the 
book's refining effect on my style and literary expression but by the content" (IILiv.7). 112 
Learning love of wisdom from Hortensius, however, did not render him ready for 
encountering Scripture. The text had "mountainous difficulty" and was "enveloped in 
mysteries" and he "was not in any state to be able to enter into that" as he was "a little 
beginner"(III. v .9). 11 3 The text of the Scripture is presented as a height difficult to reach, 
and hidden behind veils of discernment he cannot see through. But it is also presented as 
a gate, a space to enter into, "something neither open to the proud nor laid bare to mere 
children" (III.v.9). 114 But at this point, the path is not yet clear. Augustine doesn't know 
he is journeying to his own center, even as he begins to dimly sense the divine calling 
from within. He lacks the explicit appeal that, he will later understand, only Christ can 
interpret to the soul. Though he "burned with longing to leave earthly things and fly back 
to you," he was not yet a proficient, inspired reader of his own interior and "did not 
know what you were doing with me" (III.iv.8.). 115 
Despite having experienced the beginning of a transformation or a redirection 
from reading Hortensius, Augustine falls in with the Manicheans at first because of their 
11 2 Ibid. "non ergo ad acuendam linguam referebam ilium librum, neque mihi 
locutio sed quod loquebatur persuaserat." 
11 3 Ibid., 40. "excelsam et velatam mysteriis. et non eram ego talis ut intrare in 
earn .. . ed ego dedignabar esse parvulus." 
114 Ibid. "et ecce video rem non compertam superbis neque nudatam pueris." 
115 Ibid., 39. "quomodo ardebam revolare a terrenis ad te. et nesciebarn quid 
ageres mecum!" 
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stylistic superiority, even as he admits that "for myself, my hunger and thirst were not 
even for the spiritual creation but for you yourself," for "God the unchanging truth," 
towards which he is traveling. (III. vi.l 0) 116 At the time of his encounter with the 
Manicheans, Augustine writes God was "far distant. Indeed I wandered far away, 
separated from you, not even granted to share in the husks of the pigs" (III. vi.ll ). 117 The 
"husks" are evident in his setting the Manichean problem in terms of language again, 
writing, "These names [your name, and that of the Lord Jesus Christ, and that of the 
paraclete, the Comforter, the Holy Spirit] were never absent from their lips; but it was no 
more than sound and noise with their tongue" (III. vi . l 0). 118 He is the prodigal son and the 
husks are the rhetorically competent lies the truth is set against: "They used to say 'truth, 
truth,' and they had a lot to tell me about it; but there was never any truth in them ... Truth, 
truth, how in my inmost being the very marrow of my mind sighed for you!" (III.vi.l0) 119 
It is here that the very journey narrative he is employing and transforming from 
his rhetorical training now proves itself superior to the Manichean tales. He has rejected 
116 Ibid., 41. "at ego nee priora illa, sed te ipsam, te veritas, in qua non est 
commutatio nee momenti obumbratio, esuriebam et sitiebam." 
117 Ibid., 42. "ubi ergo mihi tunc eras et quam Ionge? et longe peregrinabar abs te, 
exclusus et a siliquis porcorum quos de siliquis pascebam." 
118 Ibid., 41. "haec nomina [nominis tui et domini Iesu Christi et paracleti 
consolatoris nostri spiritus sancti ]non recedebant de ore eorum, sed tenus sono et strepitu 
linguae." 
119 Ibid. "et dicebant, 'veritas et veritas,' et multum earn dicebant mihi, et nusquam 
erat in eis ... o veritas, veritas, quam intime etiam tum medullae animi mei suspirabant 
tibi." 
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literature in favor of the Scripture, but he is upholding literature in relation to 
Manichaeism: 
How superior are the fables of the masters of literature and poets to these 
deceptive traps! For verses, poems, and 'the flight of Medea" are certainly 
more useful than the Five Elements which take on different colors, each 
in accordance with one of the Five Caverns of Darkness ... verses and 
poetry I can transform into real nourishment... as 'Medea flying through 
the air' I might recite, but would not assert to be fact (III. vi.ll ). 120 
Even as literature for Augustine was set in the externals, it was not masquerading as 
truth, and therefore was not nearly as pernicious as the false doctrine of the Manicheans. 
Augustine was able to borrow the model of the epic journey and interweave it and 
transform it into a prodigal's journey, redeeming the form for the purposes of confession. 
God, the end of the journey, is where both self and the selfs language give way to 
truth, and Augustine sets God's presence spatially "more inward than my most inward 
part and higher than the highest element within me" (III. vi.11). 121 Yet even as Augustine 
hungered for this "truth 'in whom there is no changing nor shadow caused by any 
revolving"' (III.vi.lO) 122 he is easily tempted because he was "living outside myself, 
120 Ibid., 42. "quanta enim meliores grammaticorum et poetarum fabellae quam 
ilia decipula! nam versus et carmen et Medea volans utiliores certe quam quinque 
elementa varie fucata propter quinque antra tenebrarum, quae omnino nulla sunt et 
occidunt credentem. nam versum et carmen etiam ad vera pulmenta transfero; volantem 
autem Medeam etsi cantabam, non adserebam." 
121 Ibid., 43. "tu autem eras interior intima meo et superior summa meo." 
122 Ibid., 41. "te veritas, in qua non est commutatio nee momenti obumbratio, 
esuriebam et sitiebam." 
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seeing only with the eye of the flesh" (III. vi, 11). 123 In this section of the journey, 
Augustine again reminds his readers that he "was unaware of the existence of another 
reality, that which truly is" (III. vii.12). 124 He may be journeying towards the divine, but 
he still doesn't know he is: "While traveling away from the truth I thought I was going 
towards it." (III.vii.12). 125 The soul is actively seeking truth now, no longer merely prey 
to the torrents of habit or the hunger of the flesh, yet susceptible to wrong turns, as the 
knower hasn't yet been able to heed the calls of him whom it seeks to know. 
In Book IV after recapitulating the passive and active failings of the will, "being 
seduced and seducing, being deceived and deceiving," 126 the traveler continues to seek 
knowledge. Though exhibiting direct agency towards the quest for truth, the soul 
continues to fall into error, his own ability still misguided. Traveling on his own, he is 
an inexpert explorer, "without you, what am I to myself but a guide to my own self-
destruction" (IV .i . l.). 127 He is still "falling about on slippery ground" though God was 
always able to see him "from far off" (IV.ii.2.). 128 His choices support the outward 
orientation of the soul: Of his concubine he writes that he "found her in my state of 
123 Ibid., 43 . "quia invenit foris habitantem in oculo carnis meae," 
124 Ibid. "nesciebam enim aliud vere quod est." 
125 Ibid. "et recedens a veri tate ire in earn mihi videbar." 
126 Ibid., 52. "seducebamur et seducebamus, falsi atque fallentes" 
127 Ibid., 52. "quid enim sum ego mihi sine te nisi dux in praeceps?" 
128 Ibid., 53 . "deus, vidisti de longinquo lapsantem in lubrico." 
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wandering desire" (IV .ii.2). 129 The contact with astrologers seem to support the external, 
and deemphasize the will's agency, as "they make a man not in the least responsible for 
his faults, but mere flesh and blood and putrid pride" (IV.iii.4). 130 Yet God intervenes at 
various stages through more expert guides as Augustine instructs his readers that if the 
soul was turned away and in ignorance of the location of the divine in the heart, God was 
not encumbered by such limitations. God, "even by means of that old man" Vindicianus, 
who speaks against the arguments of the astrologers, "did not fail to help me or miss the 
opportunity of bringing healing to my soul." (IV.iii.5) 131 
The death of his friend provides the next stage in the soul's quest to discover its 
interiority. Augustine's soul "could not endure to be without him" and while he was 
"under my influence this man's mind was wandering astray (IV.iv.7) .132 Upon this 
friend's death, Augustine's distress leads him to glimpse the possibility of an interior 
space by its striking absence. He depicts carrying his "lacerated and bloody soul when it 
was unwilling to be carried by me. I found no place where I could put it down. There 
was no rest in pleasant groves" (IV.vii.12). 133 His attention was directed to the temporal 
129 Ibid., 53. "Sed quam indagaverat vagus ardor." 
130 Ibid., 54. "scilicet ut homo sine culpa sit, caro et sanguis et superba putredo." 
131 Ibid., 55. "tamen etiam per ilium senem defuisti mihi aut destitisti mederi 
ani1nae meae." 
132 Ibid., 56. "mecum iam errabat in animo ille homo et non poterat anima mea 
sine illo." 
133 Ibid., 59. "portabam enim concisam et cruentam animam meam impatientem 
portari a me, et ubi earn ponerem non inveniebam. non in amoenis nemoribus ... 
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and outward matters; as he was not progressing inward, he couldn't partake in the rest of 
things spiritual. More importantly, he did not know that this rest, which appears early in 
the Co11{essions as the purpose and end of human nature, was a region of the interior. 
All the external things he inventories, "pleasant groves," "games or songs," 
"sweet scented place," "exquisite feasts" "pleasures of the bedroom and bed," "books and 
poetry" (IV.vii.12)134 couldn't answer this need, leaving the soul in a desolation only 
intensified by ignorance, confused andrepulsed by "all that was not he"(IV. vii.12).135 
Augustine did realize that he was at an impasse, that his current station had no exit and 
that "if I attempted to find rest there for my soul, it slipped through a void and again 
came falling back upon me. I had become to myself a place of unhappiness in which I 
could not bear to be but I could not escape from myself' (IV. vii.12).136 In desperation 
and grief, Augustine is refusing his own interiority: "where should my heart flee to in 
escaping from my heart? Where should I go to escape from myself? Where is there where 
I cannot pursue myself? (IV.vii.12).137 Given its timing, it even seems, as the narrative 
134 1bid., 59. "amoenis nemoribus ... ludis atque cantibus .. . suave olentibus 
locis . . . con vi viis apparatis ... voluptate cubilis et lecti ... libris atque carminibus. " 
135 Ibid., 59. "et quidquid non erat quod ille." 
136 Ibid., 60. "si conabar earn ibi ponere ut requiesceret, per inane labebatur et 
iterum ruebat super me, et ego mihi remanseram infelix locus, ubi nee esse possem nee 
inde recedere." 
137 Ibid. "quo enim cor meum fugeret a corde meo? quo a me ipso fugerem? quo 
non me sequerer?" 
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flows, that the subsequent move to Carthage is an outward manifestation of this need to 
flee from himself and his grief. (IV.vii.l2). 138 
In a way it appears as if the implacable reality of death and the ensuing 
unbearable grief made interiority and a new perspective on time evident to him. They 
break open the flow of chronological time and let him glimpse the outside/inside 
difference, show him the possibility of a new orientation; this understanding may 
dissolve once the extraordinary moment of existential contemplation brought on by grief 
subsides in intensity. He realizes in the midst of this experience that "the reason grief 
had penetrated me so easily and deeply was that I had poured out my soul on to the sand 
by loving a person sure to die as if he would never die," (IV. viii. l3). 139 The soul is still 
facing away, in danger of being squandered on the externals, vulnerable in a region 
dangerous and detrimental to it. At this moment of despair, Augustine the narrator 
interjects with a reminder that the soul ultimately cannot achieve its own turning: "Turn 
us and show us your face, and we shall be safe (Ps . 79:8)." 140 Inserting the yet-to-come 
wisdom of the soul, he stresses that "wherever the human soul turns itself, other than to 
you, it is fixed in sorrows, even if it is fixed upon beautiful things external to you and 
external to itself, which would nevertheless be nothing if they did not have their being 
138 Ibid., 60. 
139 Ibid., 60. "nam unde me facillime et in intima dolor ille penetraverat, nisi quia 
fuderam in harenam animam meam diligendo moriturum acsi non moriturum." 
140 Ibid., 61. "converte nos et ostende faciem tuam, et salvi erimus" 
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from you" (IV.ix.15). 141 In the spatial terrain of the interior, the agency that makes 
turning possible is not, as the soul will learn, self-generated. 
In Book V, in the beginning passage of prayer, Augustine talks about the heart as 
an enclosed space that is always within view of the divine as "there is 'none' who can 
hide from your heat' (Ps. 18:7)" (V.i.1.). 142 The soul, ignorant of the cost of being in 
externals, asks about its felt multiplicity, "where was I when I was seeking for you? You 
were there before me, but I had departed from myself. I could not even find myself, 
much less you" (V.ii.2). 143 In its error, the soul may find itself on false heights, relying 
on its own power, and unaware of "this way by which they may descend from themselves 
to him and through him ascend to him" (V.iii.5). 144 . 
Meeting Ambrose, Augustine finds that "salvation is far distant. Nevertheless, 
gradually, though I did not realize it, I was drawing closer" (V.xiii.23). 145 What 
contributes to the growing awareness of the soul's condition is an enlivening of the 
seemingly flat scriptural text by the spirit of figurative language Ambrose was able to 
141 Ibid. 61 . "converte nos et ostende faciem tuam, et salvi erimus. nam 
quoquoversum se verterit anima hominis, ad dolores figitur alibi praeterquam in te, 
tametsi figitur in pulchris extra teet extra se. quae tamen nulla essent, nisi essent abs te." 
142 Ibid. , 72. "et non est qui se abscondat a calore tuo." 
143 Ibid. "ubi ego eram, quando te quaerebam? et tu eras ante me, ego autem et a 
me discesseram nee me inveniebam: quanto minus te!" 
144 Ibid., 75 . "non noverunt hanc viam qua descendant ad ilium a se et per eum 
ascendant ad eum." 
145 Ibid., 88. "sed longe est ... salus, qualis ego tunc aderam, et tamen 
propinquabam sensim et nesciens." 
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breathe into it: "I heard first one, then another, then many difficult passages in the Old 
Testament scriptures figuratively interpreted, where I, by taking them literally, had found 
them to kill" (V.xiv.24).146 With Ambrose's mediation, his ability to inspire through 
interpreting Scriptures, Augustine takes a first, crucial step in his quest for self-
knowledge. He understands that while God is "everywhere a whole and never limited in 
space," he is, as is all humanity, made "in your image, and man from head to foot is 
contained in space" (VI.iii.4 ). 147 
The soul has progressed enough, as Book VI unravels, for Augustine to abandon 
Manichaeism, stay clear of the academics, and choose to become a catechumen with 
Ambrose as his guide. Book VII seems to function as a second threshold of sorts. Having 
understood that he is made in the image of God, the soul now crosses from the outward to 
the inward, from mere understanding of its existence towards the region where salvation 
and indeed rest is possible. Even as Augustine is troubled by the origin of evil , "there 
was a firm place in my heart for the faith ... in many respects this faith was still 
unformed and hesitant ... yet my mind did not abandon it, but daily drank in more and 
more' (VII.v.7). 148 While he searches for the origin of evil, the faith he does have means 
146 Ibid. "maxime audito uno atque altero et saepius aenigmate soluto de scriptis 
veteribus, ubi, cum ad litteram acciperem, occidebar." 
147 Ibid., 94. "sed ubique totus es et nusquam locomm es .. . fecisti hominem ad 
imaginem tuam, et ecce ipse a capite usque ad pedes in loco es." 
148 Ibid., 116. "stabiliter tamen haerebat in corde meo in catholica ecclesia fides 
Christi tui, ... in multis quidem adhuc informis ... , sed tamen non earn relinquebat 
animus, immo in dies magis magisque inbibebat." 
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he knows God is unchangeable and 'care[s] for humanity andjudge[s] us" (VII.vii.11)149 
and that there is life after death. At this stage, he presses on, language failing to convey 
his turmoil, its communicative power not "sufficient to tell them of the full tumult of my 
soul" (VII.vii.l1)150. While "in silence I vigorously pursued my quest' (VII.vii.l1)151 
and though not yet able to undo the propensity of the will towards the outward and the 
temporal, the soul's insight is growing as is its silence, to where the soul can begin to 
realize that "by inward goads you stirred me to make me find it unendurable until, 
through my inward perception, you were a certainty to me' (VII.8.12). 152 
The soul's growing receptivity to divine communication is rewarded by the 
encounter with "some books of the Platonists" (VII.ix.l3)153 where he found, confirming 
his insight while with Ambrose, an appreciation that in virtue of its very existence, the 
soul receives the light of reason and truth, namely that "the soul of man, although it bears 
witness of the light, is 'not that light'" (VII.ix.l3). 154 But he has not yet found the Christ 
of Incarnation: "that the 'word was made flesh and dwelt among us ' (John 1:13-140) I 
149 Ibid., 119. "esse de hominibus curam et iudicium tuum." 
150 Ibid., 120. "numquid totus tumultus animae meae, cui nee tempora nee os 
meum sufficiebat, sonabat eis?" 
15 1 Ibid. "et cum in silentio fortiter quaererem" 
152 Ibid., 121. "stimulis internis agitabas me ut impatiens essem donee mihi per 
interiorem as pee tum certus esses." 
153 Ibid. "quosdam platonicorum libros." 
154 Ibid. "hominis anima, quamvis testimonium perhibeat de lumine, non est 
tamen ipsa lumen." 
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did not read there (VII.ix.l4).155 
With that understanding must come the slight opening of the closed self-
reflexivity that accounts for perversion of the will, and he recalls that "by the platonic 
books I was admonished to return into myself. With you as my guide I entered into my 
inner most citadel [in intima mea] and was given power to do so because you had become 
my helper' (VII.x.l6).156 Augustine enters his own interior previously inaccessible to 
him and sees the source of his own light above himself, witnesses "above that same eye 
of my soul the immutable light higher than my mind" (VII.x.l6). 157 He is overcome, in 
awe by discovering in his own heart "a different thing, utterly different from all our 
kinds of light. it transcended my mind ... It was superior because it made me, and I was 
inferior because I was made by it" (VII.x.l6). 158 
The cascade of awareness continues, with Augustine understanding that "what I 
saw is Being, and that I who saw am not yet Being" and that maturation isn't finished as 
the newly audible divine voice clarifies: "I am the food of the fully grown; grow and you 
will feed on me. And you will not change me into you like the food your flesh eats, but 
155 Ibid. "quia verbum caro factum est et habitavit in nobis, non ibi legi." 
156 lbid., 123. "et inde admonitus redire ad memet ipsum, intravi in intima mea 
duce te, et potui, quoniam factus es adiutor meus." 
157 Ibid., 123. "supra eundem oculum animae meae, supra mentem meam, lucem 
incommutabilem." 
158 Ibid., 123. "sed aliud, aliud valde ab istis omnibus. nee ita erat supra mentem 
meam, ... sed superior, quia ipsa fecit me, et ego inferior, quia factus ab ea." 
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you will be changed into me" (VII.xi.l6).159 He understands the benefit of the will's 
choosing "to stick fast to God ... for if I do not abide in him, I can do nothing. But he 
'abiding in himself makes all things new' (VII.11.17), 160 and becomes aware that evil 
stems from "a perversity of will" facing away from God towards "inferior things, 
rejecting its own inner life (Ecclus . 10: 10) and swelling with external matter" 
(VII.xvi.22).161 It isn't that the will is self-concerned, but rather that the focus is on itself 
amongst the externals. In the circular causality that Taylot describes, the will 's choices 
are influenced by the will's insight, which having not benefited from the divine light 
limits the will's choices. 
At this stage, Augustine is "astonished to find that already I loved you ... but I 
was not stable in the enjoyment of my God"; unable to choose steadfastly to remain he 
was "caught up to you by your beauty" only to fall back pulled by his own, carnal, 
weight. (VII.xvii.23). 162 The will is beginning to be healed, yet it isn't yet able to exercise 
its full commitment to the good it now sees: "I was in no kind of doubt to whom I should 
attach myself, but was not yet in a state to be able to do that. 'The body, which is 
159 Ibid. "ut viderem esse quod viderem, et nondum me esse qui viderem" "' cibus 
sum grandium: cresce et manducabis me. nee tu me in te mutabis sicut cibum carnis tuae, 
sed tu mutaberis in me."' 
160 Ibid., 124. "mihi autem inhaerere deo bonum est, quia, si non manebo in illo, 
nee in me potero. ille autem in se manens innovat omnia." 
16 1 Ibid. , 126. "voluntatis perversitatem" "proicientis intima sua et tumescentis 
foras." 
162 Ibid. "et mirabar quod iam te amabam ... et non stabam frui deo meo" "sed 
rapiebar ad te decore tuo moxque diripiebar abs te pondere meo, et ruebam in ista cum 
gemitu." 
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corruptible, weighs down the soul, and our earthly habitation drags down the mind" 
(VII.xvii.23). 163 His "weakness reasserted itself, and I returned to my customary 
condition" (VII.xvii.23). 164 
To remain inwardly focused he needed the strength he didn't find "until I 
embraced 'the mediator between God and man, the man Christ Jesus' (1 Tim. 2:5)." 
(Vll.xviii.24).165 Only with the assistance of the incarnate Christ can the closed 
reflexivity of the will be open, only so can those who choose to "be made his subjects" be 
detached "from themselves" so they "no longer place confidence in themselves" and be 
transported over the threshold, "across to himself' (VII.xviii.24). 166 Also, importantly, 
Augustine learns that Christ did not despise flesh and he "acknowledged the whole man 
to be in Christ, not only the body of a man or soul and body without a mind, but a fully 
human person"' (Vll.xix.25). 167 This realization is salutary because the soul cannot 
remain inward, but, upon having encountered the divine, must return and dwell in the 
world. 
163 Ibid., 127. "sed mecum erat memoria tui, neque ullo modo dubitabam esse cui 
cohaererem, sed nondum me esse qui cohaererem, quoniam corpus quod conumpitur 
adgravat animam et deprimit tenena inhabitatio sensum mul ta cogitantem." 
164 Ibid. "per ea quae facta sunt intellecta conspiciuntur " "repercussa infirmitate 
redditus solitis" 
165 Ibid., 128. "nee inveniebam donee ampJecterer mediatorem dei et hominum, 
hominem Chris tum Iesum." 
166 Ibid. "per quam subdendos deprimeret a seipsis et ad se traiceret, sanans 
tumorem et nutriens amorem, ne fiducia sui progrederentur Jongius." 
167 Ibid., 129. "quia itaque vera scripta sunt, totum hominem in Christo 
agnoscebam, non corpus tan tum hominis aut cum corpore sine mente animum." 
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Even though Book VII brings the soul so much nearer the divine encounter, at this 
stage it still lacks understanding: Without encountering Christ, "I prattled on as if I were 
an expert, but unless I had sought your way in Christ our Savior (Titus 1:4 ), I would have 
been not expert but expunged"(VII.20.26). 168 The books of the Platonists have their 
function, however, separating the stages in the journey inward, and showing the 
"difference between presumption and confession, between those who see what the goal is 
but not how to get there and those who see the way which leads to the home in bliss, not 
merely as an end to be perceived but as a realm to live in" (VII.20.26). 169 They open the 
appetite for the Scriptures in part by suggesting the power of what is to come, in part by 
simply not leaving the reader fully satisfied as they "do not contain the face of this 
devotion, tears of confession, your sacrifice, a troubled spirit ... , the cup of our 
redemption" (VII.xxi.27). 170 Book VIII will show that only "the sacred writings of your 
Spirit" can heal the will. He speaks to Simplicianus of reading the Platonists, and the 
priest reassures him that these texts are a proper gateway to Scripture, and that "in all the 
Platonic books God and his Word keep slipping in" (VIII.ii.3). 171 
168 Ibid., 130. "garriebam plane quasi peritus et, nisi in Christo, salvatore nostro, 
viam tuam quaererem, non peritus sed periturus essem." 
169 Ibid. "discemerem atque distinguerem quid interesset inter praesumptionem et 
confessionem, inter videntes quo eundum sit nee videntes qua, et viam ducentem ad 
beatificam patriam non tan tum cernendam sed et habitandam." 
170 Ibid., 131. "non habent illae paginae vultum pietatis huius, lacrimas 
confessionis, sacrificium tuum, spiritum contribulatum, poculum pretii nostri." 
171 Ibid., 135. "in istis autem omnibus modis insinuari deum et eius verbum." 
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Even though he had just stepped over the threshold towards his own interiority 
and is certain of God as the foundation and sustainer of all that exists, including himself, 
the lure of the temporal and the call of all that changes is still prevalent. As Book VII 
ends so does Book VIII begin, with Augustine's concession that his "desire was not to be 
more certain of you but to be more stable in you. But in my temporal life everything was 
in a state of uncertainty" (VIII.i.l ). 172 The will doesn't love with the fullness of its insight 
and though Augustine is "attracted to the way, the Savior himself," he "was still reluctant 
to go along its narrow paths" (VIII.i.1). 173 But the progress he has made is real: he had 
surpassed the "vain in whom there is no knowledge of God" (VIII.i.2), 174 had "climbed 
beyond vanity" and had found "you our Creator and your Word who is God " 
(VIII.i.2).175 Augustine had "discovered the good pearl" though "to buy it I had to sell all 
that I had; and I hesitated (Matt. 13:46)" (VIII.i.2). 176 
Yet hope is near, introduced by the story of a successful conversion, told by 
Ponticianus, where the protagonist "read on and experienced a conversion inwardly 
where you alone could see and, as was soon evident, his mind rid itself of the world" 
172 Ibid., 133. "ablata rnihi erat, nee certior de te sed stabilior in te esse cupiebam. 
de mea vero temporali vita nutabant omnia." 
m Ibid. ". "et placebat via ipse salvator, et ire per eius angustias adhuc pigebat 
174 Ibid., 134. "vani sunt certe omnes homines quibus non inest dei scienti." 
175 Ibid., 134. "transcenderam earn et .. . inveneram te creatorem nostrum et 
verbum tuum." 
176 Ibid. "et inveneram iam bonam margaritam, et venditis omnibus quae haberem 
emenda erat, et dubitabam." 
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(VIII. vii.l5). 177 This functions as a trigger that prompts Augustine to compare himself to 
those who found their "soul's health." He finds that he falls short, and recollects his 
journey from the first step in this progressive return to the divine, when he found Cicero's 
Hortensius and "had been stirred to a zeal for wisdom" (VIII. vii.17). 178 He had been 
delaying corning to terms with his state but finally "the day had now come when I stood 
naked to myself" (VIII. vii.l7) 179 and finds that he cannot answer the challenge of his 
conscience as to why he was not quicker to rid himself of his "burden of futility" 
(VIII. vii.17) 180 even in light of the new insights he now had. He cannot overcome this 
state, he is "gnawing at my inner self"(VIII.vii.17)181 and cannot simply will himself to 
move forward; it is from this state, "in the middle of that grand struggle in my inner 
house, "(VIII. viii.19) 182 that he seeks refuge in his garden, "where no one could interfere 
with the burning struggle with myself in which I was engaged" (VIII. viii.19). 183 
This moment of crisis reaches such heights because Augustine hears the call, 
wishes to obey it, yet watches himself with "indignation and distress," unable to enter 
177 Ibid., 144. "et legebat et mutabatur intus, ubi tu videbas." 
178 Ibid., 145. "excitatus eram studio sapientiae." 
179 Ibid. "et venerat dies quo nudarer rnihi." 
180 Ibid. "sarcinam vanitatis." 
181 Ibid. "ita rodebar intus." 
182 Ibid. "146. "in ill a grandi rixa interioris domus meae." 
183 Ibid., "ubi nemo impediret ardentem litem quam mecum aggressus eram." 
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"into my pact and covenant with you," fully "aware how ill I was, unaware how well I 
was soon to be" (VIII.viii.19). 184 His illness is one of the will, a will not "strong and 
unqualified" but rather "half-wounded, struggling with one part rising up and the other 
falling down" (VIII.viii.19). 185 Augustine observes that "the body obeyed the slightest 
inclination of the soul to move the limbs at its pleasure more easily than the soul obeyed 
itself, when its supreme desire could be achieved exclusively by the will alone" 
(VIII. viii.20). 186 In the garden, thinking of the choice of Adam and Eve that at first 
brought on the possibility of interior conflict, Augustine seems to be telling a story of a 
fervid attempt to re-enter Eden through reconciling the "delight of eternity" that "draws 
us upwards and the pleasure of temporal good" that "holds us down" (VIII.x.24). 187 
A "vast storm" (VIII.xii.28) 188 gathers in the heart as this interior exploration 
approaches its end and as Augustine comes to terms with the need to relinquish the 
temporal and the external and with the limitation of what he can accomplish on his own; 
he cries "Why not now? Why not an end to my impure life in this very hour?" 
184 Ibid, 146. "indignans indignatione turbuie11tissima quod 11011 irem in placitum 
et pactum tecum" "gnarus quid mali essem et ignarus quid bo11i post paululum futurus 
essem." 
185 Ib.d 147 "~ . . " " . . I d 1 ., . 10rt1ter et mtegre sem1saucwm ... vo u11tatem parte a surgente 
cum alia parte cadente luctantem." 
186 Ibid. "faciliusque obtemperabat corpus tenuissimae voiu11tati animae, ut ad 
nutum membra moverentur, quam ipsa sibi anima ad voluntatem suam magnam in sola 
voluntate perficiendam." 
187 Ibid., 150. "ita etiam cum aeternitas delectat superius et temporalis boni 
voluptas retentat inferius." 
188 Ib.d 152 " II . " 1 ., . proce a mgens. 
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(VIII.xii.28).189 And instantly, with the well-known chant of "toile lege, toile lege," 
(VIII.xii.29)190 the storm abides. "At once," he writes, "my countenance changed" and he 
"checked the flood of tears." Conversion replaces Augustine's own language with the 
redeemed language of Scripture, and before speaking to anyone, he consumes the 
"inspired utterance" of the first passage he sees "in silence." 191 The effect of the verse is 
immediate in dispelling the storm: "it was as if a light of relief from all anxiety flooded 
into my heart" (VIII.xii.29). 192 Augustine passes into a new inward stage, one of peace 
and still waters, in striking contrast to the unpredictable chaos of the natural forces by 
which the soul had been tossed about. 
In Book IX, newly converted, for the first time fully and committedly turned, or 
rather re-turned, Augustine the traveler has come to understand what Augustine the 
narrator tells readers in the very first book, namely that the purpose of speech is to praise 
God. Thus, Book IX begins with praise from Psalms: "I will sacrifice to you the offering 
of praise ... Let my heart praise you and my tongue ... Let [my bones] speak, answer me, 
189 Ibid., 152. "quare non modo? quare non hac bora finis turpitudinis meae?" 
190 Ibid. "Pick up and read, pick up and read" 
191 Ibid., 153. "statimque mutato vultu" "represso que impetu lacrimarum" "tali 
oraculo" "et legi in silentio" 
192 Ibid. "statim quippe cum ... quasi luce securitatis infusa cordi meo omnes 
dubitationis tenebrae diffugerunt." 
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and say to my soul'I am your salvation" (IX.i.l). 193 Having fully entered inward, he 
finds a great difference in the orientation of his speech, as "I was now talldng with you, 
Lord my God" (IX.i.1 194). In the interior landscape, he and companions were "climbing 
out of the 'valley of tears' (Ps. 83:6f)" as the divine Word took seed and he "carried your 
words transfixing my innermost being" (IX.ii.3). 195 This conversion of language and 
through the language of Scripture is followed by giving up his professional post as 
"salesman of words in the markets of rhetoric" (IX.ii.2). 196 He writes of relinquishing his 
profession, "you delivered my tongue from a task from which you had already delivered 
my heart" (IX.iv.7). 197 Language comes to an end, is exhausted, even physically, as soon 
thereafter Augustine falls ill: "my lungs had begun to weaken ... and deprived me of the 
power to speak clearly or for any length of time" (IX.ii.4). 198 This provides him with a 
genuine excuse for leaving his profession without incurring the ire of his pupils or their 
parents. The loss of language outwardly directly corresponds to the beginning of the 
193 Ibid., 155. "tibi sacrificabo hostiam laudis. laudet te cor meum et lingua mea, 
et omnia ossa mea dicant, 'domine, quis similis tibi?' dicant, et responde mihi et die 
animae meae, 'salus tua ego sum." 
194 Ib.d " . b .b. d . d " 1 . et garne am tl 1, ... , ammo eo meo. 
195 Ibid., 156. "a convalle plorationis ascendentibus" "gestabamus verba tua 
transfix a visceribus." 
196 lbid., 155. "ministerium linguae meae nundinis loquacitatis." 
197 Ibid., 159. "eruisti linguam meam unde iam emeras cor meum." 
198 Ibid., 157. "pulmo meus cedere coeperat et difficulter trahere suspiria ... se 
saucium vocemque clariorem productioremve recusare." 
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inward, new awareness of the converted, whose own language has first been replaced 
with the words of the Scripture he will later come to embody as vox to the divine Verbum. 
He finds joy in the Psalms, "utterances of devotion which allow no pride of spirit 
to enter in!" (IX.iv.8). 199 They give him an outlet for a redeemed rhetoric, and help him 
remember his path: "as I heard the psalm, I trembled at words spoken to people such as I 
recalled myself to have been" (IX.iv.9).200 And it is in various scriptural texts that he 
finds the language to recounts his transition. Inspired by Paul he writes, "but now the 
goods I sought were no longer in the external realm, nor did I seek for them with bodily 
eyes in the light of this sun" (IX.4.10).201 He seeks shelter in Scripture to write of the 
Manichees, "in desiring to find their delights in externals, they easily become empty and 
expend their energies on the things which are seen and temporal " (2 Cor. 4: 18) 
(IX.iv .1 0). 202 He appeals to John's Gospel and again to Paul's letters to express his new 
understanding that "we are not the light that illuminates every man (John J :9). We derive 
our light from you, so that we 'who were once darkness are light in you' (Eph. 5:8)" 
(IX.iv.lO). 203 And it is with Psalms that he describes finding the rest promised at the 
199 Ibid., 160. "sonos pietatis excludentes turgidum spiritum." 
200 Ibid., 161. "et ideo audivi et contremui, quoniam talibus dicitur qualem me 
fuisse reminisce bar." 
201 Ibid., 161. "ec iam bona mea foris erant nee oculis carneis in isto sole 
quaerebantur." 
202 Ibid. "volentes enim gaudere forinsecus facile vanescunt et effunduntur in ea 
quae videntur et temporalia sunt." 
203 Ibid., 162. "non enim lumen nos sumus quod inluminat omnem hominem, sed 
inluminamur ate ut, qui fuimus aliquando tenebrae, simus lux in te. " 
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beginning of the journey, joyfully declaring his revelation that "In you is repose which 
forgets all toil because there is none beside you, nor are we to look for the multiplicity of 
other things which are, not what you are. For 'you Lord, have established me in hope by 
means of unity' (Ps. 4:1 0)" (IX.4.11).204 
Augustine finds rest from the tumult of his wanderings through conversion and 
then baptism when "disquiet about our past life vanished from us" (IX.vi.14)?05 At 
Ostia, Augustine glimpses the mystery of the Verbum beyond the vox. As he converses 
with Monica, their "minds were lifted up by an ardent affection toward eternal being 
itself" (IX.x.24).206 As they "ascend even further by internal reflection and dialogue and 
wonder at your work," they "enter into our own minds." (IX.x.24). 207 This divine ascent 
and pinnacle of Augustine's journey inward and upward reaches, however momentarily, 
the "region of inexhaustible abundance where you feed Israel eternally with truth for 
food" (IX.x.24).208 This region of truth and wisdom, atemporal and wordless, they 
"touched in some small degree by a moment of total concentration of the heart" only to 
204 Ibid. "in te requies obliviscens laborum omnium, quoniam nullus alius tecum 
nee ad alia multa adipiscenda quae non sunt quod tu, sed tu, domine, singulariter in spe 
constituisti me." 
205 Ibid., 164. "baptizati sumus et fugit a nobis sollicitudo vitae praeteritae." 
206 Ibid., 171. "erigentes nos ardentiore affectu in id ipsum." 
207 Ibid., 171. "et adhuc ascendebamus interius cogitando et loquendo et mirando 
opera tua et venimus in mentes nostras." 
208 Ibid. "regionem ubertatis indeficientis, ubi pascis Israhel in aeternum veritate 
pabulo." 
91 
return to "the noise of our human speech where a sentence has both a beginning and an 
ending" (IX.x.24)209 so unlike the divine word, which "dwells in you without growing old 
and gives renewal to all things" (IX.x.24).210 
Ultimately, language provides Augustine with the scaffolding needed to achieve 
understanding beyond itself: It causes Augustine and Monica to sigh with longing for the 
unmediated silence they briefly glimpsed, where in the absence of language, 
understanding was manifest: 
if to anyone the tumult of the flesh has fallen silent, if the images of earth, water, 
and air are quiescent, if the heavens themselves are shut out and the very soul 
itself is making no sound and is surpassing itself by no longer thinking about 
itself, ... if all language and every sign and everything transitory is silent ... then 
he alone would speak not through them but through himself. We would hear his 
word, not through the tongue of the flesh, not through the voice of an angel, nor 
through the sound of thunder, nor through the obscurity of a symbolic utterance. 
Him who in these things we love we would hear in person without their 
mediation . . .. So too eternal life is of the quality of that moment of understanding 
after which we sighed. (IX.x.25). 211 
209 Ibid. "et dum loquimur et inhiamus illi, attingimus earn modice toto ictu 
cordis" "strepitum oris nostri, ubi verbum et incipitur et finitur." 
210 Ibid. "in se permanenti sine vetustate atque innovanti omnia." 
211 Ibid., 172. "si cui sileat tumultus carnis, sileant phantasiae terrae et aquarum et 
aeris, sileant et poli, et ipsa sibi anima sileat et transeat se non se cogitando . . . omnis 
lingua et omne signum, et quidquid transeundo fit si cui sileat omnino ... et loquatur ipse 
solus non per ea sed per se ipsum, ut audiamus verbum eius, non per linguam carnis 
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As the passage recapitulates the stages of the soul's journey, the fleeting overcoming of 
the soul and of its language is total. It encompasses the material body, the sensory 
information from the world outside, the intellect, and leaves the soul fully, if temporarily, 
remedied of its self-concern. It has, the sequential language of the passage describes, 
bypassed the successiveness of language and the dark mirror of reason, and absent 
temporality and the 'carnis' of the material it is free of the 'aenigma similitudinis.' The 
'momentum intellegentiae' offers the soul the promise of eternity and the temporal 
description reminds it it cannot stay. 
Cloaked by the power of language redeemed, of Scripture, which Augustine 
invoked and inhabited from the very beginning of the Confessions, Augustine is able to 
show how each step towards conversion has aided in his self-knowledge as he traveled 
away from the false promise of the externals to the truth of the divine within. The soul 
escaped out of the abyssal wilderness that endangered it with torrents, whirlpools and 
abrupt cliffs. It left the deserts of destitution and its cycle of sterile concupiscence was 
rent open. It discovered and faced its interior, climbing toward it with the aid of texts and 
stories of conversions, culminating with Scripture, until it reached its inner summit. 
Language remains important, if not for achieving direct knowledge of the divine, 
for worship and for teaching. And Augustine, as the Confessions shows, does not resort 
to silence. Language is a sign of mediation, of distance, of time and of space, of 
dissimilarity, of what makes us human. For Augustine, Incarnation seeks to redeem the 
neque per vocem angeli nee per sonitum nubis nee per aenigma similitudinis, sed ipsum 
quem in his amamus, ipsum sine his audiamus ... ut talis sit sempiterna vita quale fuit 
hoc momentum intellegentiae cui suspiravimus." 
93 
nature of language as it seeks to redeem the nature of man. Through the Incarnation, 
divine meaning is coupled with human word, verbum meets vox and revelation can serve 
as the antidote of fallen language. And this is how Augustine can go on speaking, lifting 
his longings, his hopes, his learning, and intertwining it with scriptural language, proving 
at all times that if he speaks, he speaks as the vox of the divine verbum, rather than as a 
disconsolate, meaningless noise. 
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Dante's Inferno 
If in the Co11{essions Augustine carves out the interior space as he travels through 
it, clearing out paths wherever the desires of the will and the pull of the intellect appear to 
reveal where truth might reside, until, after many false starts, he hears the call of the 
divine Word and orients himself towards his very own center, discovering the presence of 
God in the heart, for Dante, that interior is already there, fully built, even though the 
protagonist may at first walk blindly, unclear of which way he needs to turn. If 
Augustine's epic journey mentions the abyss as a fearsome and dangerous state the soul 
finds itself in when facing away from God, a metaphorical suggestion of a location that 
evokes the horror of the soul, its sense of peril and spiritual submergence in the unknown, 
for Dante, the abyss has become concretized, developed, an inverted city sprung out of 
mis-oriented will, a pit borne out of wrongful intentions and habits where souls, in terror, 
enact their error eternally. 
Augustine builds his world out of his own travails; he makes an example, a 
landscape, of himself, becoming to himself a region of destitution and climbing up his 
own inner mountain at Ostia. In his turn, Dante's pilgrim is traveling through a solid, 
architecturally defined, concrete world of punishment, moving downward in a museum of 
divine justice, observing those God already made an example of. He is witnessing the 
shades as pure consequence of that which they desired in a downward crescendo of 
punishment from lust to malice to fraud, from incontinence and violence to the bitterest 
of treacheries, from piercing laments to frozen silence. 
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While Augustine's narrator often remarks that his journey is guided and 
overseen by the divine will even when he is turned away, in Dante's journey, the very 
geography conspires for the down to point upwards, for the wrong way to be built-in the 
right way. As John Freccero argues in "Dante's Pilgrim in a Gyre," in Dante's three-
dimensional space, following Aristotle's cosmic model where absolute left and right were 
West and East, and absolute up was South, and Aquinas's explanation of the map of the 
'cosmological man' where human beings reside in the Northern, cosmically downward 
hemisphere, "the pilgrim is traveling upwards, even during his descent into Hell, for true 
'up' in the cosmos is 'down' to us. 1 And this, as Freccero continues, is "the literal 
justification of the moral truth," 2 Augustine's meaning as he writes in Book IV of the 
Cm~fessions, "Come down so that you can ascend, and make your ascent to God" 
(xii.l9).3 
If in Plato's shadow, improper action was the result of ignorance, and once 
understanding was achieved the will necessarily followed, for Augustine, the will appears 
to have the capacity of choice; it is not disposed towards the good alone, but is capable of 
inclination towards both good and evil. Yet the will, as shown in the Confessions, is 
vulnerable to acting against, or below its insight, and is in need of healing so that it can 
first know the good and then choose the good it knows, overcoming its Adamic heritage 
with respect to both understanding and action. For Dante, too, the problem isn't one of 
1 John Freccero, "Dante's Pilgrim in a Gyre," PMLA 76, no. 3 (1961): 170-171 
2 Ibid., 171 
3 Augustine, Confessions, trans. Henry Chadwick (New York: Oxford University 
Press, 1998), 64. 
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mere ignorance, which as Freccero writes, can be overcome by teaching. The issue is 
"how to apply that vision of the good to moral action." As in Augustine, "the solution of 
the problem lies only partially with man himself;"4 the pilgrim requires divine assistance 
throughout. 
In this journey of healing, the will, in order to find the way towards the divine 
and upwards, has to be corrected, pried away from the thrall of its habits which with 
"harsh bondage held me [Augustine] under restraints" (8. v .1 0). 5 The going downward, in 
Dante's Inferno, must unwind the will, "the descent, .. . , literally necessary to reach the 
hemisphere which is true 'up,' and tropologically necessary, for it profits a man to know 
moral truth only if he is able to will it, and he is able to will it only after he has plumbed 
the depths and recognized sin for what it is." 6 
In the polysemy Dante ascribes to his work in the 'Letter to Can Grande della 
Scala,' the allegorical perspective on its subject is the will's activity: "man according as 
by his merits or demerits in the exercise of his free will he is deserving of reward or 
punishment by justice"(25).7 Dante explains in the letter that the Commedia is concerned 
with "the branch of philosophy ... of morals or ethics; ... not for speculation but with a 
4 Freccero, "Dante's Pilgrim in a Gyre," 17 4. 
5 Augustine, Confessions, 140. 
6 Freccero, "Dante's Pilgrim in a Gyre,'' 178. 
7 Dante, "Epistole (XIII, 1-90)," Ed. Ermenegildo Pistelli, Testo critico della 
Societa' Dantesca Italiana; Florence: Societa' Dantesca Italiana, 1960, and Princeton 
Dante Project, June 2011, http://etcweb.princeton.edu/dante/pdp/epistoJe.htmJ: "homo 
prout merendo et demerendo per arbitrii libertatem iustitie premiandi et puniendi 
obnoxius est." 
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practical object" (40 [16]),8 echoing Aristotle's declaration in the Nicomachean Ethics 
that "the purpose of our examination is not to know what virtue is, but to become good, 
since otherwise the inquiry would be of no benefit to us" (ii.12.ll 03b26). 9 
Dante's Inferno is focused on what Aristotle calls the "virtue of character ... 
which "results from habit [ethos]" (ii .l.1103a15), on moral virtue. In his Ethics, Aristotle 
teaches that instead of being a property like the senses, which are present at birth, virtue 
of character is achieved by habituation: "we become just by doing just actions, temperate 
by doing temperate actions, brave by doing brave actions" (ii.1.(2).1103a30). Actions 
affect the agent, and the agent affects the quality of the action, therefore proper 
habituation is crucial since actions "control the character of the states we acquire" 
(ii.12.11 03b30). 10 
The features of this correct type of habit-forming include first avoiding either 
extreme, whether excess or deficiency, and striving for the mean (ii. 12). Aristotle 
correlates source and consequence, explaining how an action can influence an agent to 
then increase her ability for the performance of that action. For example, "habituation in 
disdaining what is fearful and in standing firm against it makes us become brave, and 
when we have become brave we shall be most able to stand firm" (ii.l2). 11 
8 Ibid. "Genus vero phylosophie ... est morale negotium, sive ethica ... quia non 
ad speculandum" 
9 Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, trans. Terence Irwin, (Indianapolis, IN: Hackett, 
1985), 35. 
10 Ibid., 33-35. 
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An additional aspect of proper habituation is the agent's response to her action, 
whether positive or negative, pleasurable or painful. Doing the proper action but 
resenting it is not virtuous; rather, taking pleasure in doing the right thing is the opposite 
of, or a victory over, our natural inclinations: "for it is pleasure that causes us to do base 
actions, and pain that causes us to abstain from fine ones. Hence we need to have had the 
appropriate upbringing ... to make us find enjoyment or pain in the right things" 
(ii.l3(1)1104b10).12 
If one is not properly habituated, a cure is offered here, one that appears echoed, 
among other sources, in Dante's Purgatorio. Aristotle explains, "Corrective treatment 
[for vicious actions] also indicates [the relevance of pleasure and pain], since it uses 
pleasures and pains; it uses them because such correction is a form of medical treatment, 
and medical treatment naturally operates through contraries" (2.13 (3)1104bl5). 13 No 
such medicine is available to the inhabitants of the Inferno, whose fate is to bear upon 
their shade bodies the literalized, physical equivalent to their crime. They can no longer 
hope for correction of the will. 
Virtue distinguishes itself from vice, then, by having the proper response in 
relation to pleasure and pain, by choosing well. To become virtuous, one must not 
simply do the good act, but must do it as the good person would; in other words, "the 
agent must also be in the right state when he does them. First, he must know [that he is 
It Ibid., 35-36. 
12 Ibid., 37. 
13 Ibid., 37. 
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doing virtuous actions]; second, he must decide on them, and decide on them for 
themselves; and third, he must also do them from a firm and unchanging state" 
(2.14.1105a30). 14 Knowledge, intention, and action are decidedly connected, and 
Aristotle reiterates that, indeed, thought alone is not enough, just as one doesn't become 
well by knowing the doctor's advice but not following it. 
Virtue and vice, however, do not suffice in considering the journey of the will. 
And Aristotle, in Book VII of the Ethics, introduces the topic of 'continence' and 
'incontinence,' 'akrasia.' In considering the level of knowledge the akratic person has, 
Aristotle remarks, "it would be terrible ... for knowledge to be in someone, but mastered 
by something else, and dragged around like a slave" (7.31.1145b25). 15 1f one assumes 
that the akrasia-afflicted may have knowledge, then, according to Aristotle, "there is no 
incontinence" but only ignorance. However, as Aquinas describes it in his commentary 
on the Ethics, "It is not the knowledge of the universal but only the evaluation of the 
sensible, which is not so excellent, that is dragged about by passion" (7.3.1352), 16 as the 
weak-willed has neglected the proper cultivation of virtue. 
Weak-willed is the station of the pilgrim in the beginning of the b~ferno, on the 
slope Freccero calls "the locus, in the moral landscape, of the Pauline situation, 
14 Ibid., 40. 
15 Ibid., 174. 
16 Thomas Aquinas, Commentary on the Nicomachean Ethics, trans. C. I. 
Litzinger, 0. P. (Chicago: Henry Regnery Company, 1964) and "Commentary of the 
Nichomachean Ethics", Dominican House of Studies, December 2009, 
http://dhspriory.org/thomas/Ethics7.htm#3. 
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knowledge without virtue, where the spirit is willing but the flesh is fatally weak." 17 The 
journey of the Inferno follows the pilgrim's moving on his two feet, will and reason, but 
limping as to his will. In the downward trajectory progressing from incontinence, where 
the will is swayed by passions, to malice, where reason is directly involved, the soul's 
movement is "analogous to the movement of the body"-the "figure of a man in the act 
of walking .. . quite literally the incarnation of the act of choice. "18 
If the soul began to limp in Eden, when the serpent lured Adam and Eve into their 
infamous choice, language itself, as Dante explains, also originated, and faltered, in the 
garden. In De Vulgari Eloquentia (VE), 19 after ascertaining that Adam was the first to be 
granted speech, Dante wonders what his first word might have been, and declares that, as 
"will readily be apparent to anyone in their right mind" (I.iv.4), the first word was "the 
name of God or El, in the form of a question or of an answer," (I.iv.4) man's speaking the 
name of God to God since "he had been made human by Him and for Him" (I.iv.4) Yet 
since the fall, language has born the mark of the separation between man and God. Dante 
notes that since the "disaster that befell the human race, the speech of everyone of us has 
begun with 'woe!' (heu I.iv.4).21 The interjection brings to mind the opening of the 
17John Freccero, "Dante's Firm Foot and the Journey without a Guide," The 
Harvard Theological Review 52, no.4 (Oct. 1959): 250. 
18Ibid., 264. 
19Dante Alighieri, De Vulgari Eloquentia, ed. Pio Rajna, trans. Steven Botterill, 
(Florence: Societa Dantesca Italiana, 1960), and Princeton Dante Project, June 2011 , 
http://etcweb.princeton.edu/dante/pdp/vulgari.html 
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Inferno, where the narrator's first self-conscious word to the reader is a similar cry, 'ahi!', 
regarding the difficulty of describing the awakening in the dark forest (h~j: 1.4).22 
If Adam, as Dante imagines, spoke first to God, Dante questions why he may 
have done so given that "God knows all our secrets without our putting them into words" 
(l.v.2). His answer regarding the initial purpose of speech is the same as Augustine's, 
namely, "He still wished that Adam should speak, so that He who had freely given so 
great a gift should be glorified in its employment" (l.v.2). Language itself is of value and 
the fact that "we rejoice in the ordered activity of our faculties is a sign of divinity in us" 
(l.v.2) and it is desirable in praising God. If Augustine balances the epistemological 
hesitations of language with the gratitude for divine revelation, Dante expresses a similar 
perspective, finding grounds for his linguistic optimism in the very story of creation as 
"the place of the first speech was in Paradise itself" (l.v.3).23 
"A form oflanguage," he explains, "was created by God along with the first soul" 
(I.vi.4). The notion of a 'form' affecting the lexicon, its morphological and phonetic 
rules, and syntax, almost, seems a notion of a deep structure or model of language itself, a 
set of rules of which the particular language Dante describes is a perfect manifestation. 
Adam, he continues, spoke the language that followed these rules, as did "all his 
descendants until the building of the Tower of Babel (which is interpreted as 'tower of 
22 Dante Alighieri, The Divine Comedy of Dante Alighieri, Volume 1, Inferno, ed. 
and trans. Robert M Durling, (New York: Oxford UP, 1996), 26-27. All Inferno citations 
are taken from the Durling translation. 
23Ibid. 
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confusion')" (I.vi.5), and this language is Hebrew.24 The importance of this conclusion is 
brought out with the consequent reference to Christ's genealogy which ensures he "should 
not speak the language of confusion, but that of grace" (I.vi.6), grace leading to a new 
optimism regarding language, now redeemed through the Incarnation of the divine 
L 25 ogos. 
The Hebrew language, the "sacratum ydioma," did endure among those who "had 
neither joined in the project nor praised it" (I. vii.8), but, Dante laments, the punishment 
for Babel led to each guild's speaking a different language, "and the more skill required 
for the type of work, the more rudimentary and barbaric the language they now spoke" 
(l.vii.7). Human beings, who desired to reach above the giver of their very nature, were 
stopped in their attempt by a confusion of the language they misused in their perverted 
desire. Instead of praising God with their language, they attempted to use it to "excel 
thei r creator" (I. vii.4 ), and their punishment was meted in a rather fitting example of the 
Conunedia-like 'contrapasso .' After naming Nimrod, the giant, as the leader of the tower-
builders in the VE, Dante places him silent, at the very bottom of the inverted tower of 
Babel that is the Inferno, isolated by a language that fails in its very purpose, as no one 
could understand his speech (l.vii.4)?6 
24 Ibid., I. vi.7: "So the Hebrew language was that which the lips of the first 
speaker moulded." 
25Ibid. 
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The consequence of the confusion of Babel has left language in a tenuous state. 
Structurally, it "has been assembled, in haphazard fashion" (I.ix.6), and has followed the 
punishment of human beings, in that it became neither eternal, nor unchanging: "Since 
human beings are highly unstable and variable animals, our language can be neither 
durable nor consistent with itself; but, like everything else that belongs to us ... it must 
vary according to distances of space and time" (I.ix.6). Yet out of the changeable can 
arise the illustrious. The vernacular he searches for, the elusive panther he hunts for in the 
forests of Italy, is likened to God: "its scent may still be stronger in one city than another, 
just as the simplest of substances, which is God, is more clearly present in human beings 
than in animals ... " (I.xvi.5). The illustrious vernacular "belongs to every Italian city yet 
seems to belong to none" being the form, the "hinge," really, "against which the 
vernaculars of all the cities of the Italians can be measured, weighted, and compared" 
(I.xvi.6). And it is in discussing the uses of the vernacular by the proper speaker that 
Dante again reflects on his understanding of the verbal sign. Language, he writes, "is 
nothing other than the vehicle indispensible to our thinking as a horse is to a knight," 
(II.i.8); worthy language, especially poetry, being paired here with worthy thinking: if 
"thought is not of the best it will not seem better for being mixed with the best type of 
vernacular, but worse- as would an ugly woman swathed in gold or silk" (II.i.l0).27 
The poet, as mediator and stand-in for Christ, can restore the shattered unity of 
language and its speakers, even as revelation restores the common language of the 
faithful. Yet, the poet must know the limits of his role. Just as will must ultimately be 
27Ibid. 
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healed through divine intervention, true understanding can only be facilitated by the 
divine Word. Dante prefaces his account of the importance of the noble vernacular with 
the clarification that he will "try, inspired by the Word that comes from above," to speak 
about the importance of the "vulgar tongue," hoping to aid those who "walk the streets 
like the blind, ever thinking that what lies ahead is behind them" (I.i.1),28 a qualification 
reminiscent of Augustine's in its refusal to take full responsibility for the communicative 
act, leaving the divine as the ultimate agent in the disclosure of meaning. "And so both 
these classes had better give up blaming me, and pray instead that God would grant them 
the sight of their eyes. For though I can move my finger to point out an object, it is out of 
my power to open men's eyes that they may see either the fact that I am pointing, or the 
object at which I point" (Preface). 29 For Augustine and Dante, speech, therefore, poetic 
or otherwise, must be redeemed so that it can be worthy of expressing divine truth; 
understanding and interpreting must be completed by divine inspiration as well. 
Dante and Augustine consider speech necessary to convey the inside to the 
outside, to "expound to others the concepts formed in our minds" (I.ii.3) In other words, 
as Dante explains in VE, humans are not transparent to each other, they do not share with 
the angels the "ready and ineffable sufficiency of intellect" that allows them to be known 
to one another fully by either communicating their very selves, or by being reflected, "in 
the fullness of their beauty and ardour, by that resplendent mirror which retains an image 
29 Augustine, On Christian Doctrine, Trans. J.J. Shaw, (Lawrence, KS: Digireads, 
2009) , 3. 
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of all of them" (Liii.3). Angels appear to be able to capture each other's "glorious 
concepts" either directly, as unmediated selves, or indirectly, but fully, through the mirror 
of their godlike understanding. Human beings, however, as VE alludes to the I 
Corinthians 13:12 passage, only see "through a glass, darkly" and only "know in part" 
therefore needing the explanatory aid of language. Angels can communicate pure 
. h h d . 30 meanmg; umans, owever, nee Signs. 
Humans, however, differ significantly from angels. They are characterized by 
reason, which "takes diverse forms in individuals" (Liii.l) so that having access to 
oneself does not ensure access to others; rather, individuals are so very different from one 
another that they each appear to represent one distinct type: it's as if, Dante writes, 
"almost everyone enjoys the existence of a unique species" (Liii.1). Unlike angels, the 
materiality shared by humans impedes them from entering "into each other's minds by 
means of spiritual reflection," "the heaviness and density of the mortal body" keeping the 
spirit "weighed down" (I.iii. 1). To overcome these difficulties, human beings needed 
"some signal based on reason and perception" (I.iii.1). This vehicle for meaning, as 
imagined here, had to be 1) rational, so that it can convey content between minds, and 2) 
detectable to sensory perception "for, if it were purely rational, it could not make its 
journey; if purely perceptible, it could neither derive anything from reason nor deliver 
anything to it" (I.iii.2). The solution is the verbal sign, which through its double nature as 
30 Dante, De Vulgari Eloquentia. 
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perceptible sound and inner, rational meaning can indeed bridge the gap between minds, 
allowing human beings to "communicate their conceptions among themselves" (l.iii.2)?1 
This notion of the linguistic sign bears a striking resemblance to Augustine's 
theory. As Marcia Colish writes, "Dante's treatment of poetry as an epistemic method ... 
parallels the rhetorical theology of Augustine ... and it is based on the same fundamental 
conception of words as signs." 32 Dante's poetics "appropriating for Christian poetry the 
role that Augustine entrusts to Christian rhetoric in the knowledge of God,":n aims, as 
Augustine did, to "express the Word and to move men toward God," a poetics that 
"through its aesthetic, moral, and intellectual rectitude, retains the functional 
interrelations between wisdom, virtue, and eloquence assigned by Augustine to redeemed 
speech. "34 Virtue, therefore, is the topic of the Comedy not only in terms of the exercise 
of free will, but also in terms of the practice of virtuous language-use, the 'rectitude' 
Marcia Colish defines as combining pleasing the audience with "accuracy and humility" 
regarding the poem's subject matter. The human being, she offers, is the principle source 
of signs of God, and he or she mediates as well as signifies God to his fellow men. 35 
In the Inferno, body and soul, language and thought, remain connected through 
the container metaphor, the play between outside and inside. Durling remarks, "in the 
31 Ibid. 
32 Marcia Colish, "Dante, Poet of Rectitude," The Mirror of Language, (Lincoln, 
NE: 1968), 152-53. 
33 Ibid., 153. 
34 Ibid. 
35 Ibid., 225. 
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medieval terms of Dante's analysis, the dual structure of integument versus content is 
inherent in language itself, whose necessity derives from the existence of the body ... 
The relation of integument and content is thus analogous to that between body and 
soul. "36 In Hell, will and language, together, face the abyss of their failing, ending, for 
Hell's proper inhabitants, with action frozen in ice, and with language silent. 
The Inferno37 begins in the middle: the middle of life, the middle of the forest, 
and the middle of the story itself. The middle of life as "nostra vita" (our life b~f I.1 )38 
signals that, even as the pilgrim39 is about to set out on a very individual journey, his is 
the journey of all. The middle of the story as its unfolding requires the wisdom of the 
Paradiso in order to even begin; it is an interpretative middle, where the poet mediates a 
world to the reader and announces himself as a stand-in for man and for Christ. The 
middle of the forest, the "selva oscura" (dark wood b~f !.2)40 is where the pilgrim is 
alone, making the reflexive pronoun 'mi' stand out sharply in response to the expansive 
36 Robert M Durling, "13 .The body analogy, 2: The Metaphorics of Fraud," 
Additional Notes, in The Divine Comedy of Dante Alighieri, Volume 1, Inferno, ed. and 
trans. Robert M Durling, (New York: Oxford UP, 1996), 576. 
37 My reading of the Inferno is greatly indebted to Professor Dennis Costa's class 
lectures in his Dante course at Boston University. I am grateful for his allowing me to 
attend many of the sessions while preparing the dissertation prospectus. 
38 Dante Alighieri, The Divine Comedy of Dante Alighieri, Volume 1, Inferno, ed. 
and trans. Robert M Durling, (New York: Oxford UP, 1996), 26-27. All Inferno citations 
are taken from the Durling edition unless otherwise noted. In-text references are to Canto 
number and line number in this edition. 
39 Within the discussion of the text, from here on, I refer to the pilgrim as 'Dante,' 
'pilgrim,' 'protagonist,' or 'traveler, ' and to the self-conscious narrator as 'narrator.' 
40 Dante, Inferno, 27. 
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"nostra," because the journey of penance must begin from the self. The use of the past 
tense, "ritrovai," creates a sense of time shared with the reader, a narrative 'then' in the 
poetic space. The reader steps within the world of the text and is invited to look back in 
time to this moment of middle. Yet the middle also implies, together with the past tense, 
that the journey has already taken place, and that the narrator is reliving it together with 
the reader, practicing a pilgrimage that the reader will also practice, reenacting the steps 
down and then up towards the divine, while placing the reader in the same confusing 
situation the pilgrim may have found himself in upon awakening. 
The story of the Inferno begins in an anti-Eden, a place of darkness and 
forgetting, a forest of confusion, echoing the moment of self-awareness immediately 
following the Biblical fall, the instance when Adam and Eve exercise their will, realize 
their separateness, and their eyes are opened. The first terzina also presents the poem as a 
digression, an entering into a fictional space that is plucked out of the temporal situation 
of the narrator's life, the forest pointing to the transition between the real and the poetic, 
the poem being itself a vision. The protagonist 'finds himself' into the woods without 
knowing how he got there, though knowing he had abandoned the "verace via" (the true 
way lnf !.12) not only by straying from the "diritta via" (straight way Inf 1.3) but also by 
using fiction to find truth in an alternate way. The first lines suggest that though this may 
be invention, it expresses a Christian truth, positioning the poem as a necessary detour to 
get back on the straight path, a linguistic corrector that elevates the didactic potential of 
poetry and also folds in itself the redeemed language of Scripture to explain its very 
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necessity. Poetry, when one is lost, can lead one back to the right path.4 1 
Once the temporal and spatial contexts have been established, the narrator, in 
declaring the difficulty of language to render the experience the poem recounts, interjects 
the cry "ahi," echoing that of Adam after the fall, as Dante had expounded in De Vulgari, 
placing himself in the lineage of those cast out of Eden. The 'oscura' of the landscape is 
also the 'oscura' of language. And it is difficult now, the narrator explains, at the 
moment of speaking to relate the past, "quanta a dir qual era e cosa dura" (how hard a 
thing it is to say what ... was lnf 1.4) linking the present of the narrator with the reader's 
own present as the story begins to unfold. As for its meaning, the hardness of the topic 
points also to a hardness of interpreting the sense of the story at this point, without the 
benefit of the divine light.42 
This great fear is quite sensory-based, and the tongue itself is affected by the 
asperity of the message, as well as its bitterness: "Tant'e amara che poco e piu morte" (lt 
is so bitter that death is little more so! lnf 1.7). The poem's aim involves a narrative 
taking over of the bitterness of the world to show the light and the good (lnf 1.8-9). The 
poem serves as an instructive confession, the pilgrim, corporeal, suffers the sensory 
onslaught and fear of death in order to bring to the reader the story of the halting and 
failing will, mistaken in its object of desire in the descent into the abyss.43 
41 Ibid., 27 
42 Ibid. 
43 Ibid.,"per trattar del ben ch'i' vi trovai, I diro de l'altre cose ch'i' v' ho scorte" 
(to treat of the good that I found there, I will tell of I the other things I saw.) 
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The first instance of the image of turning and gazing in relation to the will comes 
in a similitude, a seashore, where one "si volge a l'acqua perigliosa e guata," (turns back 
to the perilous water and stares Inf 1.24) with "lena affannata" (laboring breath Inf 
1.22).44 Breathing will come to signify both corporeality and the pilgrim's ability to speak 
as one alive in the Inferno, and therefore his singularity. In the narrative occasioning the 
simile, the protagonist's animo turns towards the "pass that has never yet left anyone 
alive," (b~f 1.25-27) just beginning to comprehend the impossibility of his position. If 
the simile refers to the corporeal traveler, the animo45 and its turning suggest the role of 
the will in directing the person, a role that is already prominent in the prologue where the 
very decision to undergo the journey unfolds. This turning is at the bottom of a hill 
Dante-pi-lgrim will not be able to climb, needing first to descend into Hell. The labyrinth 
of the landscape, it seems, guides him by restricting his possibilities, as he cannot turn 
around so as to leave, and he cannot go up the mountain in the carefully staged spiritual 
. 46 
exercise. 
If the first word of the narrator to the reader was the cry 'ahi,' the first words the 
pilgrim utters in the lnferno47 echo the liturgical aspect of the descent. Upon first 
44 lbid., 27. "si volge a l'acqua perigliosa e guata," "lena affannata." 
45 Robert Hollander, in his Commentary to lines 25-27 points out the distinction 
between the soul (anima) [which] animates the body" and "the animo [which] is the force 
within us that wills." See Dante, Inferno, trans. Robert and Jean Hollander (New York: 
Doubleday, 2000) and Dartmouth Dante Project, April 2012, 
http:/ /dante.dartmou th.edu/biblio. php?comm_id=20005. 
46 Dante, Inferno, 27. 
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glimpsing Virgil's yet unidentified presence, Dante responds with a double act of reading 
as he calls to the interlocutor and to his silent presence with "Miserere dime," (Have 
mercy on me ln:f 1.65), both quoting the Aeneid 48and quoting the incipit of 'Psalm 51 ,'49 
the penitential psalm. 5° The latter sets him in community with all penitents. It is a con-
text of conversion and re-justification, separating him from all he will meet in the 
Inferno, in addition to the distinction of his corporeality.51 
Virgil, unable to discern Dante's distinction, inquires into his apparent choice, 
his direction and intention, particularly why it is that he 'returns' "a tanta noia" (to so 
much suffering lnf 1.76), why did he 'turn' and not ascend "il dilettoso monte I ch' e 
principia e cagion di tutta gioia?" (the delightful mountain that is I origin and cause of all 
47 I refer to the space within which the pilgrim travels as Hell or Inferno, and to 
the text itself as Inferno. 
48 Unlike Augustine, who in the Cm~fessions states his view of classical literature as 
a dangerous temptation even though he employs some of its devices, Dante freely 
employs it in the service of his poetry. As William Franke writes, "Dante is combining 
classical tradition with Christianity, and Augustine is a major precedent, even though 
Augustine, for his part, rejected pagan literature and specifically the Aeneid. Contrary to 
Augustine, Dante places his emphasis on synthesis rather than disjunction between 
classical literary tradition and Christian revelation." "Dante's Poetic Revelation as 
Prophetic Truth," Philosophy and Literature 33 (2009): 253. 
49 "miserere mei Deus" Latin Vulgate Bible, The ARTFL Project, April 2012. 
'Psalm 50:3' 
http://artfl. uchicago.edu/cgi-bin/philologic/getobject.pl ?c.18: 1:49. vulgate.98775.98781 
50 See Virgil, Aeneid, Book VI.117. Robert Hollander, Commentary to lnfl.65, 
Dartmouth Dante Project, April 2012, 
http://dante.dartmouth.edu/search_view.php?doc=200051010650&cmd=gotoresult&arg1 
=14 
51 Dante, Inferno, 28-29. 
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joy? b~l 1.77-8)52 But after the fall, one cannot simply desire to ascend and then climb. 
Now, will unhealed, path cut off, the pilgrim must go down to come up, needing this 
"altro viaggio" (another path Inf 1.91) to leave the "loco selvaggio" (savage place lnf 
1.93).53 
As the pilgrim inquires into the purpose for his journey, his choice of words 
suggests the inherent death of baptism, the necessity of the abyss, as he worries about his 
readiness for "l'alto passo" (the deep pass lnf II.12)54 and hesitates in agreeing to 
proceed, speaking of it in terms, paradoxically, of deciding to let go of agency: "se del 
venire io m'abbandono" (if I abandon myself to the journey Inf II.34).55 The poem 
depicts both the enactment of the sacrament, a recalling of Christ's death, as well as a 
descent into the imagined consequence of a mis-oriented will. The pilgrim's own will is 
presented as an interior movement, struggling against itself, opposing itself, since to 
proceed would require it to let go of its desires; he resembles one who "disvuol cio' che 
valle" (unwills what he just now willed Inf II.37) and is ready to undo the promise of a 
beginning. 
When Virgil calls the pilgrim out for his cowardice, this weakness of will is 
portrayed again by a turning: "moltefiate l'omo ingombra I si che d'onrata impresa lo 
52 Ibid. 
53 Ibid., 30-31. 
54 Ibid. 
55 Ibid., 42-43. 
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rivolve, /comefalso veder bestia quand' ombra" (many times so encumbers a man that he 
I turns back from honorable endeavor, as a false sight I turns a beast when it shies b~l II. 
46-8). Turning of the will away from or to the goal, the pivoting forward and backwards 
on the "oscura costa" (dark slope lnf II. 40i6 brings attention to the direct role of the 
landscape for highlighting self-understanding in a spatial manner. The significance of 
this turning impresses the role of mediator that the narrator, as well as the pilgrim, takes 
upon himself. The decision to tell the story at all, as well as the decision to undergo the 
journey, is a result of the successful narrative that, from the reader's point of view, is yet 
to take place in the conversion-theater to follow. The choice is made by one already 
converted, presenting the drama of the narrative not simply for instruction, but also for 
personal edification, for living out the narrative as spiritual practice. The poem here 
appears to show its antechamber, the moment of the pilgrim's acceptance to undergo the 
difficult descent of the fractured will. This turning both prefigures and is a result of the 
eventual turning and healing of the will once free of Hell. 
As it marks the actual beginning of the descent, and of the poem following the 
prologue, the gate's message in Canto III establishes the order of things in Hell. 
56 Ibid. 
Per me si va ne la citta dolente, 
per me si va ne l'etterno dolore, 
Per me si va tra la perduta gente. 
Giustizia mosse il rnio alto fattore; 
fecemi la divina podestate, 
la somrna saplenza e '1 primo amore. 
Dinanzi a me non fuor cose create 
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se non etterne, e io etterno duro. 
Lasciate ogne speranza, voi ch'intrate (Inf III.l-9).57 
It is another direct preview, or pro-logue, about "la citta' dolente" (the grieving city Inf 
III.1) where reside "la perduta gente" (the lost people Inf III.3). It's worth noting the 
play on the word 'duro,' first as a verb to underscore Hell's everlasting quality, "io 
etterno duro" (I endure eternallnf III.8), and then as an adjective in Dante's inquiry into 
the sense of the inscription, which is "duro," (hard b~f III.11), repetition that recalls the 
earlier "cosa dura" (hard thing) in Canto 1.4. Both the telling of the story and its sense 
are 'hard.' Here, hardness is evoked materially by the hardness of the bedrock the 
inscription is engraved on, recalling, in contrast, the divine Word, the Logos, as the way, 
the door through which souls enter towards their salvation. 58 Furthermore, the allusion to 
2 Corinthians:3 recalls the contrast between the writing in stone and the writing on the 
heart, as the saved are themselves a letter "scripta non atramento sed Spiritu Dei vivi non 
in tabu/is lap ide is sed in tabulis cordis carnalibus. "59 
57 Dante, Inferno, 55. "Through me the way into the grieving city, I Through me 
the way into eternal sorrow, I Through me the way among the lost people. I Justice 
moved my high maker; I divine power made me, I Highest wisdom, and primal love. I 
Before me were no things created I Except eternal ones, and I endure eternal. I Abandon 
every hope, you who enter. (b~f III.l -9) 
58 Latin Vulgate Bible, The ARTFL Project, April2012, 
http:llartfl.uchicago.edulcgi-binlphilologiclgetobject. pl ?c.42: 1: 13. vulgate.83790.83794, 
John 14:6, "ego sum via et veritas et vita nemo venit ad Patrem nisi per me." 
59 Ibid., 2 Corinthians 3: 3, "written not with ink, but with the Spirit of the living 
God; not in tables of stone, but in fleshy tables of the heart" "King James Bible," The 
ARTFL Project, April 2012, http:llartfl.uchicago.edulcgi-
binlphilologiclgetobject.pl?c.46: 1 :3.kingjames. 
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The reader, as Freccero has pointed out,60 is not in a position to know who 
speaks with the words 'Per me.' Echoing the pilgrim's own confusion in the 'selva 
oscura,' the reader has to confront the unknown bearer of the pronoun in the three 
instances of 'Per me.' The gate provides an entry through language literally, a 
representation or counterpart of the spirit that gives life- here, letter, literally, kills, is the 
gate to eternal death. 61 It is a warning too, to the reader, that the literal, un-in-spired 
interpretation cannot give life . The words of the inscription, in the world of the poem, 
are signs that do not point away from themselves, but remain self-centered, signs that 
have lost their connection to life. This is the door to Hell, an entombing in language, a 
"ministratio mortis litteris deformata in lapidibus."62 
Yet interpretatively, as a metaphor, the inscription succeeds, representing, as 
Freccero writes, "the abandonment of all hope by the abandonment of all reference in its 
marmoreal self-containment. "63 This self referentiality and its futility become expressed 
in Hell in the behavior of the shades whose movements are repeated, unproductive. The 
hopeless circularity is further evident in the very representation of them as shades that 
appear as bodies, pointing to, as Freccero remarks, the Pauline association of the Jetter 
60 John Freccero, "Infernal Irony: The Gates of Hell," MLN, 99, 4 (September 
1984), 769-786. 
61 Latin Vulgate, 2 Corinthians: 3: 6 "littera enim occidit Spiritus autem vivificat"; 
King James Version: "for the letter killeth, but the spirit giveth life" 
62 Ibid., 2 Corinthian: 3. King James Version: "ministration of death, written [and] 
engraven in stones." 
63 Freccero, "Infernal Irony," 776. 
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with body and of signification with soul. They are dead, but appear alive, and they are 
shades, but appear embodied, appearance belied again and again by their startled 
response to Dante's embodiment. The dead soul, notes Freccero, can't be told apart from 
the body it is supposed to be signifying- it is the true death 'dramatized'64 by the words of 
the inscription pointing to the words in the inscription pointing to the words on the 
text/page. The gate embodies both the connection between language and person, and 
their mutual death here. The inscription also announces the pointlessness of desire, which 
can never be fulfilled here. Hope is hopeless. Will is not able to move.65 
As Virgil explains in Canto XI, the Inferno is a moral space exhibiting in its 
architecture a taxonomy of transgressions tainting every aspect of the soul, from 
concupiscence to absolute betrayal. Shaped as a downward, spiraling labyrinth, Hell is 
the anti-paradise, its levels leading to the center where Satan awaits. It may appear an 
ineffectual maze, a frozen image, where souls do not travel forward towards Satan, 
standing in for the awaiting Minotaur; they are already slotted for the circles in which 
they will spend eternity without any progress. Yet as a picture of humanity's having 
acted out its potential for sin, the maze comes to life, every section of damnation 
showcasing the human capability for moral destitution, until, at last, shades march to the 
inevitable end of the labyrinth, Satan's jaws. In keeping with the labyrinth allusion, and 
underscoring the lack of will or its inefficacy in Hell, Minos emerges as the visible agent 
of the implacable divine justice, acting on his own person the punishment the soul is sent 
64 Ibid., 779. 
65 Dante, Inferno, 54-55. 
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to, embodying the very architecture of Hell, sending the shades into their "loco d'i1~jerno" 
(Inf V .1 0) upon their confessions, which hold no absolution. 
In this "canticle of the submerged," the moving, developing will of the traveler 
transforms the static, eternal horror of the punished into a metaphor of conversion. The 
space of the Inferno serves as the theater within whose walls the dramatization of the 
distinction between the shades and the traveler unfolds. In relation to the shades, it is the 
ground on which they act out their unrest, the ordering principle of their punishments. 
For them, residing in their allotted circles, the abyss is an unchanging container. The 
punished, their soul-bodies, are trapped in the physical, literalized manifestation of the 
metaphorical description of their trespasses. Yet they, together, serve as the figurative 
that ultimately points the pilgrim away from that which they model. For the pilgrim, the 
Inferno is a stage, however frightfully present, in the movement from bad to good. As 
such, instead of confining him, the landscape moves him along. If the shades are trapped 
in a circular existence, the downward spiral the pilgrim will discover appropriately 
showcases his distinction, as he can and will change and learn. 
As the reader witnesses the pilgrim's lessons she isn't a mere spectator to the 
pilgrim's unwinding will. Through the narrator's address, the reader explicitly becomes 
an interlocutor, a participatory audience. The narrator self-consciously communicates 
with the reader on how the work as remembrance, and its rendition, has impacted him 
and how it should impact the reader. But the narrator has become a character in his own 
fiction, so the reader must not only interpret the pilgrim's journey, but also the responses 
of the narrator to his experiences. Because the narrator dramatizes for the reader the 
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experience of reading, he is making overt the connection between the training of pilgrim's 
will to his own training in reading well. Reading is further, and primarily, involved in 
there having been a story to begin with, as the conversion story of the pilgrim rests on, 
and responds to, the reading and interpreting of the narrative of Christ. 
And so the reader must navigate these layers with care, learning from and with the 
pilgrim not to fall into the abyss it witnesses through inordinate compassion or 
identification, not to become so taken with the story as to risk self-referential death, the 
danger of becoming entombed in the text and of not achieving the transformative aim the 
narrator has indicated. The perils of doing so are vividly set forth both in the description 
of the shades' plight and in the pilgrim's instructive descent. 
Virgil reminds Dante he must be resolute, must "lasciare ogne sospetto" 
(abandon every suspicion b~f III.14), a counterpart to 'lasciate ogne speranza' from the 
inscription, marking the pilgrim' s distinction from the shades in the Inferno, as his will 
can still act. Speaking to Dante about the place they are about to enter, Virgil weaves his 
explanations with language taken from the inscription: he takes the 'dolore' from "per me 
siva ne l 'etterno dolore" (through me the way into the eternal sorrow lnf III.2) and the 
'gente' from "per me siva tra la perduta gente" (through me the way among the lost 
people lnf III.3) and refers to the inhabitants of Hell as "le genti dolorose" ("he grieving 
people Inf III.17) who, like Virgil himself, do not benefit from the divine end of 
intellect's reach. In Limbo, when Virgil fully introduces himself he remarks of the spirits 
there, and therefore of himself, that they "non ebber battesmo, I ch 'e porta de la f ede che 
tu credi" ("did not receive baptism, which is the gateway to the faith that you believe" 
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Inf IV.32-3). 
Virgil echoes the portal that he did have, that of the Inferno, which for Dante 
functions instead as the first stage of his poetic, instructive, baptism. Virgil, as one of the 
shades of Limbo, is punished to exist eternally "in disio" but "sanza speme" ('in desire' 
but 'without hope' Inf. IV.42),66 fulfilling the inscription's message, and underscoring the 
the impossibility of resting in the divine, the reason for the journey of life, as Augustine 
writes in the beginning of the Confessions "You stir man to take pleasure in praising you, 
because you have made us for yourself, and our heart is restless until it rests in you" 
(l.i).67 The will's inability to act productively, to change the states of the shades stands in 
contrast to the progress of the pilgrim, which is mandated, as Virgil's explains to Charon 
and many subsequent guardians, by the divine decree, from a place of will that can act: 
"dove si puote I cio che si vuole" (where what is I willed can be done Inf. 111.95-6).68 
If the futility of the will's efforts is presented through increasingly horrible acts 
against the shade's selves, the inexorable circularity applies to language as well. In Hell, 
an inverted Babel of confused speech, language is in anguish. Beyond the gate, the air 
"sanza stelle" (starless b~f III.23), the travelers are presented with a taxonomy of sound, 
from the multitude of languages signaling the comprehensiveness of Hell and their 
dispersion at Babel, to dialect, word, accent and pitch "diverse lingue, orribilifavelle, I 
66 Ibid. 
67 Augustine, Confessions, 3. Durling also notes this connection in his Note to 
Canto 4, line 42 where he writes that those in Limbo "desire the beatific vision of God 
but cannot hope to reach it; compare with Augustine, Confessions 1.1," Inferno, 81. 
68 Dante, Inferno, 59 
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parole di dolore, accenti d'ira, lvoci alte efioche" (lnf III.25-7).69 No aspect of 
linguistic communication is impervious to Hell's reach, the first and perhaps 
' 
quintessential impression of sound being that of a whirlwind, a sand storm of painful 
utterances: "un tumulto, il qual s'aggira I sempre in quell'aura sanza tempo tinta, I come 
la rena quando turbo spira." (a tumult that turns forever in that air I darkened without 
time, like the sand when a I whirlwind blows lnf III.28-30).70 
From the first circle, girding the abyss, they proceed downward, and once Minos 
is silenced, "comincian le dolenti note I afarmisi sentire" (the grief-stricken notes begin 
to make I themselves heard Inf V.25-6). The pilgrim finds himself in a place where 
"d'ogne luce muto" (all light is silent lnf V.28),71 muted in the poem's play with the 
senses, and where souls are prey to the "bufera infernal, che mai non resta" ("infernal 
whirlwind, which never rests" Inf V.31), a wind that "voltando e percotendo li molesta" 
(turning and striking, it I tmtures them lnf V.33), because they, the lustful, "Ia ragion 
sommettono al talento" (subject their reason to their I lust b1f V.39).72 This circle is 
indicative of the general problem in this section of the h1ferno, where reside the weak 
willed, those whose reason became overpowered by the wind of a problematic desire, 
causing them to act against reason's dictates, keeping souls in perpetual motion. The 
69 Ibid., 25-27 "Strange languages, horrible tongues, words of I pain, accents of 
anger, voices loud and hoarse, and I sounds of blows with them" 
70 Ibid., 54-57. 
71 Ibid., 87. 
72 Ibid., 88-89. 
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souls' perdition, their untethered state, is underscored in the spirits' flight, which takes 
them "di qua, di Ia, di giu, di sit" (here, there, down, up lnf V.43) in a chaotic, 
disorienting whirlwind. 
The agony of the souls as they feel the effects of their sins is again expressed in 
the torment of sound, language as fully corrupted as their will has been: "quivi le strida, il 
compianto, illamento; I bestemmian quivi Ia virtu divina" (there the I shrieks, the 
wailing, the lamenting; there they curse I God's power Inf V.35-6) . As they approach, 
they are "traendo guai" (uttering cries Inf V.48)73 in response to which, once the pilgrim 
has identified his desired interlocutor, he "mossi Ia voce" (sent forth my voice Inf V.80/4 
and called the souls over. Dante's very act of speaking signals his embodiment, as he 
emphasizes the projection, the breathing necessary in order to speak. His emotive 
participation, his pity for Francesca and Paulo's plight, criticized later in the Inferno as 
misdirected, is a sign of failing to appreciate the finality and justice of Hell, his very 
corporeality increasing his response. The shades respond to Dante's call, even though to 
speak of memories causes them pain: "diro ' come colui che piange e dice" (I will do as 
one who weeps and I speaks Inf V.126.) . 'Piange e dice' is the theme in the Inferno as 
far as language of the shades is concerned. 75 
73 Ibid. 
74 Ibid., 90-91. 
75 Similarly, The prodigal and the avaricious, through their pointless and Sisyphic 
movements enact again and again the senselessness of movement towards that which is 
wrongly desired, each step drawing attention to how removed these souls are from the 
eternal rest: "for all the gold that is under the moon and that I ever was, could not give 
rest to even one of these weary souls" Inf VII.64-66) . Dante, Inferno 114-15. "che tutto 
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The new circle, of the gluttons, underscores the relentlessness of torment, not just 
of the rain in this circle, but of Hell as a whole as "its rule and quality never change" (Inf 
Vl.9). Here, as in an anti-paradise, the changelessness is that of despair, of unanswered 
hope, even as souls await the end of time and the return of their bodies, when change will 
mean a deepening of their suffering. The pilgrim, as the only traveler incarnate, is 
vulnerable to that pain all the more. 76 
As Virgil and his charge descend "a maggior pieta" (to even greater pity lnf 
VII.97),78 the angry explain their punishment together, with inarticulate sighs and a 
drowning anti-song: "This hymn I they gurgle in their throats, for they cannot fully I 
form the words" (lnf VII. l25-6). Their attempt to speak from their allotted place "in the 
mire" (lnf VII.l21) is another reminder of the distinction between the shades and Dante 
who can progress, while they are fixed in their murky place.79 When able to move, the 
shades only do so to enact a repetitive sequence whose terms are predetermined. 
The gate of Dis, announced first by the "duolo" (shrieking lnf VIII.65),80 
piercing Dante's corporeal ears, underscores Dante's embodiment: the fallen angels have 
noted his advancing toward the gates, the "porte," without having died, "sanza morte," 
I' oro ch'e sotto la luna e che gia fu , di quest' anime stanche I non poterebbe fame posare 
una" 
76 Ibid. , 100-01. "regola e qualita mai non l'e nova" 
78 Ibid., 116-17 
79 Ibid. , 118-19."quest' inno si gorgoglian ne la strozza, I che dir nol posson con 
parola integra" "nellimo" 
80 Ibid., 128-29. 
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(b~f VIII.82;84 ). Death itself, and therefore absence of the body that acts, proves a 
necessary gate of the city, a requirement only the pilgrim managed to sidestep. Virgil 
signals to Dante he wishes to speak to the devils "segretamente" (secretly b~f VIII.87), 
recalling Virgil's earlier invitation to take Dante into the 'secret things' no one alive, no 
one with a body, had experienced.81 
The demon checkpoint threatens the travelers' progress. The pilgrim is being 
challenged to go back, "Sol si ritomi per Ia .folie strada" (Let him return alone along his 
foolhardy path Inf VIII.91).82 The demons propose a turning that would undo the 
resolve of the pilgrim's will, would claim to act against divine will, and that would leave 
the protagonist alone in the 'secret' world without a guide, facing the first gate into the 
poem, the "passo I che non fascia gia mai persona viva" (pass that has never yet left 
anyone alive bif. 1.27). 83 
It is here that the narrator makes the first apostrophe to the reader to show his 
reaction to the "parole maladette" (cursed words b~f VIII.95) of the fallen angels. So 
great is his fear, the narrator confesses, that "I did not believe I would I ever return here" 
(Inf VIII.95-6). 84 Narrator and protagonist are fused here, the story teller unable to 
extricate himself from the story, afraid that he may remain prisoner of his own art, even 
as he is in fact breaking through the narrative wall, engaging the reader in the full and 
81 Ibid., 130-31. 
82 Ibid. 
83 Ibid., 26-27. 
84 Ibid., 131. "non credetti ritornarci mai" 
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present consequence of this threat, that of not simply failing in a metaphorical journey, of 
narratively getting lost, but that of dying before salvation. If the pilgrim enacts poetically 
the story of Christ, then failing here would be equivalent of Christ's being trapped in the 
underworld.85 And here, for a moment, Virgil's own virtuous, ornate speech becomes 
ominously fractured, "parola tronca" (truncated words b~l IX.14) as he attempts to make 
sense of being denied entrance. 86 
Underscoring the importance of gaze as an indicator of the will's inclinations, 
in the encounter with the furies, Virgil not only warns Dante to "turn around and keep 
your eyes closed" (lnf IX.55) because, were he to see the Gorgon, "there would I never 
be any going back up" (bif. IX.57); Virgil follows his words with action and "he himself 
turned me" (b~l IX.59). 87 He only releases Dante's eyes when the angel who will open 
the gate is visible, offering a safe object for Dante's gaze. 
But meaning is not left to chance here . The narrator interrupts the narrative 
once again to stress the interpretative lesson that parallels the pilgrim narrative: "0 you 
who have sound intellects, gaze on the teaching that is hidden beneath the veil of the 
strange I verses" (Inf IX.61-3). 88 Given the previous scene, with its emphasis on not 
gazing, the exhmtation invites the reader to be a discerning interpreter, to instead gaze 
85 Ibid.' 130-31. 
86 Ibid., 140-41. 
87 Ibid., 142-43. "volgiti 'n dietro e tien lo viso chiuso" (b~l IX.55). 
"nulla sarebbe di tornar mai suso" (lnf IX.57). "elli stessi I mi volse" (b~f IX.59). 
88 Ibid., 143. "0 voi ch'avete li 'ntelletti sani, I mirate la dottrina che s'asconde I 
sotto '1 velame deli versi strani" 
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upon the teaching of Scripture through the poetic layers of allegory, underscoring the 
didactic nature of the poem, while drawing attention to its character as text. The 'versi 
strani' serve, as it was suggested in the very beginning, as a corrector, a detour, a lie 
hiding, yet creating, the experience of its truth. This interlude points, too, to the multi-
layered meditations on language in the poem, where, on the one hand, the language of the 
shades appears wounded and tormented, yet the showcasing of that language in poetic 
form, the play of the pilgrim, narrator, and reader, and the weaving of scriptural allusions, 
serve to affect a response, to please, to instruct, and to create a transformative experience. 
The urgent exhortations of the narrator for the reader to be active, alert, 
discerning, and cautious appear particularly apt as the travelers descend into the division 
of deeper Hell where souls weren't merely caught up in the sway of their appetites and 
their emotions; their trespasses were acts performed with progressively fuller awareness 
of wrongdoing. When Dante fears facing the voice he hears from Farinata's tomb, Virgil 
commands him: "Volgiti! . . . I Vedi" (Turn! ... See lnf X.31), condoning the encounter, 
though limiting the speech: "Le parole tue sien conte" (Let your words be counted lnf 
X.39). Speech is becoming more of a concern on the descent since the shades here had 
exhibited more agency in their sins. 89 
In Canto XIII, upon escaping the "infamia di Creti" (the infamy of Crete Jnf 
XII.12), mocked in his helplessness and serving as his own prey, the travelers find 
themselves in a new anti-Eden, a "bosco I che da neun sentiero era segnato" (wood that 
no path marked" b~l XIII.1-2), which resonates with and recalls the first wood, the "selva 
89 Ibid., 156-57. 
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oscura," and where, too, he sees no path inward to explain how he arrived there. Then, 
he had lost himself and now, in the forest of the suicides, who negated personhood, the 
canto begins with words of non-being, "non era" (lnf XIII. I), suggesting the 
disorientation accompanying loss of self and signaling the non-being, the emptiness to 
come. The repetition of "non . .. ma" exacerbates the implacable absence, the dark forest 
filled with negation of life and confirmation of death: "Non fronda verde, ma di color 
fosco, I non rami schietti, ma nodosi e 'nvolti, I non pomi v 'eran, ma stecchi con tosco" 
(Not green leaves, but dark in color, not smooth I branches, but knotted and twisted, no 
fruit was there, I but thorns with poison XIII.4-6).90 
In this poisoned forest , language itself is challenged: "I heard cries of woe on 
every side but saw no I person uttering them" (lnf XIII.22-3),91 the disembodied voices 
pointing to the damage to the person, but also alluding to the moment of shame in 
Genesis , when Adam and Eve "heard the voice of the LORD God walking in the garden 
in the cool of the day: and Adam and his wife hid themselves from the presence of the 
Lord God amongst the trees of the garden" (Genesis 3:8).92 The confusion leaves Dante 
90 Ibid., 198-99. 
91 Ibid., 199. "Io sentia d'ogne parte trarre guai I e non vedea persona che '1 
facesse" 
92 Bible, King James Version. Latin Vulgate: "et cum audissent vocem Domini 
Dei deambulantis in paradiso ad auram post meridiem abscondit se Adam et uxor eius a 
facie Domini Dei in medio ligni paradisi." 
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at a Joss, "smarrito" (lnf XIIL24), 93a word that, in the context of the wood and lost way, 
recalls the loss of the 'din·ita via' in Canto 1, which 'era smarrita.' 
And to further the disorientation felt in a place with no anchoring of direction, the 
pilgrim utters a disorienting line, "cred' i"o ch'ei credette ch'io credesse" (My belief is 
that he believed that I must believe lnf XIIL25) regarding the origin of the voice, placing 
himself as well as the reader at the center of the confusion. Virgil indicates the problem 
of fragmented language, quite literally represented here: "se tu tronchi I qualche 
fraschetta d'una d'este piante, I li pensier c'hai sifaran tutti monchi" (If you break off 
some little twig from one of these plants, the thoughts you I have will all be cut off lnf 
XIII.28-30), 94 inviting Dante to partake in the violence against the unity of the plant, the 
only possibility to have it speak. 
The shades, trapped now in the body of tree stumps, enact a chaotic anti-
Incarnation, where the act of interpretation brings no salvation, where the seed of the 
soul, echoing the biblical parable of the seed of the revealed word, falls in unworthy soil, 
and will bear no fruit. The soul, divested from its body, "falls into the wood" (b~j: 
XIII.97) and "sprouts like a I grain of spelt" (b~f XIII.99), becomes a plant exposed to the 
Harpies who continue to inflict pain and break apart its new integrity.95 The souls' bodies 
are destined to hang on the bushes they've become, an echo of Judas's hanging, who 
binds the allusion to the crucifixion and the theme of suicide. It was because his actions 
93 Ibid. 
941bid. 
95 Ibid., 203. "cade in la selva" ( lnf XIIL97). "germoglia come gran di spelta" 
(h~f XIIL97 
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led to violence to the divine incarnate, that he resorted to violence against his own self, 
and, upon betraying Christ, hung himself. As it tells its story of suicide, the shade of 
Piero says his soul "ingiusto fece me contra me giusto" (made me unjust against my just 
self Inf XIII.72),96 presenting the suicide as a display against adversaries, rather than 
merely an act of violence against the body, a struggle that, as Durling notes, "condenses 
and almost spatializes the self-division of suicide." 97 
When the pilgrim is about to enter into the deeper circles of fraud, the narrator 
pauses to refer to his poem as "questa comedia," a "ver c'hafaccia di menzogna" (truth 
which has the face of falsehood lnf XVI.124) setting it apart from the fraud to come, 
which, as the monstrous Geryon does, presents the face of truth but is in fact falsehood. 
In his third apostrophe to the reader, the narrator swears to the truth of what he is about to 
reveal, in this case the description of Geryon, yet he does so "perle note I di questa 
co media" (by the notes of this comedy lnf XVI.127 -8), solemnizing the truthful lie of 
his art in preparation for the coming circles of deceit.98 
Geryon has brought them to Malebolge, which is described as a deep labyrinth, 
an ever narrowing series of valleys crisscrossed by ridges girding the central emptiness. 
This is a guided journey through the labyrinth the pilgrim, as well as the reader, takes for 
his own instruction, going the right way even when seemingly going the wrong way. 
96 Ibid.' 202-03. 
97 Ibid. Note to Canto 13, Line 72, 213. 
98 Ibid., 252-53. 
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Stepping virtually always to the left, in the upside down world, the travelers are really 
moving in the 'right' direction, just as going downward constitutes a going upward in the 
linear trajectory from north to south, from absolute down to absolute or cosmic up. 
In the first bolgia of the panderers and seducers, Dante's "chiarafavella" (clear 
speech b~f XVIII.53) coerces speech from a shade, Venedico Caccianemico, whose own 
speech, "Mal volontier lo dico" (unwilling I say it b~f XVIII.52), accompanies his 
punishment: "As he was speaking a demon struck him with his scourge" (Inf 
XVIII.64 ). 100 Dante's will prevailed over the will of the shade, and Dante becomes, 
indirectly, the agent of rebuke, as the shade, having cast his eye downward so as to not be 
whipped, is indeed punished upon speaking to Dante, upon disclosing his story. Because 
in this region of Hell language is so intertwined with the sin of fraud, shades do not 
eagerly reveal their back stories, reiteration often bringing with it the renewed force of 
their penalties. 
It was Jason the Argonaut's "parole ornate" (elaborate words lnf XVIII.91) 
that aided his deception of Hypsipyle and Medea, landing him in the first bolgia. In the 
next pocket, for the punished flatterers, words gain aptly malodorous mass. The travelers 
"sentimmo gente che si nicchia" ( heard people whimpering lnf XVIII. I 03), their 
improper use of language leaving them dehumanized, "che col muso scuffa," (puffing 
with their snouts lnf XVIII.104). 101 The one angry soul who speaks up against being 
recognized explains "qua giu m'hanno sommerso le lusinghe I ond' io non ebbi mai la 
100 Ibid., 276-77. "Cosi parlando il percosse un demonio I de la sua scuri"ada" 
101 Ibid., 278-79. 
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lingua stucca" ("I am submerged down here by the flatteries with which my tongue was 
never cloyed" lnf XVIII.125-6). 102 
Canto XX begins with another self-conscious reflection upon the very comedy, 
"Of a strange new punishment I must make verses I and take matter for the twentieth 
song in this first canticle, which is of those submerged" (Inf XX.l-3), bringing to the fore 
the fact that this is a multi-part work of fiction, and that the unifying situation of all those 
in Hell is that they are 'submerged,' not only under various fluids in several cantos, but 
overall underneath the ground. Whatever the form of their punishment, the shades reside 
in the abyss of Hell. In this canto, of the diviners, looking down into the fourth bolgia, 
Dante sees a "uncovered depth, which was bathed with anguished weeping" (b~f XX.S-
6), giving 'submerged' the meaning of not only under the earth, but also under their own 
weeping, as if their anguish had flooded them, and also the pilgrim, who empathizes with 
the state of the shades, and who himself weeps. 103 
In the fourth apostrophe to the reader, deploring the distortion of the body the 
pilgrim sees in the diviners, "so twisted that the tears of their eyes were bathing their 
buttocks I down the cleft" (Inf XX.23-4), the narrator declares, "Se Dio ti !asci, lettor, 
prenderfrutto I di tua lezione, or pensa per te stesso I com' io potea tener lo visa 
asciuttol .. certo io piangea" (So may God permit you, reader, to take profit from your 
reading, now think for yourself how I could keep dry eyes ... Surely I wept lnf XX.I9-
102 1bid., 280-81. 
103 Ibid., 304-05. "Di nova pena mi conven far versi I e dar matera al ventesimo 
canto I de la prima canzon, ch'e d'i sommersi" (lnf XX.l-3). "scoperto fondo, I che si 
bagnava d'angoscioso pianto" (Inf XX.S-6). 
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21, 25). 104 The narrator isn't only asking the reader to participate in the shades' sorrow; 
he is asking for empathy for his having to endure the retelling of such a horrific scene. 
To learn, the reader must experience, must live out the story alongside its protagonist and 
its nanator; the apostrophe makes the space between reader and text porous. 
Yet here, perhaps, the poem lures one in, and does so unreliably. Virgil 
rebukes Dante for his weeping, "are you still one of the other fools?" (lnf XX.27), for 
bringing "passion" to the "giudicio divin" (God's judgment lnf. XX.30), 105 and the rebuke 
then applies to the reader too. Should the reader learn to have compassion, or should the 
reader instead learn, together with the pilgrim, to accept the divine will and avoid the 
danger of compassionate overinvolvement? Virgil, himself one of the inhabitants of Hell, 
cannot appreciate the empathic stance of one traveling alive through this realm. He 
seems unable to perceive that Dante, embodied, feels , rather than merely observes, these 
tableaux of divine justice. To understand what he sees, Dante wishes to lean over the 
ridge, "/o era gia disposto tutto quanta I a riguardar" (I was already bent over to gaze 
lnf XX. 4-5), 106 his physical posture suggesting his emotional inclination, while Virgil 
orders, "Drizza la testa" (Raise your head b~f XX.31), 107 again redirecting that gaze. 
In the canto of the barrators, Dante's looking is problematic, his involvement 
too direct, and here, perilous. Turned towards the pitch and transfixed, Dante is exposed, 
104 lbid."si torta che '1 pianto deli occhi le natiche bagnava per lo fesso" 
105 Ibid." an cor se' tu de li al tri sciocchi?" 
106 Ibid., 304-05. 
107 Ibid., 306-07. 
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and in danger. Only at Virgil's urgent warning and his own physical repositioning does 
the pilgrim understand his precarious state: "Then I turned, like one eager to see what he 
must escape, whom sudden fear robs of vigor" (Jnf XXI.25-7), and "vidi dietro a noi un 
diavol nero" (I saw behind us a black devil (b~f XXI.28-9), turning again being a 
physical manifestation of the will's choices, and the danger of gazing fixedly at an object 
h b . d . 109 t at may e Improper to es1re. 
"Taciti, soli, sanza compagnia" (Silent, alone, without companions lnf 
XXIII.l), ultimately escaping their demonic followers, the travelers continue their path; 
yet Dante once more confronts fear, and "kept looking backwards" (lnf XXIII.20), his 
embodied panic--" all my hairs curling with fear" (b~f XXIII.19)-- 110 in stark contrast 
with Virgil's shade presence. Virgil responds by expressing his understanding of Dante's 
state as a mirror would, in the same way that angels would understand each other 
according to VE: "If I were made of leaded glass I would I not catch your outer image any 
faster than I grasp I your inner one" (lnf XXIII.25-7). 111 The statement to the 
transparency of understanding between Virgil and Dante and the latter's connection and 
coherence between the inner and the outer is all the more apt in light of the circle they are 
in, among the "gente dipinta" (painted people lnf XXIII.58). The shades, wearing cloaks 
109 Ibid., 318-19."mi volsi come l'uom cui tarda I di veder quel ch'ei convien 
fuggire, e cui paura subita sgagliarda" 
110 Ibid., 347. "stava in dietro intento" "tutti arricciar li peli I de la paura" 
111 Ibid., 349. "S'i fossi di piombato vetro, I l'imagine di fuor tua non trarrei I piu' 
tosto a me che quella dentro 'mpetro" 
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golden on the outside but underneath made of lead, (Inf XXIIL64-5) 112 "made their 
round," 11 3 reiterating the circularity of their state by their movement. If the lead in 
Virgil's mirror is there to reveal and aid in communication, the lead in the hypocrites' 
mantle serves as a reminder of their deception. Dante is recognized as alive, and therefore 
corporeal, because of the movement of his throat, his 'gola,' his 'parola' and his lack of 
the heavy mantle, the 'stola (Inf. XXIII. 85-88). 114 The pilgrim's embodiment is 
contrasted here with the false clothing of the hypocrites who bear on their person the 
mark of hypocrisy, the disconnect between their own actions, words, and thoughts. 
A new obstacle in the path appears, and Virgil guides Dante, telling him to pay 
attention to his embodiment as he navigates the rocks of the landscape, while 
acknowledging that "non era via da vestito di cappa" (it was not a path for anyone 
wearing a cloak Jnf XXIV.31), where 'cloak' recalls the inhabitants of the previous 
canto, while signifying the body here; corporeality continues to be a concern in the 
descent, as Dante confesses "My breath was so milked from my lungs" (Jnf XXIV.43) 11 5 
from navigating the rocky outcrops, that he is unable to go further, declaring the limits of 
his body. Yet these limits must be overcome, and Virgil's subsequent encouragement to 
prevail ends with the exhortation "conquer your panting I with the spirit that conquers in 
11 2 Ibid., 348-49. 
11 3 Robert Hollander Translation. "giva intorno." Princeton Dante Project, 1999, 
http://etcweb.princeton.edu/dante/index.html. 
114 Ibid., 350-51. 
115 Ibid. 365. "La lena m'era del polmon si munta" 
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every battle, if it does I not let the heavy body crush it down" (lnf XXIV.52-55 .11 6 
Speaking is, of course, intimately connected with breath and with the body; 
Dante, who felt his lungs giving out, now "pretending to be better furnished with breath 
than I felt" (ln:f XXIV.58-9, attempts to speak (so as not to seem feeble !nf XXIV.64).m 
Speaking clearly is a way to show he is alive, able, and distinct from the inhabitants of 
this world. Immediately after recalling his able speech, the poem introduces the next 
inhabitant of Hell as "a voice came from the next ditch, unapt to I form words" 
(XXIV.65-66) .118 
Once Dante and Virgil depart towards the eight bolgia, the narrator reveals the 
ethics of his storytelling, in a statement that serves also to set up a point of contrast with 
the subject of the new canto. If the narrator's language is to be kept in check, "I rein in 
my wit more than is my custom, I that it may not run without virtue guiding it" (Jnf 
XXVI.20-22), the pilgrim, continuing to feel and identify with the fate of those in Hell, 
grieves particularly for what he is about to see here, foreshadowing Ulysses' story. 
Ulysses did not rein in his quest for the beyond, nor the charm of his language by which 
he persuaded his companions to join him in a journey beyond the bounds of the known 
world. The narrator, however, seems to attempt to rein in poetry so as not to forget the 
didactic purpose, so that, "if a good star or something better has given me I what is good, 
116 Ibid., 364-65."vinci l'ambascia I con I' animo che vince ogne battaglia, I se col 
suo grave corpo non s'accascia" 
117 Ibid., 365. "mostrandomi fornito I meglio di lena ch'i' non rn.i sentia" "per non 
parer fievole" 
118 Ibid. "una voce usd de l'altro fosso, a parole formar disconvenevole" 
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I may not deprive myself of it (Inf XXVI.23-4).119 
In this canto, the sinners are tongues of flames, and Dante, showing his intense 
interest by his own body position, straining to see, is in ever greater danger of falling in 
(Inf XXVI.44-5). Upon Dante's request to wait and speak with Ulysses, explaining to 
Virgil that "I bend toward it with desire" (Inf. XXVI.68), 120 he is warned, "mafa' chela 
tua lingua si sostegna" (but see that your I tongue restrain itself b~f XXVI.72). Not only 
has the narrator expressed his intent to restrain his creative wit in the rendering of the 
episode; here, the pilgrim has to enact what, in the fiction, is his own linguistic 
admonition. 
When Ulysses responds, the flame itself struggles to function, moving, "come 
fosse la lingua che parlasse" (as if it were a tongue that spoke Inf XXVI.89). The flame 
that speaks correlates with the burning desire, the "ardore" with which Ulysses wished to 
experience "human vices and worth (Inf XXVI.99) 12 1 thus forgetting family and duty. 
And it is Ulysses' persuasive, rather than prophetic speech, which he with false modesty 
calls "questa orazion picciola" (this little oration Inf XXVI.l22) that led to the going 
astray, beyond Hercules's warning that "l'uom piu' oltre non si metta" ("one should not 
go fmther" Inf XXVI.l09). He tells his shipmates, "Consider your sowing: you were not 
119 Ibid., 398-99. "piu lo 'ngegno affreno ch'i' non soglio, I perche non corra che 
virtu nol guidi" (Jnf XXVI.20-22). "se stella bona o miglior cosa I m'ha dato 'I ben, ch'io 
stessi nol m'invidi" (Inf XXVI.23-4). 
120 Ibid. "del disio ver' lei mi piego!" 
12 1 Ibid., 402-03."de li vizi umani e del valore" 
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made to live like brutes, but to follow virtue and knowledge" (lnf XXVI.ll9-20).122 
Speaking with the forked tongue of the flame, recounting his luring his comrades, 
Ulysses conjures the serpent in Eden, leading Adam and Eve towards desiring the fruit of 
the tree of knowledge of good and evil. And like the serpent, Ulysses' speech caused 
unbridled desire, as afterwards he says, falsely, of his shipmates, "a pena poscia li avrei 
ritenuti" (I could hardly have held them back Inf XXVI.l23). Language that is not 
reined in leads to action that is not reined in seems the lesson of Ulysses' story, a story 
pe1iinent to the pilgrim's own. 
What Dante sees in the next bolgia prompts the narrator to state the limitations 
of language and memory: "who could ever, even with unbound words, tell in I full of the 
blood and wounds that I now saw, though I he should narrate them many times? I Every 
tongue would surely fail, because our language and our memory have little capacity to 
comprehend so much" (b~j: XXVIII.l -6). 124 These hesitations, which dot the canticle, are 
not so much apophatic as intensifying. They do not shy away from the inexpressible, but 
prepare the way for the shocking sight, the "unbound words" signaling not merely the 
poetic structure, but bringing to mind the unity of the human person, destroyed in the 
flesh of the sowers of discord, and the unity of able, skilled, and virtuous language, in 
contrast to the fractured, seditious language of the punished who speak through their 
122 Ibid., 405. "considerate la vostra semenza: fatti non foste a viver come bruti, I 
rna per seguir virtute e canoscenza" 
124 1bid., 432-33."chi poria mai pur con parole sciolte I dicer del sangue e de le 
piaghe a pieno I ch ' i' ora vidi , per narrar piu' volte? I Ogne lingua per certo verria meno I 
per lo nostro sermone e per la mente, I c'hanno a tanto comprender poco senno." 
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wounds, from the lips of a detached head to the bloody, opened windpipe. Their 
condition makes the pilgrim's bodily presence all the more startling, his unified, 
unwounded flesh leading them to "riguardarmi I per maraviglia, obliando il martiro" 
(gaze up at me in I amazement, forgetting their suffering lnf XXVIII.53-4). 125 This canto 
is about fragmentation, not only of society, by sowing discord, but of self, as the body 
walking with its head in its hand says '"0 me!' I Di se facea a se stesso lucerna," (Oh 
me!' of himself he made a lamp for himself XXVIII.124-5), 126 the rhyme broken in two in 
the "rare example of rimafranta, one rhyme combining two words,"127 the poem's 
language enacting the wounds in its own flesh. The pilgrim too, is so affected by the 
suffering of the tearing apart he witnessed, that his gaze lingers and his will, wounded, 
follows, prompting Virgil to chastise him for the excessive involvement, all the more 
present here, where being embodied causes the pilgrim to respond ever more strongly to 
the gruesome punishments he witnesses. 
Dante's bodily involvement continues "sull 'ultima chiostra" (above the last 
cloister Inf XXIX.40) where his senses, bearing the brunt of Hell's effect on the body, are 
assaulted: his hearing suffers as "strange lamentings struck me, arrows whose iron I heads 
were made of pity, so that I covered my ears I with my hands" (Jnf XXIX.43-45) 128 and 
his sense of smell is overpowered by the odor from below, "qual suol venir dele marcite 
125 Ibid., 434-35. 
126 Ibid., 438-39. 
127 Ibid., Durling, Note to Canto 28, Line 123, 447. 
128 Ibid., 453. "lamenti saettaron me diversi I che di pieta ferrati avean li strali; 
ond' io li orecchi con le man copersi" 
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membra" (like that from rotting I limbs lnf XXIX.51) where the falsifiers are "languir .. 
. per diverse biche" (languishing in I different heaps XXIX.66), waiting their judgment 
129
. As they observe the shades, the travelers, "Passo passo andavam sanza sermone, I 
guardando e ascoltando li ammalati, I che non potean levar le lor persone" (step by step 
we walked without speech, seeing and hearing the sick, who could not lift their bodies 
XXIX.70-72). Dante's and Virgil's emphasized ability to move 'passo passo' stands in 
contrast with the condemned, who cannot change their location or position, as they 
cannot change their state; their condition "non ha piu soccorso" (no longer has any 
remedy lnf 29.81). All they can do is deepen their own pain, the shades attacking 
themselves, tearing off their own flesh. Yet, if the travelers can move, their language 
ceases as they pass "sanza sermone." 130 
Movement lessens further as they walk on, as the featured impersonators have 
limbs that are heavy and "legate," (bound b~f XXX.81) 131 and they lie about unable to 
change sides, allowed only to strike and quarrel with each other. At Dante's persistent 
gaze, Virgil rebukes him sharply, "con ira," "angrily," in response to which Dante 
"volsimi verso lui" (turned towards him (Inf XXX.134) in effect changing what he 
desires. Whether Dante's response is caused by the realization that Hell is contaminating 
129 Ibid., 452-53. 'biche,' according to Durling, is "properly used of the heaped 
sheaves of harvested grain waiting to be stored" alluding therefore to Last Judgment. 
Note to Canto 29, Line 66, 460. 
130 Ibid., 454-55. 
131 Ibid., 468.69. 
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Virgil and him both, or whether he considers Virgil's anger justified, Virgil's curative 
words lead to Dante's abundant shame at the rebuke that "che voler cio' udire e' bassa 
voglia" (to wish to hear that is a base desire"/nf XXX.148), base, or low desire seeming 
even more apt as they are in the last bolgia of Hell. Dante's language gives way, his 
shame unable to manifest in words, yet the remorse itself, understood by Virgil without 
words, sets him apart from the shades that lured his attention and his intention. The 
poem's language offer a sense of the hallucinatory confusion of Hell's last convoluted 
circle as the narrator explains the pilgrim's state and inability to speak and make excuses: 
"Quale' colui che suo danneggio sogna, I che sognando desidera sognare, I si che quel 
ch'e', come nonfosse, agogna" (Like one who dreams of harm, and, dreaming, wishes he 
were dreaming, so that he yearns for what it is as if it were not Inf XXX.136-8). 132 
When approaching the giants, Dante's sight mistakenly believes them to be 
towers. Virgil's affectionate readiness to explain to the pilgrim what he sees is a 
reminder that in the journey through Hell, looking isn't the concern, as the sights are to be 
instructive. It is the inordinate, excessive, lingering gaze that pulls the pilgrim towards 
the pockets of despair, lures him into the possibility of becoming that which he witnesses; 
such a gaze needs the vigilant, at times stern protection of Virgil's principled presence. 
As long as the purpose of perceiving is understanding, Virgil's guidance leads to clarity, 
''jorando !'aura grossa e scura, I piu e piu appressando ver' la sponda, I fuggiemi errore" 
(boring through the thick dark atmosphere, drawing closer and closer to the edge, my 
error fled lnf XXXI.37-9). Yet clarity, in its turn, leads to the realization of danger, and 
132 Ibid., 470-71. 
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the pilgrim responds with dread, "cresciemi paura" (my fear grew"lnf XXXI.39), 
establishing a circle of cause and effect, one step feeding into another, from mistake to 
correction to clarity, from fear, to weak will, rebuke and shame. 133 
Considering the giants, towering over the bank, the pilgrim describes the cause 
of their punishment while also, in effect, stating the very nature of Hell's structure, its 
lowest reaches inhabited by those who sought to climb the highest: "where sharpness of 
mind is joined to evil will I and power, there is no defense people can make I against 
them" (Inf XXXI.55-58). 134 Unlike the first circles of Hell, where will was simply weak 
and unable to resist the forces of temptation, here, at the bottom of the pit, the will is 
clear on its choices, with reason as its ally in pursuit of evil. 
Nimrod, in Hell, continues to attempt to wield the power afforded through the 
use of language, and his punishment, begun with Babel, offers him the solipsism he 
would have first sought, that of thinking he did not need God, or that he could surpass 
God. He is indeed sufficient only to himself now, cut off from communicating as Virgil 
explains, "Lascianlo stare e non parliamo a voto; I che cosi' e a lui ciascun linguaggio I 
come 'l suo ad altrui, ch'a nullo e ' noto" (let us leave him alone and not waste speech, for 
to him every language is like his to others, I unknown lnf XXXI.79-81). His speech has 
only the power to indict himself: "elli stessi s'accusa" (Himself accuses himself lnf 
XXXI.76), his punishment resulting in meaningless noise as thought is detached from 
133 Ibid. , 484-85. 
134 Ibid. "dove l'argomento de la mente I s'aggiugne al mal volere e ala possa, I 
nessun riparo vi puo' far la gente" 
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speech for him "per lo cui mal coto I pur un linguaggio nel mondo non s 'usa" (because 
of whose evil thought the world no longer speaks one language lnf XXXI.76-7). 135 If, as 
VE explains, angels do not require language since they can simply be transparent to each 
other, at the bottom of Hell language is also absent, unable to penetrate through the dense 
materiality of sin, all the other circles pressing down. Nimrod has become himself an 
abandoned, isolated tower of confusion. 
Once the giant Antaeus silently places them in the Cocytus, the narrator reflects 
on the problematic fit between the language at his disposal and the topic he attempts to 
express. He lacks the "rime aspre e chiocce" (harsh and clacking rhymes) that would 
match the harsh rocky outcrops of the "tristo buco'' (dreadful whole) the travelers now 
see (XXXII.1-2). Thus, be cannot "premerei di mio concetto il suco I piu ' pienamente" 
(press out the juice from my concept more I fully lnf XXXII.4-5) . Dante expresses a 
view of language where poetry functions as a distillation of thought to facilitate the 
transferring of meaning from his experience to that of his listeners. Because there isn't a 
direct match between subject matter and his verse, perhaps the reader is shielded, 
experiencing in reading only the veiled truth of what the pilgrim witnessed. The narrator, 
however, wishes to narrow that gap between experience and the recounting of it. 
Shielding the reader would go against the purpose of the journey, and poetry would be in 
danger of dissolving into jest. This is the difficulty of the poet's task, to take language 
that derives out of the quotidian and through his art have it attend to the eternal, here, the 
other worldly hoiTor of Hell. He must succeed in "discriver fonda a tutto l 'universo," 
135 Ibid., 486-87. 
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(describing I the bottom of the universe b~l XXXII.8) with, finally, something of the 
same "lingua che chiami mamma o babbo" (tongue that I calls mommy or daddy lnf 
XXXII.8-9), and he invokes the muses to assist with bridging that gap "si' che dal fatto il 
dir non sia diverso" (so that the word may not be different from the fact lnf XXXII.12). 
Like Augustine and his Platonic and Neoplatonic heritage, Dante knows language cannot 
be relied on as a tool for knowledge. But also like Augustine, Dante is aware of the 
possibility of inspiration brought about by the Incarnation. If everyday language cannot 
bridge the gap, the redeemed language of poetry informed by Scripture can create the 
possibility of understanding. Yet still, in Hell, meaning is difficult to convey, this being a 
"loco onde parlare e' duro" (place of which it is hard to speak XXXII.14). 136 "'" 
"Guarda come passi" (watch how you step Inf XXXII.19) is the first sound the 
pilgrim hears in this last circle, a warning that sums up the lesson he's been learning all 
throughout the spiral of Hell. This call, once again, makes Dante turn. His ability to do 
so, to stand and step with his feet, is underscored by the three consequent mentions of 
feet: the giants' feet above, the shades' cry to Dante not to "calchi con le piante le teste" 
(trample with your feet the heads Inf XXXII.20-1) of his presumed brothers and then his 
seeing "davante e sotto i piedi" (before me and beneath I my feet Inf XXXII.22-23) the 
icy expansion of a lake, a "grosso velo" (thick veil Inf XXXII.25), 137 separating the 
traveler from the punished, adducing the veil separating language and its referent in the 
opening of the canto. The souls encased in ice, downcast, teeth chattering with cold, 
136 Ibid., 498-99. 
137 Ibid. 
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serve as the last example to the pilgrim of the destiny of corrupted will. The question one 
shade asks looking down at the ice encasing his lower half, his own feet, "perche cotanto 
in noi ti specchi?" (why do you I mirror yourself in us? lnf XXXII.54)138 observes the 
great difference between the shades and Dante, his embodiment, and therefore, the will 
that can still choose how to act, that can move freely. At the same time, Dante is 
mirrored, reflected, pulled into the sin of the shades; he can see himself in their state. 
Dante and Virgil move closer to the "mezzo I al quale ogne gravezza si rauna" 
(the center toward I which all weight collects Inf XXXII.73), the pilgrim "tremava ne 
l'etterno rezzo" (trembling in the I eternal chill b~f XXXII.75). 139 The shade ofUgolino 
declares, "parlare e lagrimar vedrai insieme" (you will see me speak I and weep together 
lnf XXXII.9), because the sonowful and difficult act of speaking would mean the 
renewal of the" disperato dolor che 'l cor mi preme I gia pur pensando, pria ch'io ne 
favelli" (desperate I grief that already presses my heart merely thinking, I before I speak 
of it lnf XXXIII.4-6). 140 Yet the shades cannot find comfort in their sorrow here, as "lo 
pianto stesso li pianger non fascia" (weeping itself prevents weeping there Inf 
XXXIII.94), the icy tears turning into "visiere di cristallo" (crystal visors lnf XXXIII.98) 
piercing inward, blocking vision and increasing pain, leaving the shades blind and 
immobile, deprived completely of both the light of intellect and the acting power of 
138 Ibid., 500-01. 
139 Ibid., 502-03. 
140 Ibid., 514-15. 
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will.J41 
At the beginning of the last canto, when Virgil announces Satan, Dante hides 
behind Virgil, "mi ristrinsi retro I al duca mio, che non li era altra grotta" (I shrank 
behind my leader, for there was no other shelter lnf XXXIV .8-9), signaling the end of 
the landscape, the arrival to the pinnacle of the inverted tower, leaving the pilgrim 
exposed to the wind of Satan's wings. Here the pilgrim is truly among the submerged, 
where "l'ombre tutte eran coperte" (the shades were all covered lnf XXXIV.] 1), encased 
in the transparent ice. Dante himself, "gelato e fioco" ("frozen and feeble" Jnf 
XXXIV.22), is suspended, participating in the plight of the damned, as the narrator 
explains in his last apostrophe to the reader: "/o non mori' e non rimasi vivo" (I did not 
die and I did not remain alive lnf XXXIV.25). The pilgrim experiences the near death 
his descent aimed at in order to then rise towards Purgatory, and towards a healing of his 
will. 
Until then, Virgil had been shielding the pilgrim from seeing Satan; when 
Virgil reveals him to Dante urging courage, the narrator urges, "nol dimandar, lettor, 
ch 'i' non lo scrivo, I pero ch' ogne parlar sarebbe poco" (do not ask, reader, for T do not 
write it, and all speech would be I insufficient lnf XXXIV.22-24), his terror recalling the 
great fear before the gates of Dis. 142 At the bottom of Hell, the pilgrim's language is 
inadequate, the shades' language is silenced, and Satan himself, issuing from the ice, is 
silent, all three faces and mouths busy "dirompea co' denti I un peccatore" (breaking a 
141 Ibid., 518-19. 
142 Ibid., 534-35. 
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sinner I with his teeth lnf XXXIV.55-6) . And here, Virgil states the end of what can be 
seen: "e oremai/ e' da partir, che tutto avem veduto" (and now we must depart, for we 
have seen everything lnf XXXIV .68-9). The end of Hell is silent, anti-climactic, frozen, 
presided over by an impotent Satan whose wings cannot fly, whose "vele di mar" (sea-
going sails lnf XXXIV.46) cannot, in fact, sail. His role as the greatest traitor is to 
punish the three silent traitors, Judas, his head inside one of Satan's mouths, Brutus, who 
"non fa motto" (does not say a word lnf XXXIV.66), and Cassius, of whom Virgil does 
not speak. This is the last image of Hell before the travelers depart, of Satan trapped at 
the bottom of Hell, keeping Cocytus frozen with the flapping of his wings, deposed, 
beast-like, as "brutto," "ugly," now as he was once "bel" (beautiful h1f XXXIV.34), a 
"vermo reo che 'l mondo fora" (evil worm that gnaws the world lnf XXXIV.l08), but, 
ultimately, the very "stairs" by which the pilgrim escapes. 143 
It is on Satan's thigh that Virgil performs the last turning, "confatica e con 
angoscia" (with labor and difficulty b1l XXXIV .78). He "valse la testa ov' elli avea le 
zanche" (turned his head to where he had his shanks lnf XXXIV .79). The indecorous 
descent and subsequent ascent are part of the three dimensional world that Dante 
establishes, where the axis of turning away from, or towards the divine, is made 
voluminous, inhabitable, by the spiraling metaphor. Leaving the Inferno requires 
complete humility, complete submersion and complete transformation of perspective, 
which is brought out by Virgil's command to the pilgrim, "Levati su" (rise up bif 
XXXIV.94), an invitation to participate in the resurrection as he had participated in the 
143 Ibid., 536-37; 538-39. 
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death of Christ.144 He is going from eternity to time, from down to up, from dark to light, 
from descent to ascent. They depart "per que! canunino ascoso" (on that hidden path) to 
"ritornar nel chiaro mondo" (return to the bright world lnf XXXIV.133-34), 145 towards 
another "cammino . .. malvagio" (difficult path h1f XXXIV.95), but no longer 'oscuro.' 
Yet until the last moment in Hell, Dante requires the clarifying words of Virgil. He 
requests, "prima che de l'abisso mi divella" (Before I am uprooted from the abyss), "a 
trarmi d'error un poco mifavella" (speak to me a little to help me out of error lnf 
XXXIV.l00-3). 146 Even though he is erect, "dritto," set right-side-up, he requires 
understanding to leave, and when all is revealed and they are on the right path, they can 
quietly climb "sanza cura aver d 'alcun riposo" (without taking I care for rest at all Inf 
XXXIV .135) as now they are onward to see the stars again. 147 
The pilgrim's journey has righted him. It has shown him the depth, and height, 
and breadth of the abyss and it has taught him that he is both chosen and vulnerable, both 
not of the abyss but containing the abyss within. It has acquainted him with the flight of 
the incontinent of will and with the iced prison of the malicious, with the voluble laments 
of the lustful and the frozen weeping of the traitors . And he, throughout, has had to walk 
with care, learning to look but not gape, to ask but not be inquisitive, to hurry but not run 
in cowardice, to listen but not pity. Through the guidance of Virgil and the very 
144 Ibid., 538-39. 
145 Ibid., 540-41. 
146 Ibid., 538-39. 
147 Ibid., 540-41. 
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geography of the landscape, he has practiced the art of virtuous turning. At first he had to 
turn towards the journey itself, and then, once on the path, to turn away from the luring 
and lurid spectacle and back towards the path, which, though downward, led him up and 
out of Hell. 
The narrator, through the language of the sensible, has led the reader into a 
similar exploration of virtuous reading, one that celebrates the art of poetry, but does not 
become intoxicated by its artifice, and therefore swallowed up in its compelling 
metaphoricity. Both, respectively, must practice speaking and reading with care, the 
narrator reining in his rendering, the reader her gaze, both recalling and traveling towards 
the conversion purposed by the epic narrative, to "veggia la porta di san Pietro" (see the 
gate of Saint Peter lnf 1.134). 148 If, in Augustine's journey from "bad to good, good to 
better, and better to best, he gave us an example and instruction which could not be 
provided by any other testimony so true as this" (1.2), as Dante tells us in the Convivio, 149 
perhaps the same can be said of the Inferno. Dante has shown that poetry, can, in fact, 
achieve the feat that Aquinas granted only to Scripture in his discussion on metaphor, 
namely to render divine truths by means of things in the world: 
God provides for everything according to the capacity of its nature. Now it is 
natural to man to attain to intellectual truths through sensible things, because all 
our knowledge originates from sense ... this is what Dionysius says: 'we cannot 
be enlightened by the divine rays except they be hidden within the covering of 
many sacred veils.' ... the ray of divine revelation is not extinguished by the 
sensible imagery wherewith it is veiled, as Dionysius says; and its truth so far 
148 Ibid., 33. 
149 Dante, Convivio, trans. Richard Lansing, Dante's Convivio, 1998, 
http:/ /dantej I t.co] umbia.edu/books/convi vi/convivio.html. 
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remains that it does not allow the minds of those to whom the revelation has 
been made, to rest in the likeness, but raised them to the knowledge of intelligible 
truths; and through those to whom the revelation has been made others also may 
receive instruction in these matters.150 
150 A . "N f S d D . "B . W . . ifS . Th qumas, ature o acre octnne, aszc rltlngs o amt omas 
Aquinas, 15. 
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Teresa of Avila's Interior Castle 
Teresa of Avila's Interior Castle is a progression from externals to interior 
matters, from language to silence, from body to soul, from periphery to center, from man 
to God, from wilderness to inner paradise. In this journey, language and self are stripped 
of their materiality and their immediacy; they are questioned and hollowed and undone, 
so that the tasty kernel at the center of the spiritual palmetto can be revealed and can 
nourish. The soul progressively relinquishes its senses, its faculties, its own will, so that 
it may possess and be possessed by the divine in spiritual marTiage. While in the 
Confessions narrative the soul glimpses the "momentum intellegentiae cui suspiravimus," 
(IX.x.25)1 the 'moment' of comprehension that is rendered in temporal terms but that 
gives the soul a sense of its eternity and allows it to hear God, the Interior Castle, in the 
collage of these three interior explorations, explores in detail the stages of advancing 
towards encountering the divine. 
Yet Teresa, the Carmelite nun blessed with visions and beset by headaches and 
bodily illnesses, writes with the scattered vivacity of a person very much in the body, 
very much in the world, a person who is aware of the importance of actions and who 
teaches the salutary role of deeds, deeds being proof of the efficacy of the encounter with 
God, a pointed distinction between the Council of Trent's Counter Reformation position 
on deeds and the Protestant emphasis on faith. This focus on actions suggests a 
1 James J. O'Donnell, Augustine: Confessions (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
1992), last modified April, 2011, Stoa Consortium, http://www.stoa.org/hippo/, "that 
moment of understanding ... after which we sighed," Augustine, Confessions, trans. 
Henry Chadwick (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1991), 172. 
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redeeming of the externals the soul gradually dispensed with. Her story is therefore also 
a surprising exploration that reveals oneself to oneself as the mystic's tale tears down in 
order to build up again. Her journey ultimately leads the soul to itself as it pursues the 
divine: "in my opinion we shall never completely know ourselves if we don't strive to 
know God" (1.2.9) _2 
The narrator's encounter with the divine is necessary, as it has been for Dante and 
Augustine, not to begin the journey inward, but to understand and render what the stages 
signify in the soul's progress toward its goal and the way in which its overcoming itself 
may serve to engender a new self-understanding in the soul, as well as in those the text 
seeks to instruct. As Augustine and Dante have, so does Teresa wish for her readers to be 
pointed towards experience in light of her description of her own union with God. 
If Augustine's protagonist can be said to travel towards conversion, Teresa's soul-
traveler is leaming to re-enact that journey in prayer. Therefore, the story tarries less in 
the externals and, in the micro-pilgrimage, the soul is already facing the proper way. It 
follows the soul's progression no longer to orient itself, but to ready itself for the stages of 
divesting needed to renounce the temporal, even the spatial, so that it may sense beyond 
the mediation of senses, images, or words, that after which it sighed. Rather than 
showcasing extensively the perils of a self-reflexivity that disallows progress, as the 
Confessions, and markedly, the Infemo, do, the Interior Castle features the soul's 
relinquishing its healed will, its proper desire, and its own language of human prayer so 
2 Teresa of Avila. Interior Castle . 50. ("y ami parecer jamas nos acabamos de 
conocer si no procuramos conocer aDios," Teresa de Jesus, Las Moradas, last modified 
July , 2011, http://www .mercaba.org/FICHAS/Santos/TdeJesus/moradas OO.htm.) 
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that, finally, the soul may hear God speak. In learning prayer, ultimately, the soul needs 
to empty of even prayer itself. 
In Teresa's journey of understanding and interpretation, her "extended 
mystagogical midrash on the text of John 14:2 'In my Father's house, there are many 
dwelling places,"'3 the soul will start out unable to hear or speak to the divine; it will first 
hear God through the language of those who live in His presence, a mediated 
communication couched in the language of externals, a sign that the soul, weak and still 
preoccupied by matters of the body, cannot yet bear God's voice. It will suffer while 
hearing from God as it won't yet be able to speak; it will learn to speak a little later, 
awkwardly and with great effort, until it falls asleep; it dies building the cocoon, or house 
of Christ, its efforts of language and intellect silenced. All the while, the divine, having 
spoken through the faithful, now speaks to the soul directly, through the whisper of the 
eternal fountain, calling the soul further inward, possessing the soul while in its slumber. 
It is through the death of the silkworm and the coming forth of the butterfly that the soul, 
newly alive, communes with God. The soul receives knowledge and visions, culminating 
with an experience of the Trinity, the most powerful address to the soul, achieved through 
divine marriage, through the death now of the butterfly. This is the story that Teresa 
3 Katherine Grieb writes, "One way into the Castle is to think of it as an extended 
mystagogical midrash on the text of John 14:2" In my Father's house, there are many 
dwelling places." "Theresa of Avila." Theology Today 62 (2005): 231. 
"En la casa de mi Padre muchas moradas hay: de otra manera os lo hubiera dicho: voy, 
pues, a preparar lugar para vosotros." La Biblia: Reina-Valera Antigua, Last Modified 
April 2012, 
http://www.biblegateway.com/versions/index.php?action=getVersioninfo&vid=6 
tells room by room, mansion by mansion, contouring the interior space while the soul 
advances towards the divine. 
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From the prologue to the last mansion, The Interior Castle is sprinkled with 
references to Teresa' s reluctance in writing the book, her self-perceived inadequacy, and 
her requests that God communicate through her. The direct statements of her personal 
Jack of readiness for writing about the subject of prayer and mystical experience follow 
the course of the journey: as the soul travels towards the mansions closer to the center, 
the remarks on the inability of language to feature her subject grow in frequency. These 
hesitations increase markedly beginning with the fourth mansion, which forms the 
threshold into the supernatural part of the journey. This is where the soul's senses and 
faculties and intellect have less and less to bring to the events taking place and where the 
soul surrenders progressively and God steals further into it. But the text as a whole is 
encased in a basic unease regarding language. 
These reservations not only show Teresa's practicing the humility she promotes in 
the text, but also serve to usher in the wealth of sensory-laden metaphors she uses to 
weave her interior tapestry. While her overt hesitations regarding the suitability of 
language to describe interior matters signal the journey's distrust of discursive 
communication, her metaphors lure the reader in through immediate, powerful images, 
appealing to a shared embodiment and enfleshing the narrative, anchoring it into bodily 
sensations and experiences even as the soul travels further and further away from the 
reach of the material. The entire text is delicately balanced upon such contradictions, 
which themselves produce an experience of unrest in the reader that requires trust in the 
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writer's guidance. Teresa's readers must reconcile their doubts regarding her powers of 
expression yet feel drawn forward by her compelling depictions of the soul as castle, 
hedgehog, silkworm, tree, or paradise. 
The first mansion begins with Teresa's reception of the guiding metaphor "while 
beseeching our Lord to speak for me because I wasn't able to think of anything to say nor 
did I know to begin to carry out this obedience." (I.l.l )4 As she continues to present the 
soul's journey, she again remarks on her inability to express "these interior matters" as 
they are "so obscure for our minds that anyone who knows as little as I will be forced to 
say many superfluous and even foolish things in order to say something that's right" 
(1.2.7).5 Contrasted with the brilliant light of the inner castle, the difficulty of language 
and the obscurity, darkness of the "casas interiores" stands out. This obscurity is not in 
the interior itself, as was the darkness present in Dante's Inferno. The veil of darkness 
covers the pilgrim herself, signaling to the ability to understand that needs continuous 
renewal. Teresa herself has explained that the soul is covered by a "'black cloth' that 
obscures the light from the 'shining sun that is in the center of the soul."'6 She feels she 
cannot express the mystery of divine experience, yet feels compelled "to write about what 
4 Teresa of Avila. Interior Castle, 35 ("Estando .. . suplicando a nuestro Sefior 
hablase por mi, porque yo no atinaba a cosa que decir ni como comenzar a cumplir esta 
obediencia," I.l.l). 
5 Ibid., 41 ("Son tan oscuras de entender estas cosas interiores, que a quien tan 
poco sabe como yo, forzado habra de decir muchas cosas superfluas y aun desatinadas 
para decir alguna que acie1te" 1.2.7) 
6 As Edward Howells mentions in his treatment of mystical knowing in Teresa of 
Avila and John of the Cross "she regards the starting point of transformation as 
understandable only from the perspective of union.". 1 ohn of the Cross and Teresa of 
Avila: Mystical Knowing and Selfhood. (New York: The Crossroad Pub. Co., 2002), 96. 
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I don't know."7 These statements about Teresa's own relationship to language point also 
to the limitations of the intellect and of discursive thoughts in the soul's advance, 
prefiguring the intellect's inability to assist the soul in its entire journey. While she 
proceeds with the explanation of the castle, Teresa says of her shifting metaphors when 
the soul enters the castle, "It seems I'm saying something foolish ... how foolish it 
would seem were we to tell someone to enter a room he is already in," (!.1.5)8 or perhaps, 
even more elusively, given her initial account of the person, to enter the room she simply 
is already. The need for an alternative to linear exposition and the relevance of figurative 
language are therefore immediately apparent. 
As in the Confessions and the b~ferno, the point of origin for the pilgrimage is one 
appreciated best from the perspective of one who has already experienced the center of 
the souL This perspective Teresa reveals as she presents the original metaphor of the soul 
describing it as "a castle made entirely out of a diamond or of very clear crystal , in which 
there are many rooms," (1.1.1)9 surrounding the divine at the center, who has granted the 
very experience that allows for the metaphor. In Teresa's inner recursive recession, the 
body is the encasement of the soul, and the soul, in tum, is the outer casing, the setting 
for the divine in the heart. The soul is the palmetto that "has many leaves surrounding 
7 Teresa of Avila. Interior Castle, 41 ("escribir lo que no se"). 
8 Ibid., 37 ("Parece que digo algun disparate ... como pareceria desatino decir a 
uno que entrase en una pieza estando ya dentro" !.1.5). 
9 Ibid., 35 ("un castillo todo de un diamante o muy clara crista!, adonde hay 
muchos aposentos" !.1.1). 
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and covering the tasty patt that can be eaten." (1.2.8)10 Yet the soul is also the traveler, 
the stand-in for the whole person advancing to that center. 
Teresa alludes to the soul's ultimate significance as made in the image of God and 
as "a paradise where the Lord says He finds His delight" (1.1.1) 11 But the very awareness 
of the soul's status as bearing the imprint, the image of God is not available to the soul at 
the beginning of the journey. Therefore the soul is not able to see "the future importance 
of this image in its relation to the center"12 needing to first come to know itself in order to 
continue in discovering the later mansions. This requirement in the soul's progress 
recalls a similar moment in the Confessions, where Augustine needed first to encounter 
the Christ of creation before being able to encounter the Christ of Incarnation. 13 
Furthermore, the very light shining throughout the transparent castle is not necessarily 
without difficulty for the soul. It may not be able to garner how many boundaries, or 
mansions, separate it from the center if their walls are transparent. 14 Even as the soul 
begins its joumey at a more advanced stage than the Inferno or the Cm~f'essions ' 
protagonists, the danger of problematic reflexivity may briefly appear: "The crystal castle 
of the soul begins to resemble a hall of mirrors, a peculiar sort of labyrinth where it is 
10 Ibid., 42 ("que para llegar a lo que es de comer tiene muchas coberturas que 
todo lo sabroso cercan" 1.2.8). 
11 Ibid., 36 ("un paraiso adonde dice El tiene sus deleites" 1.1.1.35) 
12 Edward Howells, Mystical Knowing, 96. 
13 Edward Howells writes that Teresa ""understands this image in the Augustinian 
tradition," (95) and the she likely read it in the Confessions, possibly in Book X.xviii 
(note 9 to chapter 6), Mystical Knowing. 
14 Rowan Williams, "God at the Centre: The Interior Castle," in Teresa of Avila 
(London: Continuum, 1991), 114. Quoted by Katherine Grieb, Teresa of Avila. 
156 
possible to become so entrapped in the corridors of our own interiority that, though we 
believe we are seeking God, we are actually reflecting only on ourselves." 15 
The first dwelling place, which one enters through prayer, is the room of self-
knowledge. Prayer already begins to facilitate both communication from soul to the 
divine and from the divine to the soul, the latter exchange shrouded in mystery: "we 
always hear about what a good thing prayer is . .. , yet only what we ourselves can do in 
prayer is explained to us; little is explained about what the Lord does in a soul, I mean 
about the supernatural" (1.2.7). 16 For Teresa, knowing oneself is to be humble; it is an 
opportunity for the soul to realize its great distance from God. She maintains that "by 
gazing at his grandeur, we get in touch with our own lowliness; by looking at His purity, 
we shall see our own filth; by pondering His humility we shall see how far we are from 
being humble" (1.2.9). 17 The richness she speaks of in this room of self-knowledge is 
arrived at by contemplation of and comparison with God. The soul must know itself so 
that it may free itself of "unnecessary things and business affairs," if "a person is to enter 
the second dwelling places" (1.2.14). 18 Its goal will be to cover the distance between 
15 Katherine Grieb, "Teresa of Avila," 231. 
16 Teresa of Avila. Interior Castle, 42 ("porque siernpre oimos cuan buena es la 
oraci6n ... y no se nos declara mas de lo que podemos nosotras ; y de cosas que obra el 
Senor en un alma declarase poco, digo sobrenatural" 1.2.7). 
17 Ibid., 43 ("mirando su grandeza, acudamos a nuestra bajeza; y mirando su 
limpieza, veremos nuestra suciedad; considerando su humildad, veremos cuan lejos 
estamos de ser humildes" I.2.9). 
18 Ibid., 45 ("las casas y negocios no necesarios" "para haber de entrar a las 
segundas moradas" 1.2.14). 
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understanding itself as made in the image of God through creation, and its center as "the 
goal of this likeness when it is restored from the damage of sin and raised above the level 
of nature." 19 
She leaves her readers with the image of a body as the setting of the soul, and of 
the soul as a setting itself, whose main importance is to host the divine at the center; a 
soul that is both architecture and interlocutor with the divine, going forth towards the 
promise of secret exchanges in the last dwelling. Before leaving this first room, the soul 
is a mystery to itself; it lacks understanding and is unable to communicate with God. 
Teresa has also shown that language must constantly shift to serve the purpose of 
describing the person and the journey and must not be ossified, as it would no longer 
serve this purpose if it were. The language of prayer, the gate to the castle, is meant to 
allow the soul to enter within itself, or as she describes it, to give limbs to the soul so that 
it can advance. Prayer is language, but it is oriented inwardly. Prayer, internally 
directed, is the antidote to ordinary language, which will be silenced, just as the soul's 
'physical' description will be overcome in order to advance towards the divine. 
If the first mansion is the threshold between the outside and the inside, in the 
second mansion, the soul is on its way towards the center, though still within reach of the 
poisonous creatures that rush in when the soul enters itself. The second mansion is the 
battleground between faith and reason, and a crucial moment in the soul's progression. 
Reason shows the soul the relevance of the externals; faith "teaches it about where it will 
find fulfillment," while memory allows the soul to "see" how quickly those concerned 
19 Howells, Mystical Knowing, 96. 
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with worldly affairs are "forgotten by all." (II.l.4)20 The intellect is the messenger, the 
connector of the soul with its surrounding: "the intellect tells the soul of its certainty that 
outside this castle neither security nor peace will be found."21 It also helps the soul realize 
the endurance of God's love and that it has "everything it needs in his own house" and it 
"has a guest who will make him lord over all goods."22 The soul is the prodigal son, a 
new reminder that the soul travels in order to undo the separation from the divine caused 
by partaking of the fruit of intellectual knowledge and self-awareness. The responsibility 
of the soul continues to be to strive forward, applying its will "to avoid going astray like 
the prodigal son and eating the husks of swine" and in the process to shed the knowledge, 
language and intellect that has first led to its considering itself an entity with its own 
will. 23 The aim of the journey, as in the Confessions and in the Inferno, is "to bring his 
will into conformity with God's will." (11.1.8)24 
The soul has made progress in the second dwelling. It is now able to hear the call 
of God, but it is still unable to speak. While the soul was deaf to God in the din of the 
externals in the first mansion, it also had an easier time not speaking to God, since "the 
20 Teresa of Avila. Interior Castle, 50. "enseiia cmiles lo que le cumple" 
2 1 Ibid. "le dice que este cierto que fuera de este castilo no hallan1 seguridad ni 
paz" 
22 Ibid. "teniendo tal huesped que le hara seiior de todos los bienes" 
23 Ibid. "si el quiere no andar perdido, como el hijo pr6digo, comiendo manjar de 
puercos" 
24 Ibid., 52. "toda la pretension de qui en comienza oraci6n ... a hacer su voluntad 
conformar con la de Dios" 
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difficulty of not speaking is more easily endured by them than it is by those who hear but 
cannot speak" (II.l.2).25 Yet its ability to hear God is qualified: the call of God isn ' t the 
same intimate whisper the soul will hear in the mansions closer to the center, but the 
"words spoken by other good people, or through sermons, or through what is read in 
good books, or through the many things ... by which God calls."26 Deaf and mute in the 
first dwelling, the soul is now able to receive mediated calls from the divine. Prayer, 
however, the means by which the soul progressed from the first to the second mansion, 
and which the soul has not mastered, does allow it to hear, however feebly, the voice of 
God directly. Prayer continues to be a two way communicative mean, a way of speaking 
the soul's longings, and a way of hearing, a way for the soul to exist and interact 
inwardly, while the intellect, which has been connecting the soul with the outside world, 
is now participating in the inward journey and "is more alive and the faculties more 
skilled" (11.1.3).27 
This striving of the soul to bring its will into conformity with God ' s will and thus 
to undo its own agency constitutes what Teresa refers to as the soul's building the edifice 
it is in fact entering; such striving is a signpost for the coming metaphor of the silkworm 
in the fifth mansion, and is a reminder of the soul's journey towards its own death in 
Christ. This very perseverance towards God is itself not entirely self-generated, as she 
25 Ibid., 49. "y asi pasan mejor su trabajo de no hablar, lo que no passarian, sino 
muy mayor, los que oyesen y no pudiesen hablar" 
26 Ibid. "palabras que oyen a gente buena o sermones o con lo que leen en buenos 
libros y cosas muchas ... por donde llama Dios" 
27 Ibid. "est<i el entendimiento mas vivo y las potencias mas habiles" 
160 
reminds the Sisters that "his Majesty brings them from the dwelling places of one stage to 
those of another," pointing once more to the soul's gradual renouncing of itself and its 
own purposes. (II.1.9)28 
The second mansion has therefore begun to afford active communication between 
soul and God. If the soul's will is essential for the striving forward and its leaving behind 
the warring externals in order to enter itself and build the castle it has entered, the third 
mansion reinforces the importance of the soul's will conforming to God's, and the sheer 
teiTor of living without God, which amounts to death. If indeed the soul is able to act and 
strive with its will united to the will of God, absence of God would leave the soul 
frightfully aware that it is without its vital principle, unable to strive, to hear, or speak. 
Out of the reach of worldly concerns, the soul dwelling here has lived righteously and 
desires to continue progressing towards "possess[ing] the Lord completely" (III.l.6).29 
Given the focus on the soul's working toward its own undoing, the image of its 
possessing God might appear unexpected. Yet here again Teresa points to the mystery 
she describes at length in the fifth mansion, where the soul builds the cocoon, which is 
Christ, and where it then dies towards God, who alone dwells in the last mansion. 
Teresa warns in this last mansion before the realm of the supernatural, that neither 
speaking the desire to progress, nor hearing how to do so suffices. In fact, reliance on 
either leads to "dryness of prayer" (III.l.6). 30 She also returns to expressing her doubts 
28 Ibid., 53. "Su Majestad le lleva de unas moradas a otras" 
29 Ibid., 57. "del todo posea el Senor" 
30 Ibid., 58. "sequedades en la oraci6n" 
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about her own ability to render her thoughts clearly here, where the soul is very close to 
the supernatural stages of its progress. She urges her readers to "reflect a great deal . .. 
on some of the things that are here pointed out, even though in a jumbled way, for I don't 
know how to explain them further" (III.l.9i1 and reassures them that "the Lord will give 
you understanding of them so that out of dryness you may draw humility."32 Teresa's 
guiding her readers inward while teaching them how to pray is accompanied by her own 
prayer that her guidance will be completed by divine inspiration, required, as Augustine 
and Dante also teach, for reading well. 
As she has done from the beginning, she leaves the responsibility of creating 
understanding to God. The dryness of prayer resulting from reliance on self, language, 
intellect, on technique, will not suffice, just as Teresa's own language does not. If the 
language of desire or advice won't help the soul forward, neither will outward actions, 
since none should "think He needs our work" (III.l.8).33 The soul is bereft of all that its 
own faculties can provide. Teresa stresses the importance of resting in God since it is 
through "nakedness and detachment from all worldly things he will reach his goal."34 To 
cross into the supernatural dwelling places, the soul must be stripped of its sense of self 
derived from its abilities, must proceed with utmost humility knowing that it shouldn't 
3 1 Ibid. , 59. "Mirad mucho ... algunas cosas que aqui van apuntadas, aunque 
arrebujadas, que nolo se mas declarar" 
32 Ibid. "El Senor os lo dara a entender, para que saqueis de las sequedades 
humildad" 
33 Ibid. "y no penseis que ha menester nuestras obras" 
34 Ibid. "desnudez y dejamiento de todo, que alcanzara lo que pretende" 
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"enter our minds that we have merited this favor however much we may have served" 
(III.l.6)35 and that souls should "consider yourselves useless servants" (III.1.8).36 
She constantly wants travelers to test their self-understanding "and know whether 
or not you are the rulers of your passions" reflecting' a hierarchical view of the self where 
the "passions" can act against the wishes of the overarching person (III.2.6)?7 This 
surrender of the soul's mle over itself is Teresa's name for humility. Any desire of the 
soul to claim agency is fmstrated, questioned and warned against, so that it can continue 
journeying into its own dissolution. The soul in the third mansion has not yet 
surrendered completely because it is controlled by reason, a capacity of the intellect, 
which "love has not yet reached the point of overwhelming."38 She advises her audience 
to "abandon our reason" (III.l.8)39 and pursue humility so as not to be "weighted down 
with this mud of our human misery" (III.1.9).40 
This abandoning is necessary to learn to advance in a new way: "because there is 
an infinite gap, [between the first three and the subsequent mansions] our efforts at 
35 Ibid., 58. "ni habia de llegar a nuestro pensamiento que por mucho que 
sirvamos lo hemos de merecer " 
36 Ibid ., 59. "se tenga siervo sin provecho" 
37 Ibid., 62. "entender si estais senoras de vuestras pasiones" 
38 Ibid. "no esta aun el amor para sacar [de raz6n]" 
39 Ibid. "dejemos nuestra raz6n" 
40 Ibid., 63. "carcardas de esta tierra de nuestra miseria" 
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making the journey step by step are futile. "41 The third mansion, through its focus on the 
soul's stripping itself of all its attachments, even of striving, prepares to enter the fomth 
mansion, where "the natural and the supernatural are joined" (IV.3.14).42 The fourth 
mansion describes the progression from "consolations" (consuelos espirituales) to 
"delights," (gustos de Dios) from human attempts to create experience by communicating 
with the divine through language and intellect, to supernatural experience granted 
through divine communication, which is instant, free flowing, and which exceeds 
comprehension. At the threshold between human effort and divine grace begin "things to 
see and understand so delicate that the intellect is incapable of devising a way to explain 
them" (IV.l.2).43 As the fourth mansion begins, Teresa once again reminds her readers 
that her speech is not her own: "in order to begin to speak . . . I really need to entrust 
myself, as I've already done, to the Holy Spirit and beg Him to speak for me from here 
on that I may say something about the remaining rooms in a way that you will 
understand" (IV.l.l).44 
This purported inability of expository language to recount divine experience is 
underscored in the soul's own journey as Teresa discusses consolations, aftermaths of 
41 Howells, Mystical Knowing, 100. 
42 Teresa of A via, Interior Castle, 84 ("es tambien natural junto con lo 
sobrenatural" IV.3.14). 
43 Ibid., 67. "hay casas tan delicadas que very que entender, que el entendimiento 
no es capaz para poder dar traza" 
44 Ibid. "Para comenzar a hablar ... bien he menester lo que he hecho, que es 
encomendarme al Esprito Santo y suplicarle de aqui adelante hable por mi, para decir 
algo de las que quedan de manera que lo entendais" 
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communication from the soul to God, in contrast with spiritual delights, immediately 
granted by the divine. Her experience of the stages she is describing allows her to write 
at all, but her communicating of the experiences is made difficult by the limitations of 
human speech. Teresa's metaphor of the two founts, representing these consolations and 
delights, highlights the distinction between sequential, embodied, human utterances and 
atemporal, divine communicative acts. While the fount of consolations receives its water 
through man-made "aqueducts" created through the intellect "and the use of much 
ingenuity," (IV.2.3)45 the fount of spiritual delights contains "the source of the water ... 
and the trough fills without any noise."46 Consolations are noisy, hard-won through 
"thoughts, assisting ourselves, using creatures to help our meditation, and tiring the 
intellect,"47 while the water in the fount of delights is created "with the greatest peace and 
quiet"48 (IV.2.4) and flows from the interior part of the soul "through all the dwelling 
places and faculties until reaching the body."49 Delights "begins in God and ends in 
ourselves,"50 bringing enjoyment and integration as it affects "the whole exterior man,"51 
45 Ibid., 74. "por muchos arcaduces y artificio" 
46 Ibid. "nacimiento del agua y vase hinchendo sin ningun ruido" 
47 Ibid. "los pensamientos, ayudandonos de las criaturas en la meditaci6n y 
cansando el entendimiento" 
48 Ibid. "con grandfsima paz y quietud" 
49 Ibid. "por todas las moradas y potencias basta llegar al cuerpo" 
50 Ibid. "comienza de Dios y acaba en nostros" 
51 Ibid. "todo el hombre exterior" 
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even while in spiritual delights the soul has no need or use of intellect; its discourse is 
silenced, and its understanding is muted. While it "swells and expands"52 with "ineffable 
blessings,"53 the soul does not grasp "what is given to it there" (IV .2.6). 54 Delights cannot 
be imagined and cannot be received by human effort, being of a different substance from 
"ourselves but fashioned from the purest gold of the divine wisdom."55 Unlike 
consolations, where language seeks experience of the divine, delights provide experience 
of the divine presence and language will haltingly attempt to convey these interior 
secrets, knowing that it will "amount to no more than nothing." (IV.2.5)56 Yet the 
expansion of the soul looks to the future possibility of the soul's retaining "the overflow 
of union within itself" once it has become "accommodated and expanded to suit the 
overflow. "57 
It may be that the true threshold between the natural and the supernatural is within 
the "prayer of recollection," (oraci6n de recogirniento) where "exterior things seem to be 
losing their hold" (IV.3.1).58 In this prayer, which marks the beginning of delights , God 
52 Ibid. "se va dilatando y ensanchando" 
53 Ibid. "bienes que no se pueden decir" 
54 Ibid., 75. "que es lo que se le da alii" 
55 Ibid. "no ser de uestro metal, sino de quel purisimo oro de la sabiduria divina" 
56 Ibid., 75. "tanto como nonada" 
57 Howells, Mystical Knowing, 104. 
58 Ibid., 77. "estos sentidos y cosas exteriores parece que van perdiendo de su 
derecho" 
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calls the soul through "a gentle drawing inward" (N.3.3).59 While calling the soul 
directly, God doesn't do so through its physical senses; instead, the experience is most 
like "a hedgehog curling up or a turtle drawing into its shell" (IV.3.3).60 As the soul is 
about to enter the supernatural part of its journey, it is prepared "for being able to listen .. 
. so that the soul instead of striving to engage in discourse strives to remain attentive and 
aware of what the Lord is working in it" (IV.3.4).61 So that the soul may listen, "His 
Majesty desires the intellect to stop" (IV.2.6)62 and faculties are to be suspended here, 
absorbed by if not yet united with the divine. In its pursuit of the divine through the 
humility of self-knowledge, the soul finds here that "in our own selves there are great 
secrets that we don't understand" (IV.2.5)63 and that a new kind of knowing is required 
that is not accessible to the intellect naturally. It is from this stage of silent listening with 
the intellect overwhelmed by love that the soul must go forth towards possessing the 
divine who, through humility, "allows Himself to be conquered with regard to anything 
we want from Him" (IV.2.9).64 
59 Ibid., 78. "un encogimiento suave a lo interior" 
60 Ibid., 79. "como un erizo o tortuga, cuando se retiran hacia" 
61 Ibid. "para poder escuchar... que procuren no discunir, sino estarse atentos a 
ver que obra el Senor en el alma" 
62 1bid., 75. "Su Majestad quiere que el entendimiento cese" 
63 Ibid. "en nosotros mismos est~m grandes secretos que no entendemos" 
64 Ibid. "se deja veneer el Senor a cuanto de el queremos" 
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As the fifth mansion begins, the soul is silent and its intellect surrendered. Teresa 
herself wishes she could be silent: "I believe it would be better not to say anything about 
these remaining rooms, for there is no way of learning how to speak of them" nor is 
understanding possible, as "earthly things are too coarse for such a purpose" (V .1.1 ). 65 
With the encounter with God near, the soul is disconnected from its faculties, which "are 
asleep ... to the things of the world and to ourselves" (V.l.3).66 To experience God, the 
soul becomes "like one who in every respect has died to the world so as to live more 
completely in God."67 The soul is described in terms of body properties even as it is "so 
separated from the body that I don't even know if it has life enough to breathe" (V.l.3).68 
The soul has been traveling towards this temporary death, a needed sleep so that it can 
withstand the divine visit and recover transformed: "God so places Himself in the interior 
of that soul that when it returns to itself it can in no way doubt that it was in God and God 
was in it" (V.l.9).69 The divine waters do not need a humanly engineered aqueduct, but 
"He wants to enter the center of the soul without going through any door"70 
65 Ibid., 85. "Creo fuera mejor no decir nada de las que faltan, pues nose hade 
saber decir" 
66 Ibid., 86. "dormidas ala cosas del mundo y a nosotras mismas" 
67 Ibid. "en fin como quien de todo punto ha muerto al mundo para vivir mas en 
Dios" 
68 Ibid. , 87. "un arrancamiento del alma de todas las operaciones que puede tener 
estando en el cuerpo ... que aun no se yo si le queda vida para resolgar" 
69 Ibid., 89. "Fija Dios a sf mismo en lo interior de aquel alma de manera que 
cuando torna en si en ninguna manera pueda dudar que estuvo en Dios y Dios en " 
70 Ibid., 90. "sino entrar en el centro del alma sin ninguna, [puerta]" 
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From the beginning of the journey the soul has been preparing for this stage by 
striving forward through its senses and intellectual faculties, "going to confession, 
reading good books, and hearing sermons" (V.2.3)71 followed by "good meditations"72 
that result in consolations, until the soul is now "grown."73 Once mature, it relinquishes 
itself, "it begins to spin the silk and build the house wherein it will die" (V.2.4).74 
Through the active work of undoing its own relationship to the body, the soul builds "this 
house [that] is Christ," (Esta casa . .. que es Cristo V.2.4) as "His Majesty Himself 
becomes the dwelling place we build for ourselves" (V.2.5).75 This cocoon is built "by 
taking away our self-love and self-will, our attachments to any earthly thing" (V.2.6),76 
an envelope of self-denial that is created aided by Christ. Teresa uses a positive 
metaphor, a building up of a taking away, showing that at this moment of metamorphosis, 
the soul is closer to a rebirth, a death towards a new life, from silkworm to butterfly via 
Christ, whose Incarnation makes possible the new incarnation of the soul, which must 
acquire a new life having left the faculties through which it has thus far acted in the world 
71 Ibid., 92. "asi de continuar las confesiones, como con buenas lecciones y 
sermones" 
72 Ibid. "buenas meditaciones" 
73 Ibid. "crecida" 
74 Ibid., "cornienza a labrar la seda y edificar la casa adonde hade morir" 
75 Ibid. "Su Majestad rnismo sea nuestra morada ... labrandola nosotras" V.2.5). 
76 Ibid., 93. "quitando nuestro amor propio y nuestra voluntad, el estar asidas a 
ninguna cosa de la tierra" 
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and propelled itself behind in the cocoon. The butterfly that emerges isn't a body in the 
world, but a body of the soul in its spiritual sleep. The body that acts in the world will be 
needed for the soul to live out its life in the world in imitation of Christ's work once the 
soul has encountered Christ's humanity as well as divinity.77 The butterfly is a figure for 
the soul in union with God, where it is learning and knowing with new faculties, removed 
from its worldly body. In other world, the soul leaves behind its body but proceeds with 
the body of prayer towards union. 
The event of this union is transformative. The soul, having begun its journey as 
created in God's image, is again impressed on by God, a second sleep following the sleep 
of creation. Upon awakening, "the soul doesn't recognize itself or its image" (V.2.8)78 
and is akin to "wax when another impresses a seal on it" (V.2.12).79 The soul, its will 
surrendered so "that there be no impediment in the wax,"80 while a stranger to itself, 
maintains personal awareness and "recognizes itself as His own." (V.2.1 3)8 1 Jn such close 
proximity to the divine, the soul is alive, united with and in God and grateful for its death 
77 As Edward Howells writes, "this union of human and divine in Christ is the 
material by which the soul is expanded to have the capacity for God, that is transformed 
by favors into the human-and-divine form of Christ" Mystical Knowing (109). 
78 Ibid., 94. "no parece ella ni su figura" 
79 Ibid., 96. "la cera cuando imprime otro el sella" 
80 Ibid. "que no haya impedimenta en la cera" 
81 Ibid. "se conozca por suya" 
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since "the experience of seeing oneself in so new a life greatly helps one to die" 
8? (V.3.5). -
The soul, having figuratively shed its body, experiences this union outside the 
confines of time and space: "through the work of the senses and the faculties she couldn't 
in any way or in a thousand years understand what she understands here in the shortest 
time" (V.4.4).83 Understanding is unmediated, if brief; the soul's will is at that moment 
united with God's and language, a mark of embodiment, is unnecessary given that the 
soul is dead to its flesh and faculties. In this dwelling place, the soul, asleep to the world, 
having built its cocoon out of its self-renunciation aided by the mediation of Christ's 
Incarnation, has experienced, however briefly the death into being that is union with the 
divine. If too weak to fully recall the union, it does know it has happened. Teresa ends 
her discussion of this mansion by reasserting her own lack of ability in this na1Tation, her 
limited role in it: "I know well that this will be impossible if His Majesty and the Holy 
Spirit do not move my pen" (V.4.1 l ). 84 This stronger statement of her inability resonates 
with the sleep of the soul as God possesses it. 
The soul needs to advance on this interior path, for this union was but a short 
meeting with the divine, a meeting with the Spouse, but not the marriage, and not the 
"heaven without the intervals, trials and danger that are in this tempestuous sea" 
82 1bid., 99. "ayuda mucho para morir el verse en vida tan nueva" 
83 Ibid., 104. "por los sentidos y potencias en ninguna manera podia entender en 
mil afios lo que aqui entiende en brevisimo tiempo" 
84 1bid., 107. "que si Su Majestad y el Espiritu Santo no menea la pluma, bien se 
que sera imposible" 
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(VI.2.1 ). 85 As the soul continues towards its very center, in the sixth mansion God begins 
to reveal more and communicate more, courting the soul and making it "desire Him 
vehemently by certain delicate means the soul itself does not understand" (VI.2.1),86 by 
divine "impulses" that "proceed from the very deep within the interior part of the soul"87 
where God resides. While God communicates with the soul through "a whisper so 
penetrating that the soul cannot help but hear it" (VI.2.3), 88 the soul realizes this call even 
as "neither the senses, nor the imagination, nor the faculties stir." 89 In this experience, 
the soul does not speak; it was passive during the granting of spiritual delights, asleep 
during the divine union, and here, while awake, it experiences the divine directly and 
unmediated: "here all the senses and faculties remain free of any absorption, wondering 
what this could be, without hindering anything" (VI.2.5).90 
The manner in which God does communicate to the soul linguistically, conveying 
encouragements to sustain it in its journey, is through other people; the soul has been able 
to hear these mediated from early on, beginning in the second mansion. Here, the 
85 Ibid., "el cielo, sin los intervalos y trabajos y peligros que hay en este mar de 
tempestades" 
86 Ibid., 115. "desear, por unos medios tan delicados, que el alma misma no los 
entiende" 
87 Ibid. "impulsos" "que proceden de lo muy interior del alma" 
88 Ibid., 116. "un silbo tan penetrativo para entenderle el alma que no le puede 
dejar de ofr" 
89 Ibid., "nose osan bullir, ni sentidos, ni imaginaci6n, ni potencias" 
90 Ibid., 117. "Aquf estan todos los sentidos y potencias sin ningun 
embebecirniento, mirando que podra ser, sin estorbar nada" 
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messages, "don't be distressed"91 (VI.3.5) or "it is I, fear not"92 affect the soul 
immediately and leave it "certain and free of anxiety"93 so that it may persevere. God 
will not speak to the soul directly until the last mansion, the dwelling place of the divine 
marriage. Yet the soul knows if what it heard is from God because these utterances 
"remain in the memory for a very long time, and some are never forgotten," 
distinguishing them from words "we listen to here on earth." These words, though they 
must be decoded with the aid of the intellect, are retained by the soul with "an assurance . 
. . that cannot be overcome." (VI.3.7)94 It is this certainty that the soul can use to 
distinguish the messages God sends it from "locutions [that] come from the imagination, 
[where] there are none of these sings; neither certitude, nor peace, nor interior delight." 
(Vl.3.10)95 
Aside from whispers beyond faculties, and messages born by human or angelic 
means, God communicates to the soul through an array of visions. In the intellectual 
vision, the soul hears God speak but it does so with what Teresa calls "the ears of the 
sou]" and not with faculties marked by their limitations. The soul here is the butterfly 
born of the death of faculties and its hearing takes place in a new way. The divine 
91 Ibid., 120 "no tengas pena" 
92 Ibid., 121. "Yo soy, no hayas miedo" 
93 Ibid. "con certidumbre y sin pena" 
94 Ibid. "no pasarse estas palabras de la memoria en muy mucho tiempo y algunas 
jamas como se pasan las que por aca entendemos" "una seguridad que nose puede 
rendir" 
95 Ibid., 122. "si son de la imaginaci6n, ninguna de estas seiials hay, ni 
certidumbre ni paz y gusto interior" 
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utterance "takes place in such intimate depths and a person with the ears of the soul 
seems to hear those words from the Lord Himself so clearly and so in secret" (VI.2.12)96 
that the soul is certain the utterance comes from God. To test against the possibility that 
the words are fabricated by faculties, these words are unexpected and about "things about 
the future that never entered the mind, and so the imagination couldn't have fabricated" 
(VI.2.13). 97 
In concordance with the descriptions distinguishing communication originated 
from the divine from human-generated language, as in the two founts of consolations and 
delights, Teresa clarifies that the word from God "comes as in the case of a person who 
hears" while "that of imagination comes as in the case of a person who graduaJly 
composes what he himself wants to be told" (VI.2.14).98 Similarly to the instant flow of 
the divine waters in the fountain of delights, divine utterances are very rich "and with one 
of them much is comprehended. Our intellect could not compose them so quickly;" they 
offer "more to understand than is ever dreamed of without words" (VI.3.15).99 Finally, 
the soul is powerless to resist the divine message: "the very spirit that speaks puts a stop 
96 Ibid., 123. "Es tan en lo fntimo del alma, y parecele tan claro ofr aquellas 
palabras con los ofdos del alma al mismo Senor y tan en secreto" 
97 Ibid., 124. "cosas que jamas tuvo acuerdo de que habfan de ser ni serfan, y asf 
no las podia haber fabricado la imaginaci6n" 
98 Ibid. "porque lo uno es como quien oye, y lo de Ia imaginaci6n es como quien 
va componiendo lo que el mismo quiere que le digan" 
99 Ibid. "y con una se comprende mucho, lo que nuestro entendimiento no podrfa 
componer tan de presto" 
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to all other thoughts and makes the soul attend to what is says" as "there are no ears to 
stop, nor is there the power to think of anything but what is said to the soul" (VI.3.18). 100 
The divine message leaves a trace in the soul; it marks it for himself. While the soul, as 
wax, was impressed with divine representation during the union in the fifth mansion, 
here, the soul is wounded by God's word, and "there is no remedy for this kind of 
locution" (VI.3.18). 101 Through this mark, through the effects of the words, "the soul sees 
clearly that another greater Lord than itself governs that castle."102 In entering itself 
through prayer, the soul has needed to part with its faculties , through which it acted in the 
world; before its marriage, it must die again as the life source of those faculties because it 
is the divine who dwells, in its very center, alone. It has had to part also with its language 
and the security of its intellect, both unable to grasp the growing intensity of divine 
communication. Teresa sees this undoing as an insignificant offering in exchange for 
God's speaking to the soul: "what nothingness it is, that which we leave! Nor is what we 
do anything, nor all that we could do for a God who thus wishes to communicate Himself 
to a worm!" (VI.4.10) .103 
100 Ibid., 125-26. "el mismo Espiritu que habla hace parar todos los otros 
pensamientos y advertir a lo que se dice," "no hay ofdos que se tapar ni poder para 
pensar sino en lo que se le dice, en ninguna manera" 
101 Ibid., 126. "Asf que en excusarlo no hay remedio ninguno" 
102 Ibid. "ve bien el alma que otro mayor Sefio gobierna aquel castillo que ella" 
103 Ibid., 130. "que no es nada lo que dejamos, ni es nada cuanto hacemos ni 
cuanto pudieremos hacer por un Dios que asf se quiere comunicar a un gusano!" 
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The soul is also granted imaginative visions, which it retains in memory as a 
sense of the experience but cannot explain it in language. Ever closer to divine marriage, 
the soul is carried off in rapture by God who "begins showing it some little part of the 
kingdom that it has gained by being espoused to him" (VI.4.9). 104 In this flight, faculties 
have no access, as they could hinder the experience; all other dwellings are closed except 
"that door to His room remains open so that we can enter."105 What the soul is able to 
render afterwards is not the fullness of the vision, but "only what God wished him to 
describe" (VI.4.7) . 106 Even if the soul sees dearly "what is in that room," once no longer 
in that state, "the soul is left with that representation 107 of the grandeurs it saw" 
(VI.4.8), 108 though its language cannot describe them, "nor do its natural powers grasp 
any more than what God wished that it see supernaturally." 109 Once the soul returns to 
itself, its faculties have been transformed, the intellect bound to "awakening the will to 
love" and the soul wishing to become fully a living representation, a sign, a word for 
104 Ibid. "Ia va mostrando alguna partecita del reino que ha ganado, por serlo" 
105 Ibid., "y solo en la que El esta queda abierta para entrambos" 
106 Ibid., 129 "sino lo que quiso Dios que dijese" 
107 Teresa's very practical analogy for what she means by 'representation' here is a 
general sense of recollection, such as one might have upon seeing many vessels filled 
with treasures in a room, retaining the cumulative sense of there having been many 
riches, but unable to describe any of them in detail (VI.4.8). 
108 Ibid., 130 "Y asf queda ... con aquel representarsele las grandeza que vio" 
109 Ibid. "mas no puede decir ninguna, ni llega su natural a mas de lo que 
sobrenatural ha querido Dios que vea" 
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God's meaning, desiring to live such that "everything here on earth would be a tongue to 
h I . . H. ,110 e p 1t prmse 1m. 
In its prayerful advance towards death in God, the soul may experience a 
powerful type of rapture, a "flight of the spirit," where it, like a straw in the wind, is 
carried off: "as easily as a huge giant snatches up a straw, this great and powerful Giant 
of ours carries away the spirit" (VI.5.2). 111 This experience appears akin to the rapture 
described above, though it is more unexpected, and the soul feels its separation from its 
senses more drastically. It also feels more immediately its own impending undoing: "the 
soul that so often ... offered everything to Him should understand that in itself it no 
longer has any part to play."112 While in spiritual delights the soul experienced the divine 
as water filling the fountain instantly and gently, here, "with a powerful impulse, a huge 
wave rises up so forcefully that it lifts high this little bark that is our sou]" (VT.5.3). 113 
The sou] feels that "the spirit truly seems to go forth from the body" and that it is 
"entirely in another region different from this in which we live" where it senses the divine 
communicating with it and it is given "without words understanding of some things" 
110 Ibid., 132. "despertar la voluntad a amar" "y que todas cuantas cosas bay en Ia 
tierra fuesen lenguas para alabarle por ella" 
111 Ibid., 134. "Y porque dije de la paja, este nuestro gran gigante y poderoso 
arrebata el espiritu" 
112 Ibid. "alma que, pues tantas ... con tan entera voluntad se Je ha ofrecido toda, 
que entienda que ya no tiene parte en si'' 
11 3 Ibid., "con un impetu grande se levanta una ola tan poderosa, que sube a lo alto 
esta navecica de nuestra alma" 
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(VI.5.7). 114 Language isn't able to assist in such an exchange and Teresa is finding her 
own language faltering as she tries to relate these events. She speaks of the mystery of 
this communication with the divine as "an admirable knowledge I will not be able to 
explain" (VI.5.8). 115 This type of experience, as have the ones in previous mansions, 
continue to facilitate the soul's knowledge of itself, though for Teresa, this is not a matter 
of personal discovery, but an occasion for humility. The more the soul understands itself, 
the more it will grow in desire for God and in the understanding of grace "on seeing that 
something as low in comparison with the Creator of so many grandeurs dared to offend 
him" (VI.5.10). 116 
The soul, however, does not feel loss at realizing that its castle is governed by 
God, or that it does not and cannot contribute to union with God with its senses and 
faculties, but it must die to them. Instead, this loss is how the soul realizes "it has found 
itself' like the prodigal son and "it sees itself in an undoubtedly safe place" (VI.6.10). 117 
The soul finds itself closer and closer to the last dwelling, where the Spouse awaits, 
having arrived this far by undoing the self, questioning language and muting 
understanding. It hasn't arrived yet, as death must precede the final encounter, and the 
114 Ibid., 136. "verdaderamente parece sale del cuerpo" "en otra region muy 
diferente de en esta que vivimos" "sin palabras se le da a entender algunas cosas" 
115 Ibid., 136. "un conocimiento admirable que yo no sabre decir" 
116 Ibid., 137. "de ver como cosa tan baja en comparacion del Criador de tantas 
grandezas, la ha osado offender" 
m Ibid., 142. "jubilos" "se ha hallado a sf" "por ver su alma en puesto que no 
puede dudar que est<i en seguridad" 
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soul must remember the humanity of Christ so as to be able to continue living in the 
world. 
For even as the soul may be on the path of the ultimate divine encounter, the 
reality of this journey of prayer is that it can only offer glimpses of the final meeting with 
God in heaven. The journey itself is a representation of the meeting with God after 
death; the soul must return from its visions and contend with its senses and faculties in 
the world. She warns her readers that "to be always withdrawn from corporeal things and 
enkindled in love is the trait of angelic spirits, not of those who live in mortal bodies" 
(VL7.6). 118 In fact, staying actively involved in the everyday and continuing good works 
"is the most sacred humanity of our Lord Jesus Christ,"119 which the soul must mirror. 
As a result of the flight of the spirit, the soul is left unable to "engage as before in 
discursive thoughts about the mysteries of the Passion and life of Christ" (VI.7.7). 120 The 
soul has been transformed by the encounter with God; having found Him, it no longer 
wishes to engage in its usual meditation, the work of the intellect, since it is the will that 
is of assistance once the soul has found God. Yet since the intellect has been impressed 
with God, and by God, in the intellectual visions, "the will often needs the help of the 
118 Ibid., 145. "porque, apartados de todo lo corp6reo, para espiritus angelicas es 
estar siempre abrasados en amor, que no para los que vivimos en cuerpo mortal" 
119 Ibid. "que es ]a sacratisima Humanidad de nuestro Senor Jesucristo" 
120 Ibid., 146. "discurrir en los misterios de la Pasion y de la vida de Cristo como 
antes" 
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intellect so as to be enkindled" (VI. 7. 7). 121 The intellect bears the memory of the 
encounter with the divine, proving of use to the soul even as "those whom God has 
brought to supernatural things and to perfect contemplation ... cannot practice ... 
discursive reflection" (VI.7.11). 122 The intellect isn't able to understand divine 
communication or reach God through its own aqueducts, but is able to receive the imprint 
of God's presence. 
To highlight further the soul's role as a dwelling place for the divine, and the 
mystery of this inner presence, Teresa offers the image of the soul as a "gold vessel" 
containing "a precious stone having the highest value and curative powers" (VI.9.2), 123 
the benefit of which is felt without being seen. The soul, also referred to as a reliquary 
for this inner jewel, knows the jewel is there; but "we do not dare look at it or open the 
reliquary, nor can we, because the manner of opening this reliquary is known solely by 
the one to whom the jewel belongs."124 In an abundance of signs frustrating any self-
reliance of the soul, Teresa describes it not only as a container for the divine, a container 
unable to see what it contains, but also without power to open itself: "even though He 
loaned us the jewel for our benefit, He has kept the key to the reliquary and will open it, 
121 Ibid. "porque muchas veces ha menester ser ayudada del entendimiento para 
encender la voluntad." 
122 Ibid., 148. "quien ha llegado a llevarla Dios a casas sobrenaturales y a peliecta 
contemplaci6n; .. .lo mas ordinaria no podra. 
123 Ibid., 156 "una pieza de oro tuviesemos una piedra preciosa de grandfsimo 
valor y virtudes" 
124 Ibid., "mas no la osamos mirar, ni abrir el relicario, ni podemos, porque Ia 
manera de abrirle solo la sabe cuya es la joya" 
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as something belonging to Him, when He desires to show us the contents, and He will 
take the jewel back when He wants to, as he does" (VI.9.2). 125 
The soul is given more access late in the sixth mansion. While in prayer "and 
very much in its senses, a suspension will suddenly be experienced in which the Lord will 
reveal deep secrets" (VI.10.2). 126 It is shown "how all things are seen in God and how 
He has them all in Himself" (VI.10.2). 127 God, Teresa explains, is not only in the soul, 
but contains the soul. This containment, while causing further humility in the soul, as it 
cannot hide, is also an affirmation of the soul as an entity worth being contained. 
The seventh mansion is the center of the soul, "the only part of the soul that is in 
an immediate union with god in the Trinity while the rest of the soul remains 'outside'." 
128 As this journey prefigures the soul's ascent to heaven, Teresa observes that "just as in 
heaven so in the soul His Majesty must have a room where He dwells alone" (VII.l.3). 129 
It is here that God will take the soul "before the spiritual marriage is consummated." 130 
If in previous encounters God had denied the soul understanding and silenced its 
125 Ib"d" 1 ' h ' d Jl ' ] d' 1 ., aunque nos a presto para que nos aprovec asemos e e a, e se que o 
con la llave y, como cosa suya, abrini cuando nos la quisiere mostrar, y aun la tamara 
cuando le parezca, como lo hace." 
126 Ibid., 163. "y muy en sus sentidos, venirle de presto una suspension, adonde le 
da el Senor a entender grandes secretos" 
127 Ibid. "como en Dios seven todas las casas y las tiene todas en sf mismo." 
128 Howells, Mystical Knowing, 114. 
129 Teresa of Avila, Interior Castle, 173. "asi como la tiene en el cielo, debe tener 
en el alma una estancia adonde solo Su Majestad mora" 
130 Ibid., "primero que se consuma el matrimonio espiritua1" 
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faculties, in this mansion "our good God now desires to remove the scales from the soul's 
eyes and let it see and understand, although in a strange ways, something of the favor He 
grants it" (VII.1.6). 131 Here, the soul is granted "a certain representation of the truth"132 
through an intellectual vision, where the soul is both united with and separate from the 
divine in this intimate meeting. The soul learns about the Trinity as "all three persons 
communicate themselves to it" regarding their dwelling "with the soul that loves Him."133 
So profound is this experience, perceived "in the extreme interior, in some place very 
deep within itself' that the soul feels "a division" where "the essential part of the soul 
never moved from that room." 134 Teresa brings soul and God closer than ever in the 
climactic moment of the mmTiage encounter: "one can say no more - insofar as can be 
understood- than that the soul, I mean the spirit, is made one with God" (VII.2.3). 135 In 
the temporal union with God "even though it is the joining of two things into one" the 
joining does not fully meld the two the way two candles can create one flame but 
"afterward the soul remains without that company" (VII.2.4). 136 In mmTiage, however, 
131 Ibid., 175. "nuestro buen Dios quitarla las escamas de los ojos y que vea y 
entienda algo de la merced que le hace, aunque es por una manera extrafia" 
132 Ib"d " . d . / d l d d" 1 ., c1erta manera e representacwn e aver a 
133 Ibid., "se le comunican todas tres Personas" "con el alma que le ama" 
134 Ibid., 175-76. "en lo interior de su alma, en lo muy muy interior, en una cosa 
muy honda" "division en su alma" "lo esencia1 de su alma jamas se movfa de aquel 
aposento." 
135 Ibid., 178. "Nose puede decir mas de que a cuanto se puede entender queda el 
alma, digo el espfritu de esta alma, hecho una cosa con Dios" 
136 Ibid., 179 "se queda e1 alma sin aquella compafifa" 
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the two become one as "when rain falls from the sky into a river or fount; all is water, for 
the rain that fell from heaven cannot be divided or separated from the water of the 
river."137 It is here that the butterfly ends its journey dying "with the greatest joy because 
its life is now Christ" (Vll.2.5). 138 The soul, having died the death of its faculties earlier, 
as the silkworm, dies anew, 139 understanding "through some secret aspirations .. . that it 
is God who gives life to our soul" and crying "0 Life of my life" (VIL2.6) 140 a cry 
Augustine has uttered in the Confessions, in a similar moment of double unsaying. 
But Teresa does allow for a restrained celebration of the body to accompany the 
elation of the soul. The soul's joy in the marriage can finally imbue the faculties. The 
body is affirmed as an aid to the soul after having been silenced for most of the soul's 
travel: "these others in the castle may enjoy the great deal the soul is enjoying and that 
from that full-flowing river, where this tiny fount is swallowed up, a spurt of that water 
will sometimes be directed toward the sustenance of those who in corporal things must 
137 Ibid. "Aca es como si cayendo agua del cielo en un rio o fuente, adonde queda 
hecho todo agua, que no podnin ya dividir ni apartar cual es el agua, del rio." 
138 Ibid. "con grandfsimo gozo, porque su vida es ya Cristo." 
139 The two deaths of the soul, as silkworm and then as butterfly follow the soul's 
becoming first Christ-like, first in relation to his humanity, and then its becoming "Christ-
like in the very union of natures in our center" in order for that center to be "permanently 
united with Christ." Edward Howells, Mystical Knowing, 109. 
140 Ibid., 179. "por unas secretas aspiraciones, ser Dios el que da vida a nuestra 
alma" "j Oh, vida de mi vida, . .. " 
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serve these two who are wed" (VII.2.6). 141 It is through the body that acts in the world 
with the assistance of the will and of the intellect that good works are possible, as "the 
Lord's words are effected in us as deeds" (VIL2. 7). 142 
The soul's agency too is restored. Much as the acting self can run against the 
wishes of the soul, the soul too can "fail by not disposing ourselves and turning away 
from all that can hinder this light" (VII.2.8). 143 For God always to "fill us with Himself," 
the soul needs always to practice "emptying ourselves of all that is creature and 
detaching ourselves from it for the love of God" (VII.2.7), 144 an apt reminder that the 
progression Teresa outlines is not a one-time event, but a persistent struggle between 
unruly faculties and the soul, and between an unruly soul and the divine. Still, divine 
marriage is not without lasting consequence and solace for the soul. A part of it, the 
spirit can stay peacefully hidden in the center, amidst trials, even given the "tumult" from 
"those other dwelling places" and the "many poisonous creatures and the noise," because 
141 Ibid., 180. "que parece quiere el Sefior que gocen de alguna manera de lo 
mucho que goza el alma, y que de aquel rfo caudaloso, adonde se consumi6 esta fontecita 
pequefia, salgan algunas veces algun golpe de aquel agua para sustentar los que en lo 
corporal han de servir a estos dos desposados." 
142 Ibid. "las palabras del Sefior son hechas como obras en nosotros" 
143 Ibid., 181. "faltamos en no disponernos y desviarnos de todo lo que puede 
embarazar esta luz" 
144 Ibid., 180. "la hade henchir de Sf" "en vaciando nosotros todo lo que es 
criatura y desasiendonos de ella por am or de Dios." 
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"no one enters that center dwelling place and makes the soul leave .. . the passions are 
now conquered and have a fear of entering the center" (VII.2.11). 145 
Teresa leaves her readers with the focus on communication, God's to the soul, 
and hers to us. Of the merits of the marriage-union, she writes that it is worth it "if there 
were no other gain in this way of prayer except to understand the particular care God has 
in communicating with us and beseeching us to remain with Him" (VIII.3.9). 146 Having 
guided the soul through this pursuit of self understanding through understanding the 
divine and having preserved the mystery of understanding between soul and God, she 
destabilizes her own account avoiding undue reliance on her language as she has done 
with the powers of the intellect "I am laughing to myself over these comparisons for they 
do not satisfy me, but I don't know any others." Yet she maintains the ability of God to 
imprint itself upon the intellect and still signify to human beings, contending that "what I 
have said is true" (VIII.2.11).147 Still, her last assessment of her own understanding in 
the Interior Castle, reminds her readers that, "my confusion is great" (VIII.4.16). 148 
Finally, Teresa's castle has managed to "draw[s] upon the clarity of the castle and 
its capacity for reflecting and refracting light within its coinciding spatial domains of 
145 Ibid., 182. "asi aca, aunque en estotras moradas anden muchas baraundas y 
fieras ponzofiosas y se oye el ruido, nadie entra en aquella que la haga guitar de allf." 
146 Ibid., 185. "cuando no hubiera otra cosa de ganancia en este camino de 
oraci6n, sino entender el particular cuidado que Dios tiene de comunicarse con nosotros y 
andarnos rogando . .. que nos estemos con El." 
147 Ibid., 182. "Riendome estoy de estas comparaciones, que no me contentan, 
mas nose otras" "ello es verdad lo que he dicho" 
148 Ibid., 194 "es haria confusion mia" 
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interior and exterior. Her soul as crystalline castle emerges as a dialectical image that 
holds, at once, inside and outside, singularity and multiplicity, materiality and 
ethereality." 149 Language is both necessary and insufficient, the body is to be overcome 
but essential for the practice of the soul's new understanding, the soul is described in 
physical terms even after it has metaphorically shed its bodily encasement. Her text 
pulsates between finitude and infinitude, with its presentation of the stages of prayer, its 
linear "aqueducts" and the glimpse, through her frequent erasures of her statements and 
through fluid metaphors that defy reification to the experience of a different, fountain-
like kind of comprehension. Her unsaying of the soul that both enters and is the castle, 
together with her own hesitance about her ability to render the interior journey, 
culminates in the divine saying, and in the soul's transformation. It also serves as a 
pe1formance that the readertakes on. Her lesson on reliance on language unduly is 
evident with every metaphorical subterfuge, useful in propelling the reader forth towards 
the final mansion, reliable in creating the experience of coexistent opposites, but slippery 
as footrests. 
149 Mary Margaret Anderson, "Thy Word in Me: On the Prayer of Union in St. 
Teresa's Interior Castle," Harvard Theological Review, 99, 3 (Jul. 2006), 335. 
186 
ConClusion 
The interior spaces depicted in the journeys of conversion serve not only to lead 
the soul from the externals inward, from the outer desert roamed by savage beasts to the 
interior lighted by the presence of the divine. The hard work of deforesting, of finding a 
trail and following it away from and then to the center serves to delineate the bounds of 
the person, to offer the traveling soul a sense of itself and its potentialities, aiding it, 
ultimately, to achieve a sense of integration. From sin to salvation, every step on these 
interior tenitories is necessary, not merely for a one-directional teleology and for the 
achievement of vittue and humility, of salvation, but to mark the tenain of the soul so 
that it may know its limits, so that it may understand its peripheries as well as its center. 
The road traveled away from the divine, the dead-ends, the inadvertent 
digressions, all the space thus discovered by the mis-oriented soul doesn't get rolled up 
like a carpet when the soul has achieved its aim, having served as a mere foil to the true 
destination, but remains mapped out, there as part of an interior geography that in itself is 
informative, grounding, salutary to self-understanding; it will be walked through again 
and again as the soul convetts and confesses, and comes to know itself fmther every time 
the journey is undertaken. The externals are already inward. 
Turning within itself towards the training of the will, the soul, depicted as a 
person traveling through its imagined interior must leave materiality, sensory perception, 
intellect and language behind. It must fully overcome itself to witness and commune with 
the eternal at its center. And it must preserve the centermost space for the divine within. 
At first, the soul struggles against a tiered, harmful, unproductive, yet relentless self-
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involvement. In the process of turning, the soul's will begins to heal, its insights grow, 
and, upon hearing the call of the divine in the heart, its ability to act according to its new 
knowledge follows. Finally, as it learns more about the divine, the soul progresses until it 
gives up even this healed will and is united with God whose unmediated communication 
it is able to glimpse. Upon conversion, the journeying soul seeks to repeat its travels in 
prayerful reenactments, for its own and others' edification. In the Confessions narrative, 
the spaces of the interior abyss and of the divine encounter, the two ends of the journey 
from outside to inside and from down to up, are only briefly, if compellingly, sketched. 
In the Inferno, the abyss recedes precisely, implacably, and in the Interior Castle, the 
soul's dwellings receive passionate, if metaphorically elusive, description. 
The perspective that emerges is that of a soul-identity shown to vibrate between 
the poles of multiplicity and unity, equally in need of both. Multiplicity is the domain of 
the externals, of acting in the world, as the theoretical models describe. It is the realm of 
the temporal, of action, of the 'outside.' As the soul in each of the three texts enters the 
landscape 'within,' it seeks to align itself to the divine will. In the Confessions and the 
Interior Castle, the soul is able to will properly after much struggle, but cannot achieve 
the ultimate return to its essence on its own. What seems to happen as the result of the 
fall, is an inability for the self to be unified, for the human person, as soul and body that 
acts in the world to be fully aligned, or for the soul as principled essence to regain full 
control over the rest of the person. For this to happen, for the soul or Subject to gain 
control over the body and faculties and their desire, Subject and Self would need to be in 
certain metaphorical relationships; for example, they would need to be in the same 
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location, the fragmented Self would need to be unified, the Subject would be able to exert 
influence over the Self moving it to where it needs to be, to keep hold of it, to possess it, 
to master it, to be 'friends' with it. 
As the narratives show, this hierarchical and spatial coherence is difficult to 
achieve. In the Confessions it may be said that the soul, the Subject, cannot exercise 
control over the Self because, in one version of the metaphorical relation, the Self has left 
the location, the region of the Subject, impeding unity. Another way to characterize the 
disunity is to observe that, in the beginning, the Subject couldn't keep possession of the 
Self, which was gripped by forces beyond the Subject's ability .to affect, or exercising an 
adversary will. The Self on the other hand, was scattered in multiplicity, incoherent with 
itself, therefore unable to be coherent with its Subject. Or, conceiving the Subject-Self 
relation in terms of social relationships, the Subject and Self are adversaries, at odds in 
their intentions. 
In the Inferno, the pilgrim himself is unified, but that unity is precarious, faltering, 
in increasing danger, and the journey serves to highlight the consequence of this interior 
disconnect as the pilgrim sees and empathizes with the escalating violence inflicted upon 
the shades and inflicted by the shades upon themselves . The dense materiality at the 
bottom can be read, in light of this metaphorical view, as a warning that the Self that 
exerted the most agency to depart from the Subject can remain without the possibility of 
ever rejoining it, can be overcome and immobilized, eternally split. 
The Interior Castle highlights the achievement of unity between Subject and Self. 
But, as the Confessions has also done, it stresses that the Subject cannot in fact gain full 
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control over the Self on its own. The divine must intervene and both texts stress this 
contingency. In relation to the entire person, God functions as a divine Subject; it can 
gain control over the human person, it can turn it, it can possess it, and it can be in 
partnership with it. And it can enable the human Subject to assert control over its Self, 
though as the texts teach, this ability must be renewed again and again. 
Noting this resonance between, on the one hand, the relational aspects of the soul 
and God in the texts' performance of an incarnational theology and, on the other hand, the 
'common-sense' dualism of the models, is not intended to draw metaphysical connections 
regarding the nature of the self. The description of Subject and Self from conceptual 
metaphor theory is just that, an observation of ordinary language phenomena and their 
distillation. Furthermore, there are many variances to the Subject I Self dichotomy, not 
all of which apply to the relationship between the pilgrim/soul and God as described in 
these texts. Rather, the usefulness of considering the expanded dualism of the models 
when encountering the description of the self and its language in the three texts is that it 
may answer in part to the texts' enduring accessibility across time; it may serve as a 
starting point from which to observe the distinct manner in which each protagonist 
pursues his or her quest for inner unity; and it may serve as well to offer enough common 
ground to the reader so that she can be drawn by the familiar to then explore the ways in 
which the texts' particular anthropologies of self may be alien. 
When rendered for the benefit of others, the interior pilgrimages are meant to 
serve as textual seeds, as guides towards the reader's own transformation. They 
themselves are both essential to the interior development of the soul and are the product 
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of such a development. The texts contain within a story about their own significance. 
They are the goading that performs the divine message and calls to the soul before it is 
able to hear the call of Christ. They can make a difference only as rungs on a ladder to 
the ultimate self-discovery once the soul is willing. They can mediate and serve as the 
vox before the soul can encounter the Verbum. They cannot undo the self-involvement 
of the soul but can aid it once the self-reflexivity is open. Existing in textual multiplicity, 
they profess the message of unity. Their multiplicity is purposeful, their temporality 
necessary. 
On their pages, these texts teach their readers to read in a productive way, not to 
Jet language close in on itself, but to look beyond it towards the expansion of their self-
understanding. As the texts perform their mediation, they instmct their readers to follow 
carefully the clues of the text; not to lose sight of the whole by becoming too involved 
with particularly poignant episodes pulling for attention; to be responsible for securing 
their own inspiration and not hold the text and its author solely accountable for the 
success of the reading experience; to actually be willing to be transformed in following 
the path of the text and not simply seek its propositional message; to enflesh the message 
and participate in a germinative reading where the text is yet again turned into 
expenence. 
In the act of reading, as Ricoeur has pointed out, the reader's work is not to 
"project the a priori of his self-understanding on the text" but rather to be "enlarged in his 
capacity of self-projection by receiving a new mode of being from the text itself." 
Interpretation is to "follow the 'arrow' of the sense" of the text and to try and "think 
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accordingly" in order to initiate self-understanding. 1 The texts' lessons resonate with 
Ricoeur's call towards overcoming the self-enclosed interpretation of language pointing 
only to language and instead opening discourse, writing, metaphor, and then entire 
textual works to the germinative possibilities of language pointing the willing to life. 
1 Paul Ricoeur, "Conclusion," Interpretation Theory, (Fort Worth: Texas Christian UP, 
1976), 94. 
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